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Abstract 
This study questions the basic assumption on which state-centred development 
has been based, namely, that it acts in the general interests of society and can 
bring about economic development, and attempts to provide an explanation of 
the ineffectiveness of the state's project in restructuring the economy by 
analysing the development of the political economy of Jordan in the wake of 
the 1973-4 oil boom. This explanation rests on arguing that the state's ability to 
intervene in the economy is constrained by the particular power configuration 
that gives it its legitimacy and the necessity to maintain the prominence, 
influence and authority of the key social forces. In other words, the 
restructuring of the economy implies a change in the internal power structures 
of the state as well as its external linkages that have been the basis of its 
legitimacy and the source of its economic power. The problem, then, is not 
merely a matter of state inefficiency and misuse of funds but a more deep-
rooted structural problem that touches on the essential features of the 
organisation of state power and its legitimacy and in that respect the state is 
not a neutral force above society but a partisan force for maintaining the 
existing power structures. Thus the concentration of capital in the hands of the 
state during the oil boom period and the expanded role of the state in the 
economy produced prosperity for the dominant social forces while 
marginalising a large part of the population and resulted in a deep rooted crisis 
in the state sector and the economy in general and called into question the 
feasibility of state-led development and required critical analysis of the role of 
the state in development. 
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Introduction 
The Purpose of the Study 
This study questions the basic assumption on which state-centred development 
has been based, namely, that the state acts in the general interests of society 
and can bring about economic development, and attempts to provide an 
explanation of the ineffectiveness of the state's project in restructuring the 
economy towards commodity producing sectors and in lessening the degree of 
its dependence on external funds, by analysing the political economy of Jordan 
in the wake of the 1973-4 oil boom. The quadrupling of the price of crude oil 
ushered in the beginning of a new phase, marked by the pre-eminence of oil, in 
the transformation of the whole regional economy. As a result, the massive 
accumulation of oil revenues unmatched with previous periods provided new 
economic opportunities and, more importantly, presented the ruling classes of 
the Arab states with a unique opportunity to consolidate their legitimacy and 
embark on a massive development project. This they did through the 
mechanism of development planning and through a remarkable increase in 
state expenditure, which augmented the power of the state and expanded its 
influence. 
Jordan was considerably affected by the new situation particularly due to the 
further emphasis put on its strategic locational significance by the Gulf states, 
as well as on its labour market which provided the much-needed skilled and 
semi-skilled labour to shortage afflicted Gulf states. Economic linkages to the 
Gulf were, subsequently, extended and intensified to the level where they in 
effect determined the pace and pattern of Jordan's development, 
simultaneously increasing the dependence of local capital on state resources 
and state expenditure programmes, which were themselves predicated on the 
continuity of the state to serve as an important pillar for the stability and 
security of the Gulf. Thus, the prosperity of key economic groups and the 
widening of the spectrum of benefiting social groups, as well as the improved 
living standards and acceleration of social mobility engendered by the 
expanded state's economic power proved to be of a transient nature, since 
these changes resulted from the circulation and accumulation of externally 
derived funds concentrated in services and commercial activities without 
expanding the domestic productive base. The economy and the prosperous 
classes and social groups were extremely vulnerable to changes in the level of 
state expenditure and the regional economic environment, as exemplified by 
Jordan's economic crisis since the early 1980's. 
Significantly, this crisis coincided with the slowdown in the regional oil 
economy, which by 1985-6 had resulted in the reduction of the oil revenues of 
Saudi Arabia, the major Arab producer, to less than one-fifth of their peak 
during 1981-2. This meant that the large capital inflow of grant aid receipts and 
labour remittances had significantly dropped, exposing the myth of the decade 
of 'prosperity' and highlighting the substantial dependence of the state and 
society on the Gulf states. Although the signs of the crisis started as early as 
1983 the deciding downturn of the Jordanian economy did not take place until 
mid 1989 -the state was able to sustain its expenditure levels and to artificially 
maintain the economy via a huge expansion in loan capital - as indicated by the 
sudden and sharp devaluation of the domestic currency, the dinar, as well as 
the IMF imposition of a structural adjustment programme aiming at 
rescheduling Jordan's debt and imposing a strict regime on public sector 
expenditure. 
The economic crisis, therefore, posed a serious question concerning the actual 
impact of the 1970s on the process of development and a more general one 
concerning the effectiveness of state-sponsored development. The economy 
at the end of this period stood in sharp contrast to the state's claimed 
objectives and goals of restructuring the economy towards more productive 
activities and towards lessening its degree of dependence on external 
resources. This is by no means a question exclusive to Jordan, but one that 
has been echoing in other states in the region and many 'developing' societies. 
The crisis of the state, both an economic crisis and a political one, in 
'developing' societies came after four decades of nationally and internationally 
sponsored development effort and, in the Arab region, after the oil boom and 
the abundance of resources to fund extensive state development programmes 
in the Gulf and the rest of the region. Thus one of the significant outcomes of 
the 1973-83 period for Jordan, as for other states in the region, lies in stressing 
the need to understand the state's role and its limitations, as well as exposing 
the inadequacy of the availability of financial resources to create an internally 
sustained development. 
This need is further highlighted by the kind of response this crisis prompted 
encouraged by the West and international institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank: namely, a move away from the state and an adoption of a 
'privatisation' strategy with the aim of shrinking the state sector and 
concentrating on the stimulation of the private sector, and most significantly the 
drive for political 'liberalisation' and 'democratisation'. Thus the core of the 
problem, that is the internal and external power structures underpinning the 
crisis of the state, is completely ignored and the crisis is simply attributed to an 
inefficient and large state sector and huge state expenditure programmes, as 
well as to the inefficiency and corruption of state bourgeoisie and/or to the 
prevalence of repressive undemocratic regimes. And while stringent structural 
adjustment policies will marginalise the bulk of the population, 'democratisation' 
will provide the semblance of democracy behind which the prevalent private 
economic interests and the existing power structures will be protected through 
parliamentary legitimacy. 
Moreover, this response, besides ignoring the core problem, is in itself 
problematic. On the one hand, the shrinking of the state sector and 
'privatisation' undermine the basis on which the increasing legitimacy of the 
Jordanian state and its stability has been based: primarily its ability to expend 
and to employ, providing a livelihood to increasing numbers of people, 
especially the 'new' petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the opening up of 
the channels of political expression, especially given the persistence of the dire 
economic situation, will make it more and more difficult to allow the 
development of democratic institutions which are capable of influencing the 
decision-making process. This dilemma explains the concern relayed by the 
American administration to Jordan's ambassador in the US about the speed of 
'democratisation', implying the need to slow down the process, in addition to 
the West's reluctance to make democracy an issue in states such as Israel and 
Saudi Arabia where its economic or strategic interests override any other 
concern. More importantly, it explains why four years into this 'democratic' 
experience, (i.e. four years after the General Election of November 1989, the 
first in twenty-two years), and on the verge of its entering into the second full 
parliamentary elections in November 1993, no real change has actually 
occurred in Jordan, irrespective of measures such as the lifting the ban on the 
formation of political parties and the freezing of martial law, and irrespective of 
King Hussein's claim prior to the November 1989 election that: 
the next parliament will not serve as a forum for making political 
statements but rather as a national institute in which we will all take 
part in formulating the country's policies ... in the coming stage we 
will not suffice ourselves with mere slogans but will embark on 
objective and responsible dialogue. (The Independent 9 October: 
1989) 
The balance of power between the executive and the legislature is still held by 
the executive, in particular, by the king, who still appoints the prime minister 
and sanctions the rest of the ministerial posts, and convenes and dissolves 
parliament. In addition parliament has had little effect on government policies 
and programmes, most important among them has been the IMF programme 
as well as the peace talks with Israel. Deputies are encouraged to maintain the 
tradition of making rhetorical political statements with no influence on political 
events and outcomes or on the government's economic policies. Most 
indicative of the ability of the state to control and manipulate this process was 
the trial of Leith Shbailat, one of the most popular and outspoken members of 
the parliament and a strong advocator of democracy since the 1970s. The trial 
was a political show which asserted both the forces of the ruling class such as 
the Mukhabarat, or the secret police, and the authority of the ruling class, 
exemplified foremost by King Hussein's pardoning the accusers after the 
state's security court had found them guilty - Shbailat was given a death 
sentence. Yet the trial achieved its objective of tarring the Islamist members of 
the parliament in particular Shbailat himself, in an attempt to marginalise them 
prior to the next elections (in November 1993). 
Other significant indications of the contradictory nature of the process are the 
Law of Party Formation no (33) 1992 and the Law of Printed Material no (10) 
1993. According to the law relating to parties, the Ministry of the Interior and 
the cabinet exert immense powers to grant or withhold licences to/from political 
parties or to dissolve them, while the law of printed material is more reactionary 
and restrictive than its predecessor, to say nothing of the election law, which is 
still guided by the need to manipulate societies' cleavages and to control the 
outcome of elections through the distribution of seats and through appealing to 
traditional forms of affiliation. Even the present attempt to amend the election 
law (prior to the 1993 elections) is fraught with implications that the law is being 
manipulated to ensure a marginal victory to the Islamic trend and give better 
chances for the traditional 6lite. This has prompted a heated debate in the 
intellectual quarters of Amman and in the media concerning the implications of 
the proposed amendment to stipulate the principle of 'one electorate, one vote', 
as opposed to the existing principle where an electorate can vote for more than 
one candidate within the electoral district. To many in Jordan, this is a 
consolidation of the appeal to the electorates on the basis of primary 
affiliations, allowing candidates the possibility of participating in Parliament with 
a minimum number of votes. More significantly is the fact that the executive 
has proposed the amendment by invoking its right according to article (91) of 
the constitution to promulgate temporary laws with the kings' approval. This is 
most indicative of the marginal role imposed on the legislative and the 
government ability to control the very process of 'democratisation'. 
The success of the democratic experience in Jordan, as in other 'developing' 
societies, depends on bringing about change in the existing power structures, 
change which will undermine the prevalent economic interests, not to mention 
the Hashemite family's own authority and control. More significantly, this will 
contrast with IMF and World Bank policies and the policies of Western 
governments for preserving the status quo in the region. The Gulf War, the 
continuous threats to Iraq and the tolerance of repressive authoritarian regimes 
in the region exemplify the intent of Western powers to maintain their 
domination through protecting their proteges in the area. With the elimination 
of a counter power to the United States and Western Europe, the region is 
more open to domination by the needs of international capital and the West, 
and much more vulnerable. As long as these 'democratic' experiences do not 
threaten the interests of international capital as well as the existing domestic 
economic interests, and consequently they are of no use to the people of the 
region, they will be tolerated and encouraged. Thus the discussion of the 
state's role is not only important in terms of providing analysis of and 
information about a past period, but illuminates some of the difficulties attached 
to the present situation and emphasises the structural features of the crisis of 
the state. 
The Main Argument of the Study 
The study will argue that the state's ability to restructure the economy towards 
commodity producing sectors and to lessen its degree of dependence on 
external resources is constrained by the particular power configuration that 
gives it its legitimacy, since such a change will affect the prominence of the key 
social forces and compromise their influence and authority. In other words, the 
restructuring of the economy implies a change in the internal power structures 
of the state as well as its external linkages that have been the basis of its 
legitimacy and the source of its economic power. The problem, then, is not 
merely a matter of state inefficiency and misuse of funds but a more deep-
rooted structural problem that touches on the essential features of the 
organisation of state power and its legitimacy and in that respect the state is 
not a neutral force above society but a partisan force for maintaining the 
existing power structures. This argument will be substantiated by elucidating 
the following: 
1. Oil capital gave the ruling class, made up of the Hashemite family, the 
commercial bourgeoisie, the state bourgeoisie and the landed class, a 
chance to strengthen its position and increase its wealth, through the new 
opportunities created in economy, particularly, as a result of the expansion 
of the state domain. 
2. The broadening of the state's economic role, through expansion of its 
'developmental' role in particular, provided the channel and the mechanism 
for dispensing the huge funds in order to augment the prosperity of the 
ruling class, while enhancing stability by tying increasing segments of the 
population to the state, hence the 'new' petty bourgeois character of the 
state. 
3. The expansion of the state's 'developmental' role was accompanied by a 
huge increase in income disparities and the marginalisation of a large 
segment of the population which increased social differentiation and 
increased the polarisation of the society: a development that stands in 
sharp contrast to state's assumed role of improving the lot of the populace. 
4. The political-ideological legitimacy of the ruling class continued to be based 
on primary sub-statal affiliations, rather than on an individual formal basis. 
Social affiliation of the tribe - despite its declining significance as an 
overriding identity - family, ethnicity and religion continued to be the 
dominant forms in which societal conflicts were expressed as well as 
manipulated to the advantage of the ruling class. The significant 
implication of this is that social classes and social groupings are fractured 
along these lines, limiting the ability of any to challenge the hegemony of 
the ruling class, or of any part of the ruling class alliance to challenge the 
Hashemites. Moreover, this masks the real contradictions in society and 
relegates to the background class interests or economic interests. 
5. The dominance of the state's political structures which controlled and 
suppressed the development of democratic institutions, and permeated the 
private domain and infringed on individual civil rights and freedoms, was 
part of the state's role of protecting and maintaining the dominance of the 
ruling class. Formal institutionalised social relations remained absent, 
instead the traditional networks of affiliation and the patronage system of 
social relations permeated the whole society. 
The Objectives of the Study 
The study has four major objectives. These are the following: 
1. To elucidate the objective structural determinants of the state's role in the 
development process, being foremost influenced and determined by the 
need to maintain the dominance of the ruling class and how this limits the 
actions and policies of the state. 
2. To disclose the limitations and problems of this critical period in the 
development of the country, especially since many development 'experts' 
and government officials seem to view this period as a success story in 
terms of development and growth. 
3. To contribute to the current debate on the role of the state in 'developing' 
societies by studying the concrete case of Jordan. 
4. To fill a gap in the literature covering this period from a political economy 
perspective, simultaneously providing an insight into the present problems 
facing Jordan in both the political and economic domains. 
The Scope of the Study 
The study consists of six chapters. Chapter one suggests a conceptual 
approach by which to elucidate the structural constraints of the state's role and 
one which underpins the analysis of the study. For this purpose a review of 
some of the literature that discusses the role of the state is provided, focusing 
on the pluralist and conflict paradigms, in addition to the two recent strains of 
thought that have emerged on the state in Arab society, namely the 'rentier' 
approach and Al-Naqeeb's work on the Gulf. The adopted conceptual 
approach rejects the pluralist contentions as well as the 'rentier' and Al-
Naqeeb's approaches. Instead, a frame of reference, based on a general 
understanding of the conflict paradigm, is presented which consists of three 
major concepts: the centrality of the state, the social foundation of the state 
and the relative autonomy of the state. These concepts are useful for two main 
reasons: first, they help to eliminate the common assumption about the 
particularity of the state in the Arab world; and secondly, they will elucidate the 
fact that however powerful the state may be, its scope for action and its policies 
are constrained by the web of economic interests that gives it its legitimacy. 
Chapter two provides a critique of the existing state of accounts of Jordan, and 
highlights their limitations, especially the lack of an account of the political 
economy of Jordan, in addition to the absence of studies on the 1970's boom 
era. The discussion will focus on four major themes prevalent in the accounts 
under consideration: the formative years; Jordan and the Palestinian issue; the 
role of Jordan in a peace settlement; and the economic development of Jordan. 
Chapter three intends to overcome the limitation of the extant literature and 
attempts to provide an alternative and critical account of the political economy 
of Jordan, from the inception of the state up until 1973, with special emphasis 
on the organisation of state power and the building of the legitimacy of the 
ruling class. This aims not at providing a historical background, but rather at 
delineating the contours of the political economy of Jordan, in order to provide 
the context that will make the study of the oil boom period more 
understandable, especially from the point of view of clarifying the formation of 
Jordanian ruling class and to present a picture of the development of the class 
structure of the society. 
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Chapters four, five and six deal with the core task of this study, basically to 
show how the state, irrespective of the increased resources at its disposal and 
its increased intervention in the economy, was unable to achieve the project it 
took upon itself through 'development' planning aimed at restructuring the 
economy and producing development that enhances the livelihood of the bulk 
of the population. Instead, it enhanced the legitimacy of the ruling class and 
expanded its accumulative fund, while maintaining stability by widening the 
benefits accruing to the 'new' petty bourgeoisie. Thus the study will show that, 
the state cannot evade the particular configuration of its power base which 
provides its legitimacy and makes it enduring; and that the conditions of 
societal reproduction continued to be dependent on the state within a 
framework of dependence on external linkages that accentuated the 
contradictions and problems associated with the development process. 
Chapter four will focus on discussing the state's enhanced economic power, 
and in particular the expansion of its 'development' role and 'development' 
structures, which have been underpinned by the unprecedented levels of 
capital influx from the Gulf. The first section examines the increased level of 
grant capital and loan capital as well as migrant labour remittances. The 
second section focuses on assessing the mechanism of 'development' planning 
and the broadening of the state's 'development' structures emphasising in 
particular the significance of these structures as the most appropriate means of 
dispensing the oil capital and of distributing benefits to vested economic 
interests, in other words means by which to nurture and promote private sector 
interests while maintaining their dependence upon and subordinate position to 
the state. 
Chapter five discusses the relationship between the state's development role 
and class interests and highlights the fact that the state acts within a web of 
economic interests, that it cannot escape, via illustrating the different effects 
that the state's 'development' role have had on the Jordanian society. It will 
show clearly how state involvement in the economy has strengthened existing 
economic interests primarily in commercial and service-oriented activities, and, 
most significantly, consolidated the alliance between the state bourgeoisie and 
the propertied class, who have become increasing enmeshed. Additionally the 
chapter shows how the stability of the 1970s and the enhanced legitimacy of 
the ruling class depended on widening the spectrum of benefiting social 
groups, in particular, the 'new' petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the 
'prosperity' era produced increasing income disparities which will be highlighted 
via discussion of those social groups and classes that have become 
increasingly marginalised. 
Chapter six aims to emphasise further the fact that the state is constrained in 
its action by its internal power structures via highlighting that just as the state's 
economic structures and development agencies dominated the economy, to 
the same degree, state's political structures maintained control over society, 
increasingly encroaching into the private domain. This has been reflected in 
the undermining of the development of formal and institutionalised social 
relations and the suppression of individuals' civil rights and freedoms, and the 
dominance of traditional primary affiliations and their formalisation through 
state political structures. By maintaining this power over society the state was 
able to contain and marginalise political demands for more freedoms and 
democracy, and the social discontent and resentments that accompanied rapid 
economic growth and the widening of income disparities. In this context, the 
discussion concerning the cabinet, the legislature (the creation of the National 
Consultative Council and the revival of the parliament) and the security and 
military apparatus aims to manifest the maintenance of the subordination of 
society to the state. 
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Chapter One 
The State's Role in Development: A Critical Conceptual 
Approach 
The first undertaking of the study concerns the delineation of a conceptual 
frame of reference on which the state's role and its limitation and/or inability to 
produce development can be elucidated and analysed. For that purpose a 
discussion of some of the literature that examines the state is warranted. This 
literature falls predominantly along the major schism of the conventional and 
critical approach, within which a variety of themes exist. From among these 
the focus will be on the Pluralist and Conflict paradigms whose basic difference 
is the pluralist viewing of society from a harmonious conception of diversity and 
multiplicity of interests and social groups, rejecting ail claims that state power 
has a class basis, while the conflict proponents see state power as having a 
class base, hence society is conflictual divided across a major line of ruled and 
ruling, most importantly the ruling class power is rooted in a material base, in 
other words in its dominant economic position. These divergent paradigms will 
be examined in some detail with emphasis on the Conflict perspective. 
Moreover, recently two important strains of thought on the state in Arab 
societies have emerged, namely, the 'rentier' approach and Al-Naqeebs' work 
on the Gulf; these will be considered also. Based on this review the suggested 
conceptual frame of reference rejects the pluralist view as well as the rentier 
and Al-Naqeebs' approaches. Instead, it will be based on a general 
understanding and appreciation for the conflict view emphasising the fact that 
state is not an 'honest' broker, nor above society, however powerful it may 
appear, but limited and constrained by the dominant social force in the society 
that gives it its legitimacy and rationale to exist. 
The Pluralist Paradigm 
The premise of the pluralist perspective in conceptualising state, power and 
society is embodied in the Western tradition of perceiving society as a 
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multitude of overlapping groups with a variety of competing interests, 
economic, religious, ethnic, professional, etc. Power in this conception is 
derived from the Weberian notion of it being the 'chance of a man or of a 
number of men to realise their own will in a communal action against the 
resistance of others' (Held 1989: 57). Hence, proponents of pluralism reduce 
power to an ability to achieve one's aims, and this opportunity is equally open 
to everyone. It follows that the state is: 
an entity that stands outside and above society, an autonomous 
agency that is invested (potentially) with an independent source of 
rationality (enriched by the 'technical assistance' from metropolitan 
countries), and the capability to initiate and pursue programs of 
development for the benefit of the whole society. (Alavi 1989:289) 
The state as 'honest broker' takes account of the different sections of society, 
mediating between various groups, ensuring that all of them have some 
influence on government policy while allowing none to dominate (Haralambos 
and Holborn 1991: 126). It is this diversity of interests competing for power 
that is seen as the source of democratic equilibrium and generally favourable 
policy formulations. It follows that political parties, interest groups and group 
associations, etc., are essential instruments via which individuals vocalise and 
press for sectional social interests. This conceptualisation of a complementary 
and harmonious societal existence has been heavily criticised as a result of the 
stark empirical evidence of ever-increasing differentiation and the obvious 
discrepancies in the ability of the various groups in society to influence the 
decision-making process, in addition to the increased concentration of 
economic and political power in the state. This has prompted the emergence 
of an alternative version, namely the Elitist y\ew. 
This view recognises that state power is monopolised by a small minority, and 
defines this minority as those who hold command posts in key institutions such 
as the government, the military and civil apparatus, as well as parliament, 
company directors, etc., thereby, it acknowledges that society is divided into 
two groups: a ruling minority who exercise power through the state and a ruled 
majority. However, the diversion of interests of these two groups creates only 
the potential for conflict, since it assumes the masses to be passive and 
controlled by the manipulation and management of the elite, while the unity and 
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cohesiveness of the power 6lite is achieved through the sharing of similar 
social backgrounds, educational and value systems, in addition to the 
overlapping of personnel in key positions. Thus, the challenge of the elitist 
view to the traditional pluralist perception, through its recognition of the 
existence of a ruling minority and a ruled majority, is undermined by these two 
premises; the basing of the power of the ruling elite on its occupation of 
command positions and its insistence on the continued existence of societal 
equilibrium despite the presence of divergent interests (ibid.: 135-144). 
Other variations of the elitist view have emerged, following the pressure to 
explain the evident lack of equal opportunity for all social forces to participate 
and to influence the decision-making process, especially with the increasing 
presence of powerful monopolies, cartels and state intervention, such as the 
technocratic and the corporatist views. The technocratic view has been 
defined as 'a political system in which the determining influence belongs to the 
technicians of the administration and of the economy' (Etzioni 1985: 54). In 
contrast to the pluralist vision of fragmented and diversified interest groups, this 
view recognises the problem of the increasing concentration of economic 
power and bureaucratic power; thus it partly accounts for developments within 
advanced capitalist societies of an ever-greater need for qualified technical 
personnel and highly specialised people to run both the economy and state 
institutions. However, and, as indicated by Giddens, power stemming from 
knowledge is an oversimplification and functional indispensability is not a 
source a power (ibid.: 61). 
Societal corporatism is a recent development stemming from the original 
concept which concentrated on explaining situations in which the state 
dominates the corporatist groups through repressive means such as in the 
fascist states of Germany and Italy. In its new focus on society, corporatism is 
defined as 'an institutional arrangement whereby public policy is worked out 
through an interaction between top state elites and the leadership of a limited 
number of powerful corporate organisations' (ibid.: 63). Hence, it basically 
envisages a tripartite power core composed of representatives of the most 
powerful interest groups: top state position holders, corporate organisations 
and trade unions, recognising that diverse interests in society are not 
expressed on a voluntary and competitive basis but through hierarchical 
institutional set-ups of state and society. Although this view acknowledges that 
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this particular institutional arrangement of a limited number of the top 
leadership of state and society is necessary in order to enforce and reproduce 
the domination of the capitalist class, it still holds that competitive interests 
result in state policies that maintains equilibrium with no possible shifts towards 
either capital or labour. Corporatism has been, thus, appropriately described 
as a 'synthesis' drawing upon essential concepts of the conflict and pluralist 
paradigms (Held 1989: 66) in its attempt to challenge both. 
Before concluding the discussion of this section it is important to note that the 
modernisation theory, which prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, as the 
dominant analytical paradigm for understanding and guiding the development 
of 'developing' societies, derived its implicit assumptions of the state from 
pluralistic conceptualisation. Proponents of modernisation saw the state as 
divorced from any particular interests; representing the general interest of 
society, hence it is capable of bringing about development through policies and 
programmes which are directly aimed at achieving growth and whose effects 
will benefit everyone and/or 'trickle down' to them. Subsequently arose the 
emphasis on development planning and its adoption since the 1950s, under 
the guidance of international institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and 
the IMF, not to mention Western governments' agencies (most prominent 
among them USAID), in addition to the encouragement given to the production 
of development plans and the creation of development-oriented institutions in 
the 'Third World'. 
Naturally the West provided the model to be ameliorated, and 'developing' 
societies need only to overcome some crucial missing ingredients required for 
economic development, identified as capital, technology and expertise or 
innovative entrepreneurial skills. And these will be channelled and diffused by 
the international institutions and Western governmental agencies to foster 
progress in the 'developing' societies. The experience of the past four decades 
of state and internationally sponsored development attests to the utter failure of 
this approach to improve the lot of the people of the 'developing' world. In 
effect their situation has been made worsened, hence, undermining the 
assumption that the state can act in the general interest of society. This brings 
us to the conflict perspective within which the problematic of state and power 
and relation to the process of socio-economic change will be given a different 
dimension. 
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The Conflict Paradigm 
In contrast to pluralist interpretations the essential premise of the conflict 
proponents is the paradoxical and antagonistic relation between capital and 
labour and the central role the state plays in maintaining suitable conditions for 
profit realisation, and also maintaining legitimacy, in other words maintaining 
the hegemony of the dominant social force in society. Hence the social 
foundation of state power is crucial for any understanding of the dynamics of 
the state and its institutions and society and its private sphere. Recently a 
vigorous debate has emerged within this perspective and theoretical 
differences to the two major interrelated questions of why and how the state 
ensures the hegemony of the ruling capitalist class (Gold et al. 1975: 31-2). 
Some of the difficulties associated with such an attempt stem from the absence 
in classical Marxist writings of a developed theory of the state and its relation to 
society, in contrast to the extensive and detailed analysis of capital and the 
economic base, and as a result a number of approaches exist. 
Bob Jessop has delineated six different approaches which involve different 
theoretical assumptions, principles of explanation and political implication. 
Marx, initially, saw the state as a parasitic institution that played no significant 
role in economic production or reproduction. State and its officials rather than 
represent the common interests of the bourgeoisie tend to exploit and oppress 
civil society on behalf of particular sectional interests, hence the state becomes 
the private domain of officials for their self advancement. The second view is 
also part of Marx early writings where he treats the state as an 
epiphenomenon: a mere reflection of the economic base. Hence the exercise 
of power is seen as a surface reflection of the economic struggle, and although 
the state can hinder or accelerate economic development, the forces of 
production are always determinant. The third view, that of Engels-Lenin, saw 
the state as a factor of cohesion, regulating the struggle between antagonistic 
classes through repression and concession, thus mediating class struggle 
without undermining the continued domination of the ruling class. The fourth is 
the Marx-Lenin view of the state as the instrument of class rule. This 
conception contains several problems, one of which is how to account to the 
variant state forms such as the absolutist state, where the dominant class does 
not have immediate control over the state. The classic example is of France 
under Bonaparte. The fifth is Engels-Lenin perception of the state as a set of 
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institutions with no reference to its class character, implying that it cannot be 
determined a priori but depends on the relationship between its institutional 
structures and class struggle in different circumstances. Finally, there is the 
Marx-Engels-Lenin view of the state as a system of political domination which 
focuses attention on the forms of the state, its intervention and adequacy for 
securing a balance of class forces in the interest of a dominant class (Jessop 
1977: 354-7). From this diversity of views of the state Jessop concludes that: 
nowhere in the Marxist classics do we find a well formulated, 
coherent and sustained theoretical analysis of the state. This is not 
to deny that they offer a series of acute historical generalisations 
and political insights nor, indeed that they lay the foundations for a 
more rigorous analysis, (ibid.: 357) 
Nevertheless, of these themes, the economic deterministic interpretation, which 
reduces the state to a mere reflection of the economic base, denying it any 
autonomous role, has until late 1960s dominated readings of Marx and Marxist 
thinking. The Stalinist era helped considerably in bringing about the 
dominance of this reading and prevented the emergence of a much-needed 
debate. 
At the end of the 1960s, with the worsened or unchanged position of 
'developing' societies and with a crisis in the advanced capitalist state, two 
simultaneous developments occurred that affected the approach taken towards 
development and the debate on the state. The first was the emergence of the 
dependency theory, which contributed significantly to challenging the 
dominance of the modernisation perspective, by shifting the focus away from 
the internal constraints of development and/or the missing ingredients of 
economic growth as posited by modernisation proponents, to the global 
capitalist economy, stressing the interlocking relationship between what it 
termed the periphery and the metropolis. This relationship has been perceived 
as sharply constraining and determining the options available to 'developing' 
societies. Moreover, it has underdeweloped the periphery so the question is 
not merely of 'backwardness' or undevelopment, hence the virtual impossibility 
of development as long as the periphery-metropolis relation is maintained 
(Weisband 1989: 120). This overemphasising of the influence of international 
economic forces and neglect of the internal character of peripheral capitalist 
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societies has led to heavy criticism of this approach, especially for 'portraying 
economic development as if the periphery were no more than an analytical 
phantom of the core' (ibid.: 136). 
The second development has been a general revival in Marxist thought after 
the long period of stagnation stimulating a vigorous debate on the state. This 
further undermined Western liberal conceptualisation, and produced a 
proliferation of writings broadly divided into two approaches as presented 
below: 
The Society-Centred Approach 
Within this approach two major themes prevail: the instrumentalist and the 
structuralist. Beginning with the instrumentalist interpretation attention should 
be given to Ralph Miliband, whose book State in Capitalist Society stimulated 
the well-known Miliband-Poulantzas debate. Miliband was primary concerned 
with countervailing the pluralist democratic view as well as with elucidating the 
real features of the state in a capitalist society - to show in other words that the 
state is not an 'honest broker', a neutral force on which competing interests act 
with equal chances, but is 'above all the coercive instrument of the ruling class, 
itself defined in terms of its ownership and control of means of production' 
(Miliband 1973 [1969]: 7). 
Miliband in effect expands on Marx's idea of the state as 'the executive of the 
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie and political power is merely the organised power of one class 
oppressing another' (Marx 1973: 35). Consequently, his analysis proceeds 
along the lines of showing foremost that an economically dominant class exists, 
which the pluralists deny vehemently, and moreover that it exercises greater 
power and influence than any other class; that is, decisive power lies in its 
hands. The interrelationship of the economically dominant force with the state 
is manifested by the presence of a significant number of businessmen in the 
upper echelon of the state, running the command positions of the state. 
Miliband accepts the contemporary differentiation made by Marxists between 
the governing elite and the ruling class in terms of the former managing and 
running the daily affairs of the state and the latter holding the decisive power 
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which constrains the political process and determines how it will run and in 
whose interests (Etzioni 1985: 74-5). Yet this is offset by his emphasis on the 
paramount importance of the social origins of the governing class, proving that 
it is connected to the capitalist class, and that state officials are drawn 
predominantly from the upper and middle classes. That is what affects their 
outlook, ideological inclinations and political bias. Accordingly, 
the "bias of the system" may be given a greater or lesser degree of 
emphasis. But the ideological dispositions of governments have 
generally been of a kind to make more acceptable to them the 
structural constraints imposed upon them by the system; and these 
dispositions have also made it easier for them to submit to the 
pressures to which they have been subjected by dominant interests'. 
(Miliband 1973 [1969]: 73) 
Amidst the diversity of political views and public policies and the programmes 
of successive governments and political parties there is then fundamental 
agreement on ' "the foundation of society", meaning above all the existing 
economic and social system of private ownership and private appropriation' 
(ibid.: 64). This acceptance affects the range of policies and actions that 
governments will take, although they do not see themselves as partial to a 
particular class, but rather as classless, concerned with national interest 
serving the nation above all, since the national interest is identified with a 
thriving capitalist enterprise (cp. John Major's 'classless society'). Yet the 
actual intervention of the state aims to redress the contradictions and 
imbalances between labour and capital in the interests of the private enterprise 
via a governing 6lite identified with the capitalist class. 
Poulantzas recognised the significance of Miliband's argument in challenging 
the dominance of bourgeois thought on state and political power, but he was 
extremely critical about the methodology used by Miliband, which he saw as 
giving rise to two problems. The first is that, by refuting bourgeois thought by 
means of bourgeois concepts and principles, one undermines the 
epistemological principles of Marxism, especially that a distinct theory on the 
state is absent. Secondly, employing bourgeois concepts reduces 
conceptualisation of social classes and actors, and of social relations and the 
state to a subjective, personal level, without illuminating the objective structures 
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that determine social classes and their contradictions (Poulantzas 1969: 67-
71). Thus, Poulantzas emphasises that the relation of state and ruling class is 
an objective relation and correspondingly, if 
the function of the state in a determinate social formation and the 
interests of the dominant class in this formation coincide it is by 
reason of the system itself; the direct participation of members of the 
ruling class in the state apparatus is not the cause but the effect, 
and moreover a chance and contingent one, of this objective 
coincidence. (Poulantzas 1973:245) 
It follows that the functions of the state are not determined by those that 
occupy state power positions, but structurally determined and that the 
participation of the ruling class in government 'in no way changes things'. Marx 
emphasised that ruling class interests are in effect best served when the ruling 
class is not the politically governing class. Bonaparte is the classic example of 
this, as is Bismarck in Germany (Pouiantzas 1969: 73). It is the structures of 
society and the contradictions rooted in the economy that necessitate the 
intervention of the state in order to control and neutralise them to reproduce the 
whole system. The ways in which the state carries out that function depend on 
the level of development and the forms of class struggle (Gold et al. 1975: 36). 
That is why capitalism can produce diverse forms of the state at different times 
in history, such as arose under Bonaparte, Bismarck, Hitler, and Mussolini. 
Miliband and Poulantzas differ also on the 'relative autonomy' of the state, a 
concept central and important in Poulantzas's thought, and one which became 
very important for the whole debate about the state. Miliband accounts for it 
only in extreme cases of fascism, since 'if one locates the relationship between 
the state and the ruling class in the social origins of members of the state 
apparatus and their interpersonal-relations with the members of this class, so 
that the bourgeoisie almost physically 'corners' the state apparatus, one can 
not account for the relative autonomy of the state with respect to this class' 
(Poulantzas 1969: 74). For Poulantzas, it is only through its relatively 
autonomous role that the state can organise the hegemony of the whole 
capitalist class. In particular, the state is autonomous from the manipulations 
by specific capitalist class interests, but that does not mean that the state is 
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autonomous in any real sense from the structural requirements of the economy 
(Gold etal. 1975:38). 
An important reference point to Poulantzas's work and his emphasis upon the 
'relative autonomy' concept has been Marx's analysis in The Eighteenth 
Brumaire. In discussing Bonaparte rise to power, Marx elucidated the 
complexity of the relation between state and society, clearly granting the state 
an autonomous role. The Bonapartist state, however independent it appeared 
from society and from all social forces and despite its claim of representing all 
classes, enforced and guaranteed the rule of the bourgeois class. To 
emphasise this Marx designated the Bonapartist state as the religion of 
bourgeois rule, that is characteristic of all forms of the capitalist state 
(Poulantzas 1969: 74). This underlines two important things: that the state's 
autonomy is real and necessary and that this autonomy is relative. The state 
'is not suspended in mid air'; its autonomous role is contingent on 
developments of the society and on class antagonisms (Marx 1954: [1934] 
108). 
Bonaparte's 'executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military 
organisation, with its extensive and artificial state machinery, with a host of 
officials numbering half a million, besides an army of another half million' could 
not detach itself from society, in particular from those who had economic power 
(ibid.: 107). Although Bonaparte's rise to absolute power was directly linked to 
his close association with the peasantry and lumpen-proletariat, he 
safeguarded bourgeois order and bourgeois economic interests. By usurping 
political power Bonaparte had actually delivered the bourgeoisie from the 
danger of its own rule, that is, the collapsing coalition of the two factions of 
capital, the financial and industrial capitalists, in addition to the threat of the 
other classes, in particular the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and the 
peasantry. Therefore the bourgeoisie, in order to preserve its social power in 
act, denounced its political power, facilitated the downfall of the parliament and 
applauded the dictatorship of Bonaparte. 
Despite the significant differences between the two representative writers of 
instrumentalism and structuralism both views see the state as embedded in 
society. Poulantzas stresses the structural determinism of capital which leads 
the state to protect the framework of capitalist production, while Miliband 
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stresses the role of class forces where the state is an instrument for the 
domination of the capitalist class. In other words one sees a capitalist state 
and the other the state in a capitalist society. 
The State-Centred Approach 
The state-centred or neo-Weberian approach will be discussed via a focus on 
the work of Evans, Reueschemyer and Skocpol Bringing the State Sac/c In, 
since they present their approach as an alternative to the prevailing paradigms 
especially of the Marxists' interpretation and methodology. They view Marxism 
as unwilling to grant the state any true autonomy and maintains that its 
discussions have been carried out at a theoretical level, claiming to be 
universally applicable to all capitalist states (Evans etal. 1985: 6-7, 350). 
In contrast, they adopt an empirical-comparative approach examining various 
states and situations to reveal the circumstances under which states are likely 
to pursue autonomous goals (i.e. be actors in their own right) and the 
conditions under which they are likely to be successful in such pursuits (ibid.: 
351). The problem with this statist approach (other than it is exactly the 
opposite of the society-embedded perspective, by focusing on a top-bottom 
relation) is that their argument for granting the state complete autonomy (that it 
is able to pursue interests on its own which are different from the social forces 
of the society) does not stand up the test of the authors' empirical/comparative 
studies. Hence, their conceptual frame of reference and their substantive 
analysis exhibit inconsistency. 
For instance, the conceptual reference stresses the paradigmatic shift in 
conceptualising the state, where a new focus is developing, concentrating on 
discussing states as society-shaping institutional structures with complete 
autonomy, while in other parts of the work they claim that 'autonomy remains 
very relative; the handmaiden role remains an inescapable part of the 
repertoire of even the most autonomous modern states' (ibid.: 62). Also the 
ability of state officials to act autonomously is defined in two instances. The 
first is extraordinary or extreme situations such as military intervention to 
enforce reform or revolutionary change from above. The other is a more 
circumscribed instance of public policy actions in liberal constitutional polities, 
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especially in the development of social policy, unemployment insurance, old 
age assistance, etc. In this instance leading state officials, especially 
collectivities of career officials insulated from ties to currently dominant socio-
economic interests, and who are portrayed as more sensitive and capable of 
formulating policies of redistribution and alleviation of distress situations, are 
likely to launch new state strategies facilitated by the organisational resources 
they can deploy, and motivated by the challenges of maintaining order. In 
other words, this complete autonomy is apparently a possibility which depends 
on a variety of elements, most importantly on a notion of state officials that 
does not correspond with reality. 
Moreover, on the one hand Evans and colleagues insist that the usefulness of 
the Weberian view, is that it helps in not seeing the state as the arena in which 
social groups make demands and engage in political struggles or compromises 
(ibid.: 8). Yet on the other, they recognise that increasing intervention 
makes the state more clearly an arena of social conflicts and makes 
its constituent parts more attractive targets for take-over. In other 
words the contradictions of civil society become more embedded in 
the state as the state more deeply penetrates civil society, (ibid.: 69) 
Another example of the striking difference between their theoretical reference 
and their concrete analysis is furnished by two contrasting claims. The first is 
that 'the underpinnings of state intervention or autonomous action lay in the 
bureaucracy itself rather than in the conditions of the society', thus denying any 
societal constraint. The second acknowledges the fundamental constraint of 
state action: 'the internal structure of the state and the state's relation to the 
class structure of society limit the state's capacity to intervene in civil society in 
pursuit of the goals of economic growth and income redistribution' (ibid.: 68). 
In summary, the attempt by Evans and colleagues to redress the balance of 
the society-centred approach and illustrate the state's own capacity to influence 
social and political developments is undermined by these inconsistencies. 
They actually put the society-centred approach in a stronger position, since 
many of the conclusions in various parts of the book, as shown above, tally 
more with Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire and the existence of a dialectical 
relation between the state and society, than with this separation and focus on 
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state action as self-motivated and self-perpetuating. Consequently their 
concrete examples provide more interesting and stimulating reading than the 
theoretical reference they have attempted to provide. 
Gramsci 
Antonio Gramsci, who is acknowledged as one of the most original 
contemporary contributors to Marxism, 'is difficult to classify within any one 
perspective' (Gold et al. 1975). It is necessary, however, to refer to his work 
especially that one of its major themes has been the relation of state and civil 
society. Ironically, the Italian Government wished by his imprisonment to 
repress and restrain his influence and the development of his thought, 
demanding at his trial in 1928 that 'we must stop this brain working for twenty 
years' (Gramsci 1971: xviii). Yet it was during his imprisonment and under 
failing health that he produced his renowned Prison Notebooks. 
The nature of Gramsci's notes, a collection of thoughts, makes it difficult to 
trace a single complete conceptualisation of the state and/or civil society 
although such a concern underpins the whole work. Rather the notes contain 
several positions, including the state defined as the political society plus civil 
society, the state as a balance between the two, and the state and civil society 
as one and the same. This last definition appears to be the dominant one, 
since Gramsci makes a reference to the liberals' theoretical error in making a 
distinction between civil society and political society, whereas the distinction is 
merely a methodological one - in concrete they are the same (ibid.: 160). 
Accordingly, he developed the concept of the 'hegemony of civil society' to 
elucidate the interrelationship of state and society. What this means is that 
ruling class domination is ensured by its success in persuading the other 
classes of society to accept its own moral, political and cultural values, for 
which it is essential that it already exercises leadership before winning 
governmental power. Moreover, the fact of hegemony 
presupposes that account be taken of the interests and tendencies 
of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a 
certain compromise equilibrium should be formed - in other words, 
that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-
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corporate kind. But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and 
such compromise cannot touch the essential; for though hegemony 
is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must be based on the 
decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive 
nucleus of economic activity, (ibid.: 161) 
This is a complete rejection of the mechanical and positivist relation of structure 
and superstructure, where the structure determines the whole, leaving no role 
for ideology, as part of the whole process of creating a hegemonic position for 
the ruling class. Gramsci especially emphasised the dialectical relation 
between the superstructure and structure, and for him popular ideas, beliefs 
and sentiments, values, and intellectuals, in sum ideology, is of paramount 
importance. The state, both through its civil apparatus and through coercive 
means, guarantees this domination, and if the ruling class is successful this 
demands the minimum use of force. But in times of crisis - that is, when the 
leadership fails in some major undertaking and subordinated classes are ready 
to confront the state - it will resort to repressive instruments and/or change 
programmes and personnel in order to retain power and eliminate or 
undermine the threatening elements in the society. 
Gramsci's preoccupation with the question of socio-economic change and the 
associated importance of ideology and intellectuals in the maintenance of ruling 
class domination explains the importance he attached to Machiavelli's work. 
The Prince. The book's central idea - how to change the consciousness of 
people and make them accept what conflicts with the generalised ideology, at 
that time religion, highlighted for Gramsci the significance of the role of 
intellectuals. It gave rise to the question of who will be the medium for a 
conscious transformation of society and the building of a new consensus, since 
the modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a 
concrete individual. It can be an organism, a complex element of 
society, in which a collective will, which has already been recognised 
and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take 
concrete form. History has provided this organism, and it is the 
political party, (ibid.: 129) 
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The party - the instrument for social change, for establishing a new consensus 
and/or 'collective national will', however, was recognised by Gramsci as 
problematic from two interrelated and important reasons. The first is the 
relation of the party and party leadership to the masses, that is, internal 
democracy, and the second is the nature of popular beliefs and popular 
sentiments and how to change them. For that Gramsci stressed the 
importance of education, in particular the pedagogical educational relationship, 
in which the political party plays a fundamental role in changing the 
consciousness of the masses, not on the lines of the parties of the former 
communist societies of Europe, but rather on the basis of a democratic-
dialectical relation characterised by a continuous dialogue between party 
leadership and masses. This entails long-term revolutionary struggle and the 
building of a new consensus of the workers/masses until the proper moment 
arises, or as employed by Gramsci the 'historic bloc'; the moment when the 
objective and subjective forces combine to produce a situation of revolutionary 
change, that is, when the economic structure is collapsing and there are those 
who are willing to take advantage. 
The fundamental reflections of Gramsci, his recognition of the importance of 
ideology and the necessary existence of a generalised cultural-political system 
as an integral part of the domination of the ruling class, in addition to the 
significance of the political party for building a new and a different 
consciousness/cultural-political ideology still highlight the essential problems 
that face both 'developing' and developed societies. The fall of Eastern Europe 
- style communist parties, their utter failure in building a mass party and a new 
consciousness through democratic means, and the ineffectiveness of parties in 
'developing' societies - all these things show the continuing significance of 
Gramsci's work. 
Approaches to the State in Arab Societies 
Discussion of the state in the Arab region has been extremely limited, partly 
because of the dominance of orientalist interpretations and partly due to the 
absence as mentioned above of a coherent and developed state theory within 
the Marxist tradition. Furthermore, there is a general difficulty attached to 
analysing Arab societies due to the controversy over the character of the pre-
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capitalist formation of the area, prior to its incorporation into the international 
capitalist system and the advent of the state. The notes of Marx and Engels on 
the East, which did not escape the prevalent influence of Orientalism, gave rise 
to the notion of the Asiatic mode of production which conceptualised Eastern 
societies as static due to the absence of private property and the associated 
non-existence of struggle between classes for control of property. In other 
words, these societies lack the internal mechanisms for change, and thus it is 
necessary to externally induce development. In this context capitalist 
imperialism and colonialism were seen as progressive and necessary in order 
for these societies to break with their stationary situation. 
This view has become a source of embarrassment to many Marxists and some 
like to ignore it. In response to this and to the inappropriateness of the feudal 
mode as a defining mode of production of the pre-colonial Arab region, Samir 
Amin has developed the tributary mode of production applicable to the whole 
region, except to Egypt which he saw as the only peasant civilisation. Thus the 
rest of the region consisted essentially of a trading formation living from the 
surplus extracted through its long distance trade (Amin 1978: 12). Resolving 
the controversy over the characterisation of Arab region is beyond the scope of 
the research. Nevertheless, contesting the relevance of the oriental type of 
writings especially in the light of their lingering effects (as will be seen in some 
of the most recent discussions of the region) is extremely important, and this 
brings us to the work of Turner. 
Turner aptly destroys the central precepts of orientalist thinking, these being an 
emphasis on the role of Islam and the arbitrary power of the despotic ruler or 
'Sultanisim' with its related centralised state apparatus as the reasons for the 
stifling of the development of a burgher class compared to European 
experience as well a the ever-greater concentration of state power and 
absence of civil society. He does this by undermining the 'mythological history' 
of European capitalism, hence was more successful than Rodinson, who 
attempted to refute orientalist claims by showing the opposite, primarily, that 
Islam is conducive to capitalist development. Turner illustrates the differences 
in the experience of European development and emphasises the central role 
played by the state and not a middle class in countries such as Germany, 
Russia and Italy. Only in England was this role played by the capitalist family. 
Secondly, he illustrates the lack of coincidence between economic growth and 
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democratisation; that is, between industrial revolution and bourgeois revolution. 
Britain achieved industrialisation without a bourgeois revolution, hence the 
continuance of the monarchy and House of Lords. In France, despite the 
revolution, the petty bourgeoisie and peasants have held their place till today. 
In short, state intervention and its pre-eminence is more common than peculiar 
and the coincidence of democracy and capitalism is no prerequisite for 
capitalist development to occur (Turner 1984: 45-61). 
Any argument, therefore, concerning the particularity of Arab societies relying 
on one sole dimension - Islam, a missing entrepreneur class or for that matter 
any other one factor - fails to account for the huge transformation and 
continuous changes in the region. Moreover, neither the extensive intervention 
of the state in these societies, nor its authoritarian nature account for their 
peripheral capitalist development and the curtailed ability on the part of the 
state to induce the development of a burgher class. This is the product of a 
complex situation, in particular the result of the articulation of three factors: 
their colonial history, their integration into the international capitalist market 
dominated by Western capital and their pre-capitalist formations. 
I will turn now to some of the most recent conceptualisations of the state in the 
Arab societies, in particular following the consolidation of oil as the underlying 
economic element in the region, where orientalist thinking can still be traced. 
First, the discussion will focus on a group of writers who, following Hussein 
Mahdavy's conceptualisation of Iran and his attribution of a 'rentier' pattern of 
development to its oil based economy, borrowed the theme and applied it not 
only to the Gulf states and Libya but also to countries such as Jordan, Yemen 
and even Egypt. These include Beblawi, Luciani and others i. 
'Rentier' states, according to these proponents, are defined as having 
economies predominantly relying on external rent, in this case oil revenues, 
which can sustain them without a strong productive domestic sector - hence 
the epithet 'rentier'. The way in which this affects the state and its relation to 
society is twofold. It creates allocative/distributive states in which the 
expenditures of the state sector are central to the functioning of the rest of the 
economy, stimulating services predominantly and creating various levels of 
rent-seekers rather than productive sectors. As a result the state is separated 
from society, since it is not dependent on the surplus produced within the 
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private economy especially that in the Gulf 'rentier' states there is no taxation, 
and services are free. What this does in effect is help the state in maintaining 
legitimacy without democracy and without influences from the social forces; 
hence the survival of traditional networks of tribe, family and sect as the most 
effective levers for the distribution of accumulated oil wealth. 
A general problem with this approach is its weak theoretical basis or rather the 
lack of it. The concept is useful on a descriptive level to account for the type of 
economy prevailing in these societies. But it does not provide any conceptual 
and methodological tools for analysing these societies, their power structures 
and social reality. It remains in the realm of substantive and empirical analysis 
which is very important, but does not advance a theoretically-based approach. 
In addition its perception of states in the Arab world as unique is reminiscent of, 
orientalist writings and of the inherent problem with the Arabs/Muslims per se, 
as if the problematic is the Arabs rather than the state. This is why the book by 
Luciani is entitled the Arab State implying something unique about the Arabs. 
As to more specific problems there are two in particular. The first is the basic 
proposition about the relation of state and society, which needs 
reconsideration. The ruling families in the Gulf do not rule supreme; they are 
not completely independent of the society and its social forces. Alliances are 
extremely important for maintaining the legitimacy of these states, through their 
sharing in the economic opportunities created by the vast oil wealth. In other 
words, the social reality of the Gulf is not simple, reducible to a powerful rich 
ruling/governing class able to allocate funds onto a receptive, docile society 
devoid of social conflict and differences. Were the society to be so 
acquiescent, the levels of repression and human rights violations would not be 
so great. Thus, to maintain that the state and society are disarticulated and 
distinct from each other distorts the very reality of these societies. The crucial 
point is that a different relationship exists from that in the West; and it is in 
illustrating that different relationship and its implication that advances can be 
made in understanding these societies. 
Moreover, external factors, particularly the place of Gulf states or more 
accurately the oil economy in the international division of labour is completely 
neglected. The weak productive base is not simply a matter of the inefficient 
expenditure programmes of the Gulf states. These are important markets for 
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the West's industrial, construction and service companies. This aspect of the 
interdependence between the Gulf and the West is often disregarded by 
comparison with the exaggerated dependency of the Gulf. Gulf states affect 
the development of advanced capitalist societies not just through their oil, but 
also through their open markets. The squabbling of the West in the wake of 
the Gulf war over contracts to rebuild Kuwait and the acceleration of military 
purchases across the Gulf is a case in point of the significance of the West's 
dependence on Gulf markets. 
The second problem is the extension of the concept to other Arab non-oil 
states by terming them 'semi-rentier', which is pushing the original concept too 
far. To lump Egypt into this category as well is a misrepresentation of its 
development; most importantly it masks its achievements under Nasir and 
ignores the historical shift from Nasir to Sadat. Since the adoption of Al-lnfitah 
or open door policy, Egypt has been completely subsumed in the international 
capitalist market. It is with this that any discussion of Egypt's development 
must start rather with the flow of labour remittances and aid. Jordan following 
Mahdavy is also categorised by this group of writers as 'rentier' in that the 
grants it receives are similar to external rent with one difference, their 
unreliability. According to this interpretation the state is 'rentier' since the 
government receives these funds. Others see it as 'semi-rentier' due to its 
receiving large sums of labour remittances, part of which could be considered 
rent, here the economy is considered 'rentier'. Regardless of these 
differences, the implications and consequences are similar to those applying in 
the Gulf states. 
The other recent conceptualisation of the state in the region is introduced in the 
influential book by Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab 
Peninsula. It warrants special attention since Al-Naqeeb claims to present an 
alternative thesis to that of the 'rentier' approach or as he puts it 'a more 
comprehensive and preferable tool' for analysing the Gulf states. Unfortunately 
he fails to produce this. First, he is unable to detract himself from the 'rentier' 
concept and accordingly he attributes a more central role to 'rentier' states than 
in other capitalist societies because of the importance of public expenditure. 
More importantly, he emphasises the authoritarian structure of Gulf states and 
blames their incapability to produce an integrated development on that. This 
dimension of the authoritarian structure is defined as follows: 
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the modern, contemporary form of the despotic state....seeks to 
achieve an effective monopoly of the sources of power and authority 
in society for the benefits of the ruling class or elite. [Firstly it]... 
achieves this monopoly by penetrating civil society and transforming 
its institutions into corporate organisations which act as an extension 
of state apparatus. [Secondly]....it penetrates the economic system 
and attaches it to the state either by nationalisation (as in the other 
countries of the Arab East) or by extending public sectors to 
complete state bureaucratic control of economic life. [Thirdly]....the 
legitimacy of the system of government in it depends on the use of 
force (or naked power) and organised terror more than upon 
traditional legitimacy. (Al-Naqeeb 1990: 99-100) 
There are a number of serious problems with this definition, which is central to 
Al-Naqeeb's argument. First, democracy has not been the pre-requisite of 
capitalist development, not even in Europe, and the emergence of fascism and 
nazism cannot be separated from the processes of capitalist development, not 
to mention the absolutist state of Louis Bonaparte and the Bismarckian Reich. 
Or to take another example, this time from Asia, is Japan where the state and 
its bureaucratic organisation facilitated capitalist development. Japan today is 
a world economic power. Hence the association of democracy with capitalism 
is a 'myth', and to associate failure to produce capitalist development with 
central control of the economy and society does not tally with historical 
experience. Moreover, the ruling sheikhdoms of the Gulf are not undertaking 
something unusual and/or peculiar to them. The forms, the methods and the 
manner of establishing the hegemony of the ruling class simply vary according 
to historical circumstances and the level of development. 
Secondly, it is difficult to talk about the absence of civil society, or its 
succumbing to the state when it was not there originally. The state did not 
destroy or marginalise it, it would be truer to say that its development was 
curtailed by the state. Moreover, the state permeates civil society in advanced 
capitalist society too, through a variety of institutions, since the hegemony of 
the ruling class is essential whether, it is achieved through an absolutist state 
or a bourgeois democracy. Also resorting to coercive means for achieving that 
hegemony is not exclusive to the 'Third World', the state in advanced capitalist 
societies resort to the coercive means at its disposal when necessary. But the 
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peculiarity of the Gulf is the fact that the legitimacy of the ruling classes does 
not rest on a bourgeois class, hence the state organises its legitimacy and 
hegemony in a different way than in the West and it is this that needs to be 
brought out and analysed. 
Thirdly, Al-Naqeebs' periodisation of the transformation of Gulf society is 
questionable. He claims that the Gulf has moved away from the 'rentier' state, 
defined in particular as that period extending the two decades of 1950s and 
1960s to the 'authoritarian' state starting in the 1970s. But if one accepts the 
'rentier' concept how can one deny that the Gulf is no more based on the 
production of oil and 'living off' rent. Also the argument implies that the Gulf 
rulers were previously democratic, but not any more. Or does he confuses the 
nationalist progressive movements across the Arab world during Nasir's era in 
the 1950s and early 1960s with the political changes associated with the oil 
wealth which ushered in a whole new era for the Arab region, creating apathy 
and depoliticisation and enhancing the state's economic power. 
On all accounts, Al-Naqeeb neither convinces the reader with the 
inappropriateness of the 'rentier' concept, nor with his alternative conceptual 
thesis. Yet, in the second part of the book he provides an interesting 
discussion of the alliances of social groups and the way in which the ruling 
families organise their rule and power structures, and makes an attempt to 
delineate a class stratification of the Gulf societies. It is this, in particular, 
which needs to be emphasised, but this undermines his thesis. 
The Conceptual Approach of the Study 
Having reviewed some of the themes involved in examining the state role, the 
suggested approach in the present study, as indicated in the introduction of the 
chapter, rejects pluralist contentions as well as the 'rentier' and Al-Naqeebs 
approaches, and rests, instead, on a general understanding and appreciation 
of the conflict paradigm by emphasising three major interrelated analytical 
concepts. These are the centrality of the state, the social foundation of the 
state, and the relative autonomy of the state. They will help in contextualising 
the study and in addressing its major question, namely why, considering the 
huge resources at its disposal, the state in Jordan failed in its project of 
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restructuring the economy towards productive economic activities. At the same 
time, these concepts will eliminate some of the common assumptions about the 
state in the Arab world especially the assumption that it is in some way unique, 
and instead help to view the state's role as a common one, and in addition 
show that state intervention and ability to produce change is constrained by the 
ruling class, or in other words by the particular configuration of power relations 
which exist in the society and which give the state its legitimacy. 
The Centrality of the State 
The widespread perception of the particularity of the state in 'developing' 
societies, distinguishing it as more 'central'/'overdeveloped' (Alavi 1972; Saul 
1974), or in the case of the state in Arab societies due to lingering orientalist 
interpretations, makes it extremely important to clarify what constitutes and 
underpins state role. Moreover, the manner of the formation of the state in 
Jordan, being the outcome of British strategic interests, meant that it bore no 
relation to developments emanating from within, which makes it even more 
important to clarify this issue, since this particular formation gave the political 
realm a paramount role in the social transformation of the area and in the 
emergence of social classes, in addition to the particular organisation of state 
power being based on the ascendancy of a ruling Hashemite family, rather 
than on a rising bourgeois class. 
The crucial point about state intervention and/or its central role is that it is a 
common feature of capitalist development and is not a consequence of the 
particular formation of the state in Jordan, nor its peripheral capitalist 
development. In other words, state intervention is a necessary consequence 
for establishing and upholding the hegemony of the dominant force in a 
society. That is why the state's main function and/or central role is similar in 
both 'developing' societies and advanced capitalist societies. As stated by 
Leys: 
The state is equally important in all class societies; it is no more 
'central' in Tanzania than in Britain or the USA (or the USSR). It 
may be more 'embracing' (i.e. may own more productive forces or 
intervene more directly in various areas of social life) in some 
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societies than others, but in this respect it is typically less 'central' 
('extensive' would be a better word here) in most post-colonial 
societies than in advanced capitalist societies. (Leys 1976:43) 
Thus, differences exist, but only in the mechanisms for and conditions of 
carrying out this function, as well as in the nature of the intervention. Some of 
the factors, in 'developing' societies, that influenced the manner and nature of 
the state's intervention in the economy, include their colonial history, the 
character of their social formations prior to domination by Western capital and 
the advent of the state, as well as the nature of their linkages to Western 
capital. Also, state intervention differs among 'developing' societies, whose 
class structure and the specificity of the ruling class can only be decided on the 
merits of each society. In short, differences in the forms of state and in the 
nature of state power depend on historical conditions and on the level of 
development. Capitalism in Europe produced at particular conjectures, nazism 
in Germany and fascism in Italy (and in earlier periods Bonaparte in France 
and Bismarck in Germany) and produced a monarchy in Britain and a 
Presidential system in the United States. 
Accordingly, it is by focusing on disclosing the particularities of each situation in 
terms of the organisation of state power and state structures, and by unfolding 
the specifics of class formation and the social foundation of state power that 
the state's role and social change can be explained as well as the manner and 
the level of state's involvement in the economy. At the same time one must not 
neglect the external constraints upon 'developing' societies in producing 
development given the prevailing situation of Western capitalist hegemony, 
denoting a subservient place for them in the international market. The 
importance of illustrating the particular organisation of state power in each 
situation brings us to the second main concept, which serves to emphasis 
possible variations in the manner of state intervention. 
The Social Foundation of the State 
Unravelling the social basis of state power, that is the dominant force in society 
and delineating the social structure must be the point of departure for any 
meaningful discussion of the various forms of the state and patterns of 
development. In order to bring about social change, one needs to have a clear 
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understanding of the forces that constitute the social reality, and nowhere is 
this more important than in 'developing' societies, where social contradictions 
and immense poverty and 'backwardness' persist. Yet discussion of the ruling 
class and class formation in Jordan, as with many of the 'developing' societies, 
is particularly problematic. As Zubaida has aptly observed, among the many 
theoretical problems faced by the contemporary student of the Middle East is 
the suitability of concepts and theories of class for the analysis of these 
societies (Zubaida 1989: 58). 
Thus, even when writers attempt to apply class analysis when examining the 
transformation of the Arab region, as does Batatu in his master work The old 
Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, they feel 'uneasy 
about too precise and strict concepts of class' (ibid.: 60). One explanation 
offered by Zubaida is that such attempts have not paid much attention to the 
significance of the political realm. Political changes have a profound impact on 
social and economic organisation, in just the same way as the constitution of 
political forces arises from various and shifting social solidarity, whether of 
class or community. This conceptualisation entails moving away from a 
society-centred and essentialist interpretation to an approach that does not 
hesitate to grant the political realm its appropriate place in social process and 
social change. One of the situations where it would be virtually impossible to 
deny this is Jordan. 
The Political realm played a determining role in the formation of the Jordanian 
state and the particular formation of its ruling class, being attached to the 
Hashemite family. Thus, state power in Jordan, as in the Gulf states, does not 
rest on the legitimacy of a capitalist class, but on how the ruling families in 
alliance with key social forces attempt to create a social base for their rule 
while constrained by their place in the overall international division of labour. 
The Hashemite family does not represent a class as such, but its political and 
economic interests are promoted and protected as they are tied to key social 
forces that evolved since the establishment of central rule, through a political 
system and state structures in which the Al-Diwan Al-Hashemy, or the royal 
court, holds the focal point of political power. This is where a serious tension 
laden the role of the state: the necessity to maintain the relevance of the 
Hashemites while attempting to create viable private economic interests. 
34 
The Hashemite ruling family played a special role in the creation and building of 
the state, which explains the strong identification of the state with the 
Hashemites; hence its not accidental that the name of the country is derived 
from its ruling family. Yet that by no means implies that the Hashemites rule 
supreme and that the state is almighty, dissociated from the society, and hence 
viewed as either ruling for the good of society or a Mukhabarat, secret police, 
repressive state. On the contrary this study aims to show that the whole 
process of imposing central rule and the consequent transformation of the area 
entailed the creation of a social base that gives legitimacy and meaning to the 
state - in other words the creation of a ruling class. Throughout this study the 
Jordanian ruling class will be used to mean the alliance that have been created 
and nurtured between the Hashemite ruling family and the commercial 
bourgeoisie, landed class and the state bourgeoisie - the top level 
management of both civil and military and security apparatus. Thus, despite 
the eminence of the state and the political domain, state actions are limited by 
the very configuration of its power base. 
In order to accommodate the particular formation of the ruling class in Jordan, 
and to avoid being impeded by the dilemmas of whether class analysis is 
possible or not, the classification of social classes that will be adopted in this 
study will be based on descriptive analytical categories based on economic 
criteria. This classification was used by Marx in analysing concrete situations 
such as France during the Revolution, where he identified the proletariat, the 
bourgeoisie in its two factions industrial and financial, petty bourgeois, the 
peasantry, and the lumpen proletariat (Lee and Newby 1983: 121-2). In 
addition this classification has been adopted by other writers on the Arab 
region such as Longuenesse on Syria, Lazreq on Algeria, Abdal-Fadil on the 
Gulf, and Niblock on Sudan. In such situations one is talking about the 
subjective/concrete, actual social groups. Adopting this classification does not 
conflict with Marxist theoretical sociological usage, in which class is a 
relationship based upon the position occupied in the productive process, and 
one which explains the antagonistic and exploitive relation between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the owners of capital and property and the 
sellers of labour in the market. While this objective conceptualisation denotes 
a dual class structure, the subjective/concrete analysis can entertain several 
classes or social groups treated as fractions of a class or as separate (ibid.). 
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In the final analysis these social groups, except for the peasantry, can either 
belong to capital or labour or have a contradictory class location between 
labour and capital, such as, managers and supervisors located between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat or small employers located between the petty 
bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie (Wright 1978: 61-3). Contrary to Marx's 
prediction that intermediary classes will eventually disappear under the impact 
of capital they have provided the basis for the development of the Third World' 
while becoming solidified in developed societies, albeit for different reasons. 
The 'new' petty bourgeoisie has been consolidated in the West due to the 
complex and increased technical and administrative demands of capitalist 
development, and in the 'developing' societies due to the expansion of state 
apparatus, state services, and services in general, that is in fields that are not 
directly related to manufacturing and industry. 
One further clarification is necessary concerning the use of the term 'state 
bourgeoisie'. This term will be used in the study as an analytical category to 
designate the top level managers and administrators of the state sector, while 
acknowledging that their power stems from access and control to state 
resources rather from being rooted in private property, in addition to 
acknowledging the awkwardness of this group's position; being incapable of 
reproducing itself or ensuring its incumbency of state positions. That is the fate 
of state bourgeoisie is politically determined and the survival of its members 
depends on their usefulness to the regime and their ability to build private 
sector interest while they occupy state powerful positions (Richards and 
Waterbury 1990; Waterbury 1991). 
The Relative Autonomy of the State 
The concentration and centralisation of the economic and political power of the 
state, with its associated huge bureaucracy, gives the impression of a state 
above society, completely independent from it and from all social forces. A 
proper evaluation of this autonomy is necessary In order to eliminate these 
illusions and to avoid the danger of reformist ideas about state effectiveness, 
through better administration and replacement of the top echelon of the 
bureaucracy (Leys 1976). This is also crucial in connection with the image of 
the monarchy in Jordan as disassociated from the actions of the state and 
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above society and its fractions and contradictions, so that it can appear to act 
as an arbiter, where as in essence it has been the Al-Diwan Al-Hashemy that 
have been the focal point of power. In addition, in times of crisis, governments 
tend to attribute problems of development to corruption, nepotism and 
favouritism, and mismanagement of public funds. Hence, changes in 
personnel are utilised to appease the populace and reduce pressure on the 
state without minimising the strength of the ruling class. 
What is most relevant about the concept, thereby, is that it allows us to see that 
the 'political decision making process that determines economic development 
invariably reflects directly or indirectly the web of class interests that binds 
states and restrains governments' (Weisband 1989: 19). It helps, therefore, in 
seeing that state actions, policies and programmes are not 'class' neutral and 
that the state's power 'is not suspended in mid air,' without denying the 
influence of states in transforming societies and economies. The power of the 
state lies precisely in that: its capacity to act, in addition to its exclusive right to 
coercive instruments. Thus its essential to realise that these actions are 
located within a certain matrix of economic interests, even in a situation like 
Jordan, where the state induced social transformation and appears all 
powerful, and despite the attempt by the ruling family to appear as above state 
actions and to attribute the problems of development on an inefficient and 
corrupt governing elite. 
In this connection it is worth noting that the web of class interests can, in 
'developing societies', change radically, depending on developments within the 
society. This is a possibility inherent in all capitalist societies and is not 
exclusive to 'developing' societies, since it is contingent on the outcome of 
class struggle. But 'developing' societies are particularly affected since they 
are in flux; without a solid and stable social structure, attempting to create one, 
in addition to being besieged by a multitude of ethnic, religious and national 
problems, not to mention the immense pressure from the international capitalist 
market. Changes in leadership, through peaceful means or by coup d'etat 
imply, most of the time, a shift in the power of social forces and classes, 
imposed often by the repressive means at the disposal of the state. This is 
why a change of prime minister in Britain or president in the United States does 
not entail a change in the fundamental web of class interests whereas, for 
instance, Egypt under Nasir is not Egypt under Sadat: it moved from a state 
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attempting to create an autonomous industrial development to a compradore 
state. Syria experienced similar shifts in social alliances under Hafaz Al-Asad, 
who gave rise to a petty bourgeois state while marginalising the traditional 
landed aristocracy. 
Ironically, the instability of the ruling class and the social structure of society in 
Jordan lies in the very element that allowed the building of a state and the 
creation of a thriving commercial class and other benefiting social groups, 
namely the concentration of capital in the state's hands which is contingent on 
its ability to continue to serve Western interests in the area. Hence the state's 
ability to expend and maintain itself and the prevalent power structures were 
not conditioned by the domestic economy but by its ability to marshal external 
resources, which enhanced its independent scope for action to maintain the 
existing power relations, but simultaneously made it extremely vulnerable to 
changes outside its control. Moreover, the dependence on external resources 
undermined the state's project of building a viable bourgeois class and 
maintained its subservient political-economic position ws-^-wsthe West, which 
restricted its economic activities to the intermediary sphere, where they do not 
pose a threat to Western capital and goods and commodities. As long as the 
state can muster these external resources it is able to maintain prosperity and 
stability, and marginalise political demands. This explains why the crisis of the 
state was manifested on two levels, an economic and political level. Once its 
economic power was eroded the state was forced to open up political channels 
as a means of releasing the pressures mounting on it and to compensate for its 
inability to lessen the detrimental impact of the deteriorating economic situation 
on the bulk of the population. 
This conceptual approach of the study aims foremost to provide a critical-
analytical point of departure for unravelling the complex reality of Jordan, the 
importance of which will be further emphasised considering the present state of 
academic research on Jordan, as will be seen in the critique of the accounts on 
Jordan which follows. 
Notes 
1. See Hossein Mahdavy (1970), 'Patterns and Problems of Economic 
Development in Rentier: The Case of Iran'. Also Hazem Beblawi and 
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Giacomo Luciani (1987), The Rentier State, and Giacomo Luciani (1990), 
The Arab state. 
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Chapter Two 
A Critique of Contemporary Accounts of Jordan 
Most contemporary studies on Jordan emphasise the 'success' story of Jordan, 
either by highlighting the role of the Hashemite family, in particular King 
Hussein, in maintaining stability, or by stressing its remarkable achievement in 
overcoming the constraints imposed by its lack of natural resources, thus 
reducing the history of Jordan either to an account of the ruling family or to a 
growth miracle despite the odds. Even those who have attempted a political 
economy account remain constrained by their choice of the conceptual 
approach. Moreover, academic interest in Jordan has been a derivative one, 
overshadowed by Jordan's unique relation to the Palestinians and the Arab-
Israeli conflict, this has hindered the emergence of literature that examines 
Jordan's development on its own right. Despite these limitations in the extant 
literature, some of the available sources have provided immense help in the 
substantive analysis of the present study, in particular the works of Ameri, 
Hourani and Robins. 
The critique is divided according to the main themes prevalent in the studies 
under consideration, namely the formative years of the state, the Palestine 
issue, the role of Jordan in a peace settlement and finally, the economic 
development of Jordan. Before discussing these, however, reference must be 
made to some specific sources which were of great value to this research and 
which to some extent compensated for the lack of data and information on 
Jordan, these being unpublished MA theses from the University of Jordan, 
especially those of the economics department. Those familiar with Arabic, may 
profitably consult these, although in terms of analysis they may be limited, as 
sources that compensate for lack of data and information on specific aspects of 
the economy they are valuable. Secondly, there are two journals, Al-Urdun Al-
Jadid, or New Jordan and Al-Bunuk fit Urdun, or Banks in Jordan, published in 
the Arabic language and specialising on economic issues, the former from a 
political economy perspective and the latter from a liberal stand point. 
Moreover, the shortages of analytical sources on the economic development of 
Jordan has been compensated to a great extent by my work for over five years 
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at the Ministry of Planning prior to embarking on this study. The experience, 
exposure and knowledge gained during these years have facilitated immensely 
the development of my views. 
The Foundation of the State 
Under this theme five works will be reviewed, of which two are unpublished 
theses. These are the works of Hani Hourani, Mustafa Hamarneh, Philip 
Robins, Mary Wilson, and Ali Abu Nowar. 
The work by Hani Hourani, Al-Tarkib Al-ljtima'iy wa Al-lqtisadiy li Sharg Al-
Urdun 1921-1950, or the Socio-economic Transformation of Jordan, focuses 
on examining two major and interrelated issues: the objective conditions 
prevailing in the area prior to the creation of the state, and how these facilitated 
and/or permitted the successful implementation of the British colonial project in 
utilising the area's strategic location in order to safeguard British interests 
through imposing central rule via a ruling family from outside the area. Hourani 
maintains that the 'backwardness' of the area was the major reason behind 
such a success and this 'backwardness' has been brought about by the lack of 
economic surplus, since the conditions of pastoral-nomadism and subsistence 
agriculture did not produce it; in addition, any such surplus was appropriated by 
the Ottoman authorities through land taxes and by leading tribes in the form of 
'khawa', or tax in return for protection from tribal raids. 
Hourani proceeds then to discuss the existing economic base and suggests the 
prevalence of a multitude of modes of production, pastoral-nomadic, semi-
nomadic, feudal, and semi-feudal, as well as a petty commodity production, 
none of which were capable of transforming into a dominant one, and hence of 
producing local leadership. The period 1920-1, following the collapse of 
Faisal's government in Syria which produced several local governments in the 
various districts of the area, was taken by the author as evidence of this lack of 
a dominant social force. Hence, in answering the major question of why the 
colonial project was fruitful when internal conditions were not conducive, 
Hourani attributes this to a state of balance between the various social forces, 
which allowed none to dominate, but offered a chance for an outside force 
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equipped with a central apparatus to emerge, playing the arbiter among these 
contradictory and conflicting social forces. 
There are two problems with Hourani's analysis. The first relates to the 
inappropriateness of discussing the area prior to 1921 as a socio-economic 
unit and projecting onto it an analysis whose concepts and methodology 
presuppose such an existence. As Hourani himself indicates the territory never 
constituted a separate unit or had an economic centre. It had been 
administered primarily as part of Wilayat Damascus and its interaction has 
been outward to Palestine and Syria rather than towards an interior. Even the 
settled population were scattered and isolated from each other. This makes it 
very difficult to discuss the pre-1921 area in terms of its inability to produce a 
dominant social force and its lack of economic surplus as a reason for its 
'underdevelopment'. Significantly, after the withdrawal of the Ottoman army 
from Amman in 1918 the area was administered as part of Faisal's government 
in Syria and it became important only when Faisal and British troops were 
pushed out as a result of settling the British-French division of the Levant. It 
was solely imperialist rivalry that imposed the separation of the territory against 
its historical linkages, thus Jordan's pre-state history can only be entertained 
and explained by taking account of its historical linkages to Syria, Palestine and 
Hijaz. 
The second problem is Hourani's assertion that the success of the British task 
was due to the balancing act the Hashemites were capable of doing between 
the various conflicting social groups, this assertion needs reconsidering. It 
presumes that the question of central rule of the area was an internal one, 
unresolved because of the presence of such conflicting interests. Hence, it 
blurs the significance of the imposition of central rule, which had arisen in the 
first place as a result of British concerns, whereas the internal conditions not 
only were incapable of producing it, but did not necessitate such an eventuality. 
The various local governments that formed prior to the establishment of the 
state were instigated by the British to buy time (while a definite policy towards 
the area evolves), due to the change in the political circumstances between 
Britain and France and had little to do with local developments. Moreover, it 
was natural that several governments emerged reflecting the prevalent 
traditional affiliation and allegiances and localised centres of power. The state 
and central rule was imposed to keep the area free of anti-French and anti-
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Zionist activities or movements in order to protect Britain's vital areas: 
Palestine, Iraq and Egypt. Hourani is right, therefore, that central rule was an 
instrument in the hands of the British colonial authorities precisely to secure 
such conditions, but its success was dependent on the ability of the British to 
utilise Abdullah as a local ruler around which local interests were created while 
subduing both the sedentary and tribal population through a variety of means, 
this was made easier because of the absence of a local force to reckon with. 
Therefore, Hourani's related assumption that the state was above society and 
disassociated from it, because firstly, the ruling family had been from outside 
the area and hence was capable of playing the arbiter, secondly, the 
monopolistic control of the governing class involving few local political figures, 
in addition to the British officers and personnel and thirdly, the dependence on 
external capital, is not satisfactory. The whole process of imposing central rule 
and legitimating Hashemite rule entailed, in particular, the promotion of social 
forces with vested interests in the new state, which Hourani refers to: the 
inducement of a commercial bourgeoisie via the opportunities created by the 
monetisation of the economy and a small core of state bourgeoisie as a result 
of the building and the expanding the state apparatus, and the creation of a 
landed class through the state's registration and privatisation of land. Thus, it 
was not a matter of balancing but of establishing a ruling class, while tying the 
livelihood of a large segment of the population to the state and its expenditure. 
The ruling family only appears to be as above the conflicting interests of the 
various groups in order to manipulate successfully these differences, as well as 
to create its own legitimacy and maintain its relevance. 
In discussing the impact of the creation of the state Hourani provides a wealth 
of information detailing the socio-economic transformation of the area, in 
addition to attempting a delineation of the transformation of the social structure. 
He emphasises the dependence of the state on external resources and how 
the monetisation and commercialisation of the economy was a consequence of 
the availability of these resources from the British colonial authorities to expend 
on the state apparatus, especially the military establishment, rather than from 
the development of an internal surplus. Nevertheless, Hourani 
overemphasises the effects of the particular manner of the establishment of the 
state - as an instrument for British strategic and political interests in the region -
in determining the pattern and structure of the subsequent development of the 
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society, neglecting the importance of its pre-capitalist formation in the evolution 
of its pattern of development. It has been the articulation of its pre-capitalist 
formation and its integration into the capitalist system which has produced a 
peripheral capitalist development, characterised by the marginalisation of 
agriculture and the eminence of commerce and services, with its corresponding 
social structure. 
The second work that merits consideration is Mustafa Hamarneh's Ph.D. 
thesis, 'The Social and Economic Transformation of Jordan', covering relatively 
the same period as Hourani's book, 1921-46. Although the major theme of the 
work concerns the period after the creation of the state, Hamarneh seems to 
be more convincing in his treatment of the process of social change in the era 
prior to the creation of the state. He provides interesting material related to 
that period. Yet he leaves a big question mark, as does Hourani concerning 
the feasibility of discussing the pre-1921 territory as one unit and claiming that 
the territory that came to be designated as Transjordan in 1921 was 'backward' 
lacking economic surplus for a push fonward, incapable of producing a 
dominant social force. 
In dealing with the post-1921 period Hamarneh upholds a position similar to 
Hourani's, maintaining that the strategic and political interests of Britain in the 
region shaped and determined the development of Jordan. But he is less 
successful in providing the material and analysis to substantiate his assertions 
than Hourani. Moreover, he maintains that lack of economic surplus continues 
to be the root of the 'backwardness' of the area, and claims that Jordan, during 
the three decades following the establishment of the state and the imposition of 
central rule, has not changed and has remained stagnant and still. There are 
two objections to this. Firstly, this criterion of availability or lack of economic 
surplus, although important, is not enough to warrant the claim that the 
problem of development lies there. Many 'developing' societies possess huge 
economic surpluses and their 'backwardness' has not been eliminated. The 
most striking example is the Gulf states. Secondly to say that Jordan has not 
changed during this critical period is far from correct. The dramatic changes 
that have taken place through the mere formation of the state have been far-
reaching. Thus, the two salient characteristics of this period, the building of the 
state and its apparatus, both civil and military, and the commercialisation of the 
economy with their direct impact on the transformation of the social structure 
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has been completely ignored. Hamarneh confuses the official British policy of 
a 'stand still policy', meaning keeping expenditures at minimum with a stagnant 
society, but these are not the same and the transformation of the area attest to 
that. 
Hamarneh's inappropriate choice of the dependency school of thought as the 
theoretical basis of the research might partly explain the weakness of the 
empirical side of the study. Dependency theory lacks the methodology by 
which the internal conditions pertaining to 'developing' societies can be 
explained since its focus is on external factors and on the relation between 
nations, in particular core and periphery. This limits its usefulness in studies 
like Hamarneh's which are aiming at explaining internal transformation. 
Although Hamarneh states that this school of thought has been challenged on 
both factual and methodological grounds, he is still content to use it. Hence his 
utilisation does not transcend the descriptive account by qualifying the relation 
between Britain and Jordan as a dependent one without showing the 
dynamism of the relation and how in fact Jordan's structural changes were 
determined by British colonial policies motivated by the need to entrench the 
Hashemites as focal point of state power. 
The other problem is Hamarneh's concluding argument that the state during 
this period was 'for itself, independent of any local class interference. This is 
factually wrong and theoretically misleading. If the state was for itself and if 
internal class interferences were absent how can one explain the internal 
conflicts arising between the state and both the tribal and sedentary 
population? The essential task of both the British and the Hashemite family 
was to foster social forces that identified with the Hashemites rule and this 
resulted in two processes. The first is the co-optation and integration of the 
tribal population by providing tribal leaders with the opportunity to buy large 
areas of land and the establishment of an army drawing most of its recruits 
from the tribal population - not to mention the effects of land registration and 
privatisation in undermining the material basis of the tribal system and in linking 
the population to the state. The second is the monetisation and 
commercialisation of the economy and its effects in creating economic interests 
and benefiting social groups linked to the new rule. Thus, the state contrary to 
Hamarneh's claims, sought the support of local social groups to give it the 
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legitimacy it needed and created social groups with vested interest in its 
continuity. This formative period was particularly important in this respect. 
At this point mention should be made of Philip Robins' Ph.D. thesis, 'The 
Consolidation of Hashemite Power in Jordan', which also covers the period 
1921-1946 and focuses, in particular, on elucidating the social base of the 
state. Robins, like the previous two authors, in discussing the area prior to the 
emergence of the state imposes the question of why a state did not emerge 
from 'within' which is only relevant in terms of what happened later, that is the 
fostering of the state by a colonial power. The redundancy of the question is 
further emphasised by the analysis provided which identifies four major 
elements that prohibited such an outcome: the lack of a definable political 
community, economic surplus, a power centre and the absence of a powerful 
sub-statal group. 
Robins goes on to analyse the manner of the consolidation of Hashemite 
authority and the dynamics of the imposition of central rule. Although he 
provides substantial analysis of the key groups involved in the process there is 
one major problem with the way in which he delineates the process. Robins 
sees the process as moving from an attempt to build a 'Shariefian' state to an 
attempt to build a state based on 'external Elites'. First of all the Shariefian 
suggestion is not convincing, especially since the groups that underpin this 
suggestion, as Robins' define them, did not constitute a common or a coherent 
bloc. These included the nationalists from Greater Syria area and those 
adhering to the Hisb Al-lstiklal (independent nationalist party), a small stratum 
of merchants and the entourage of Abdullah that came with him from Hijaz. 
Among these, emphasis is put on the Al-lstiklalis, who for the first three years 
of the inception of the state dominated its administration. 
It is difficult to perceive this initial alliance between Abdullah and the Al-lstiklalis 
as presenting a basis for the consolidation of central rule and the imposition of 
a state. This alliance was based on the political motives of each side, which 
lay outside the area; in addition the Al-lstiklalis had no local support base, as 
Robins indicated, which is precisely why its presence was short-lived. Neither 
the Al-lstiklalis nor Abdullah were interested in creating a local power base, and 
that very fact negates seeing these three years as an attempt to build a state 
based on a Shariefian coalition. The British, whose interests lay in creating a 
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local power base and in keeping the French out of their zones of influence, 
could not tolerate any political force that intended to jeopardise the imperialist 
balance or threaten the process of entrenching central rule in Jordan, hence 
the dismissal of the Al-lstiklalis. Abdullah, aware of his dependence on the 
British, could do very little to avert that eventuality. Thus the shift since 1924 
signifies the need to create a local power base rather than a failure of the 
'Shariefian' proposition. 
The second proposition of Robins, concerning the shift towards building an 
'external' elite state, needs re-examining too. Although Robins is aware of the 
inappropriateness of using the term 'foreign' to refer to the Arabs that were 
involved in the process and chooses the term 'external', there remains a 
problem with this. First, these individuals were not external to the territory prior 
to the advent of the British: free movement and extensive relations existed 
between what became Jordan, Syria and Palestine and moreover many 
Syrians and Palestinians have settled there prior to the consolidation of the 
state. In other words, there was no specific political awareness that separates 
the local population of the area and neighbouring Arabs. This is crucial since it 
makes those Arabs who were involved in the building of the Jordanian state 
only 'external' in terms of the borders that the British and the French were 
erecting in the Levant. Moreover, the resentment that emerged among some 
sections of the local population was personally motivated, and more 
importantly, the British manipulated it to control the politics of Abdullah. In 
addition, the rivalry and conflict rose over power positions, and not from 
awareness of political distinctiveness. Othenwise it would be difficult to account 
for the stability and the relatively peaceful process of imposing a state if such 
resentments were widespread and significant. Also, to put those Arabs in the 
same category as the British colonial officers underestimates the dominant role 
of the British. 
Robins recognises the importance of creating social forces with vested 
interests for the consolidation of central rule and the maintenance of the state, 
and hence assigns a chapter to discussing the land policy and its effects on the 
both the sedentary and tribal population, and another chapter to discussing the 
emergent merchant class. Yet this 'external' elites frame of reference 
undermines his analysis by overemphasising that most merchants came from 
Syria and Palestine and, that part of the military recruits came from tribes 
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outside the boundaries of the state. What has been significant about this 
process is not the 'externality' so much as the ability of the Hashemites and the 
British to create vested interests in the state, and the successful manipulation 
of sub-statal affiliations and loyalties to impose central rule. Another important 
point is that it was the totality of the process of legitimating central rule that 
made it possible to build and entrench the state, not only through the land 
policy and trading activities, which augmented the power of the tribal leaders 
and made merchants influential: the military establishment, and the 
administration of the state and its various agencies, played a crucial role too, 
especially through linking the livelihood of a large part of the population to the 
state. 
A final observation regarding Robins work is the ease with which he dismisses 
the Marxist approach as unsuitable for studying 'developing' societies, 
especially the Middle East, on the basis that the relative strength of the state in 
relation to social classes is conventional wisdom. His theoretical frame of 
reference would have been enriched immensely, if he had taken into account 
some of the literature available within this approach. Despite these 
reservations, his thesis remains a very important and relevant source of 
information and analysis. 
Mary Wilson's book. King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, provides 
a thorough historical-political study of the formative years of the state through 
tracing the history of Abdullah. Wilson maintains that the value of Jordan, and 
its consolidation as a separate state from either Palestine, Syria, Iraq or Saudi 
Arabia, emerged over time as a function of the British maintaining influence 
and safeguarding their strategic interests in the area. At the end of the First 
World War Britain had no pre-planned scheme for Jordan as was the case with 
Palestine and Iraq, until the occupation of Syria by France and the dismissal of 
Faisal. Britain's fears of a French presence closer to its two vital interests were 
the motivation behind its claiming it as part of its sphere of influence. Hence 
the emergence of Abdullah as a factor in Arab-British relations coincided with 
Britain's interests. The apparently slow evolution of a definite policy stemmed 
from the variety of views about the precise shape of the settlement after the 
collapse of Faisal's government in Syria. Views differed as to Jordan should be 
part of Palestine, and hence open to Jewish settlement and colonisation, or 
separate with a strong presence of British troops or alternatively a loose 
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presence. Therefore, British policy advanced from lending support to the 
establishment of local governing bodies in various districts of Jordan, to a 
temporary sponsorship of Abdullah, to a lasting commitment to the 
establishment of a separate state under Hashemite rule, supporting it 
financially and politically over four decades. 
Wilson's main argument of a confluence of interests between Abdullah and 
Britain is an understatement of the hegemonic position of Britain and absolves 
it from its imperialist history. Britain's strategy was clearly embedded in 
protecting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and limiting 
the extension of French influence in the area. Thus, while Jordan was under 
its influence, that is, administered by Faisal's government in Syria it posed no 
problem. It only became a factor once the balance between France and Britain 
was threatened. Thus the future of the territory was, first and foremost, 
determined by Britain, Abdullah was only useful as a tool in determining the 
shape of the settlement. Although till the very end of its involvement Britain 
was not especially convinced of Abdullah's utility, but for lack of another useful 
alternative the support for the Hashemite family was maintained. Britain also 
used the creation of the Transjordanian Emirate as a means of conciliation with 
the Hashemites due to its having broken its promises to Sharief Hussein. 
Within this frame, Abdullah's willingness to co-operate with the British to the 
extent of being completely subservient to them in the hope of achieving his 
grand vision and ambition to create a united Arab kingdom in Greater Syria 
was greatly welcomed. Wilson successfully shows that Abdullah's interests did 
not lie either in Jordan or in Palestine per se, but initially in the greater Syria 
kingdom. It was the unfolding of political events that pushed him to Amman as 
merely a stepping stone towards his dream of ruling over Syria, and only in the 
mid 1930s to Palestine, although he never relinquished his dream, which with 
every passing event seemed further from being realised. Thus, it is difficult to 
conceive of British strategic interests and Abdullah's as ever coinciding. In fact 
they were diametrically opposed. In the end, Britain's arrangement with the 
Hashemites in Jordan and Iraq provided two proteges who were manipulated in 
order to safeguard its strategic position in the area. Wilson's benevolence 
towards Britain is in evidence even when she discusses the eventual 
annexation of the West Bank by Jordan. 
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Bhtain's behaviour during that period could be least described as politically 
motivated, let alone the policy of Jewish colonisation and settlement that took 
place under British protection, culminating in the 1948 Palestinian catastrophe. 
To complete the success of the Zionist project, the British granted Abdullah a 
free hand to rule the area that was allotted by the UN partition plan to the 
Arabs. Thus, it was not the fragmentation of the Palestinians' nascent 
resistance movement that allowed Britain to ignore Palestinian voices, as 
claimed by Wilson, but its own interests that saw this development as 
unwelcome, threatening the Zionist project. This is not to mention Abdullah's 
political play, sanctioned by Britain, for undermining the Palestinian resistance 
movement by exploiting the competition between its two major factions, the Al-
Nashashibis and the Al-Husaynis, playing one against the other to the benefit 
of the Jordanian regime and Britain by having Palestinian representatives 
sanction the annexation of the West Bank during the Jericho conference in 
1948. Moreover, it is difficult to see Britain's reluctance to provide arms and 
ammunition to Jordan, Iraq and Egypt during the 1948 war as a scrupulous 
honouring of the UN arms embargo while giving the Zionists the time to 
replenish and increase their armaments. Under the best of intentions that can 
only be seen as politically motivated rather than a strict adherence to the UN 
resolution, whose consequence were the retreat in Arab positions to the 
advantage of the Zionists. 
Despite the above criticisms, Wilson's book is an important reference for those 
concerned with Jordan. The author was fortunate in being able to use the 
Public Records documents that have been made public to enhance her 
analysis and provide her with a wealth of official documents related to this 
critical period of the making of the state especially those related to Abdullah's 
ties with the Zionists, and those containing embarrassing details of the 
relationship between Abdullah and Britain. 
Ma'an Abu Nowar's book The Creation and Development of Transjordan 1921-
1929 is among the recent publications covering the early period of the 
formation of the state. Yet the inappropriate theoretical/analytical underpinning 
of the study undermines the relevance of the book. Abu Nowar puts the 
question of the formation of the state in Jordan within a framework of political 
competition, of equal importance and strength among the Hashemites, Britain, 
France and the Zionists, in an era described as dominated by nationalism, 
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which was equally potent among all these major actors. He maintains that it 
was the rise of this tide of nationalism that precipitated the collapse of the 
Ottoman empire and the emergence of new states in the region. British and 
French nationalism is seen, then, as the motivation for the division and 
domination of the Levant, a process facilitated by their advanced political and 
economic organisation. Thus, mention of the crucial factor, behind the division 
and artificial creation of states in the Levant, as well as in accelerating the 
collapse of the Ottoman empire, namely Western capitalism and imperialist 
competition, is totally absent from the work. 
As a result a major flaw underpins the work in that it misinterprets the reasons 
behind the creation of the state in Jordan. Rather than seeing it as a product of 
Britain's role and strategic interests without which there would not have been a 
separate political entity in Jordan, the author attributes it to nationalism and 
nationalistic feelings. Thus, Abu Nowar avoids discussing the crucial role of 
Britain and accordingly portrays the relationship between Abdullah and the 
British as one among two competing equals. He fails to see the constraints on 
Abdullah in Jordan as caused by the very nature of the relationship dominated 
by the British and their interests (which Abdullah and his entourage understood 
perfectly well and which explains the essence of their co-operation with the 
British), but instead presents it in terms of personnel feuds and antagonism 
between Abdullah and the British officials. Another consequence of Abu 
Nowar's ignoring Britain's role is the explanation he offers for the failure of a 
local force to emerge as a unifying element. That too was wrapped in 
nationalistic jargon and put in terms of a missing man of 'light and leading', and 
Abdullah was just that man, filling a vacuum. 
In such a study, covering a short period of the history of a country, one would 
expect to find a more serious treatment of and emphasis on some crucial facts, 
such as the role of Al-lstiklalis in the first three years of the creation of the 
Emirate and their marginalisation by the British, the resistance to central rule, 
the uproar that followed the signing of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1928 and 
the subsequent organisation of a conference in Amman demanding its 
annulment and the independence of Jordan from British influence. Instead 
emphasis was laid on matters that were not particularly significant such as, a 
purported shift from an individual rule to a constitutional/institutional rule, to 
which a whole chapter is devoted. The political system in Jordan up until the 
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present has not operated on such a basis and the executive is not accountable 
to the legislature especially the king, whose powers override both the executive 
and the legislature. 
In his attempt to present a 'pro'-Hashemite interpretation and a benevolent 
view of the British, Abu Nowar has produced a study that is essentially a 
historical narrative, with very little to offer by way of analysis that might foster a 
better understanding of the formation of the state or of that particular period in 
Jordan's history. In addition, the author's desire to glorify Bedouin/Arab/lslamic 
culture and values leads to an orientalist approach, emphasising the 
unchanging, eternal nature of the Arab culture, hence his claim that despite the 
seventy years of transformation of Jordan, people's attitudes towards their 
tribal customs and traditions, familial discipline and Muslim culture has not 
changed. 
Jordan and the Palestinian Issue 
The second theme of the literature review involves looking at one of the very 
significant ramifications of the creation of the state of Israel, namely the relation 
between Jordan and the Palestinian population - who overnight found 
themselves without a home, and soon afterwards under the rule of the 
Jordanian regime. In this connection two writers warrant discussion, Clinton 
Bailey and Uriel Dann. 
The stated goal of Bailey's book, Jordan's Palestinian Cliallenge 1948-1983, is 
to examine the struggle between the Hashemite monarchy and the forces of 
Palestinian nationalism over the future identity and location of those two-thirds 
of Palestinians in the East Bank and the West bank who have been Jordanian 
citizens since 1948. The author hopes, therefore, to redress what he considers 
an imbalance and shift the focus of the Palestinian issue away from Israel to 
Jordan, since that is where he believes the main theatre of conflict to be, and 
hence it is the outcome of that struggle 'that will determine ultimately the 
destiny of the Palestinians as a people'. 
The core of Bailey's argument, which stems from his Ph.D. thesis 'The 
Participation of the Palestinians in the Politics of Jordan', is as follows. The 
52 
turmoil which riddled Jordan from the 1950s till the early 1970s and which 
carried through into the 1980s had been caused by Palestinian nationalism, 
whose aim had been the toppling of the Hashemite monarchy and its 
replacement with Palestinian rule as a prelude to the liberation of Palestine. 
Therefore two irreconcilable camps emerged, with opposing goals: the 
Palestinians, who aim at regaining Palestine, and the Hashemites, who wanted 
to rule. Following this, policies on the part of the monarchy were aimed at 
minimising Palestinian influence while not losing legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Palestinian population under its rule. Palestinian policies on the other hand, 
aimed at maximising the exposure of the regime's anti-Palestinian stances and 
pro-Western inclinations to gain influence. 
Since Bailey's primary concern is to avoid the main theatre of conflict, namely 
Israel, the context for the discussion of the Jordanian-Palestinian relation and 
Palestinian nationalism is devoid of its crucial frame of reference, that being the 
rise and fall of pan-Arabism. Without that frame it is difficult to arrive at 
accurate historical analysis of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Hence Bailey 
discusses Palestinian nationalism as one phenomenon throughout those three 
decades, thus missing an essential point, that in the 1950s Palestinian 
nationalism was part and parcel of Arab nationalism and the focus was on Arab 
unity as a way to achieve the liberation of Palestine. The struggle with the 
regime, therefore, was not between Palestinian nationalism and the 
Hashemites but between the forces of Arab nationalism and/or progressive 
movements that emerged following the defeat of the 1948 war and the 
traditional leadership. A new urban educated younger generation took over, 
with followers from both sides of the Bank cutting across the imposed 
Palestinian-Jordanian divide. Hence the 1950's epitomised the struggle 
between an opposition movement having a wide political spectrum 
(nationalists, Ba'thists, socialists and communists) against the regime and its 
traditional allies. 
As to the claim that the opposition aimed to overthrow the Hashemites, this 
remains mere speculation, since the declared objective of the opposition in 
Jordan was to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy with a 
government accountable to the parliament, hence limiting the absolute powers 
of the king, in addition to severing Jordan's special ties with the West. 
Moreover, Bailey ignores the fact that the Palestinian bourgeoisie and some of 
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the prominent families had been an integral part of the ruling class in Jordan, 
they provided support and loyalty as much as loyal East bankers. He, 
therefore, fails to see the Palestinians as part of the ruling class in Jordan or 
appreciate that economic and class interests played a major role in defining 
who was in the regime camp and who was opposed to it. It is not simply a 
matter of a regional division between East Bankers and Palestinians. 
By contrast, the post-1967 period saw the full crystallisation of an independent 
Palestinian movement as a result of Arab defeat and total resignation to the 
fact that a consolidated Arab effort was not forthcoming, and that the 
Palestinian themselves would have to foreword a separate agenda to regain 
their lost land. Thus, the struggle that emerged between the regime and the 
PLO is qualitatively different from the period of the 1950s. The PLO, which 
represented Palestinian nationalism and the aspiration for self-determination, 
did present a Palestinian challenge to the ruling class in Jordan and an 
alternative. Bailey also fails to make another significant distinction that 
between the Palestinians within Jordan since 1967 and those under Israeli 
occupation. The Palestinians in Jordan are fully integrated into the socio-
economic structure of the society and the possibility of their moving to the 
Occupied Territories in a future settlement (except the refugees, who are a 
separate category) is very unlikely. They, therefore, do not have the same 
impact on a future settlement as those under Israeli occupation. Thus, just as 
the rise of Nasir and Arab nationalism dominated the 1950s and 1960s, to the 
same extent were the decline of Nasir and Arab nationalism crucial for the 
development of an independent Palestinian nationalism. One can see how 
ignoring the regional context in which Palestinian nationalism developed limits 
understanding of the dynamics of the Palestinian-Jordanian relation, and for 
that matter, the Arab-Palestinian relation. 
It is apparent that such discussion and the shifting of focus that Bailey aimed at 
is politically motivated in order to advance the Jordanian regime as the 
legitimate heir to the West Bank and to avoid the central problem of 
Palestine/Israel. Therefore, however convincing Bailey's presentation of the 
Jordanian-Palestinian relation as the essence, Israel remains the centre of the 
conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli relation is the core, regardless of how many 
are in the Occupied Territories or in Jordan, or for that matter any other place 
in the Arab region, since the question relates primarily to the usurpation of land 
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and the dispossession of a people by a settler-colonial state which effectively 
replaced them and is attempting to annihilate them physically and 
psychologically. The fact of the Palestinian Diaspora should attest to the 
centrality of Israel to the Palestinian issue, rather than blur and confuse it. 
Moreover, legal niceties such as the Palestinians being holders of Jordanian 
citizenship and the West bank having been occupied while it was under 
Jordanian rule are not justifications for overlooking the development of 
Palestinian nationalism or denying its legitimacy, while Bailey is more than 
willing to give full support to the Jordanian regime's claim over a people that 
have shown over and over again that the PLO is their sole legitimate 
representative. In retrospect, the 'intifada', the Palestinian uprising, if anything 
has showed that the Occupied Territories is the main theatre of conflict and 
that Israel will be forced to acknowledge that and to directly deal with the 
Palestinian issue. Because of Bailey's political motivation, both his thesis and 
book in the end provided limited insight into discussing Palestinian nationalism 
and its relation with the Jordanian regime. 
Uriel Dann's book King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism 1955-
7567 discusses part of the period covered by Bailey's book, but from a different 
perspective. He focuses on addressing the question of how and why King 
Hussein survived this crucial turbulent period against all odds and most 
predictions (among those who predicted his days as numbered was the author 
himself). The methodology he uses to answer this major question centres 
around discussing in three parts the major challenges confronting Hussein and 
the manner in which he overcame them simultaneously tracing the evolution of 
Hussein himself from the young inexperienced monarch to the veteran king. 
Although Dann's treatment of the various challenges - the consolidation of 
Nasir as the pan-Arab leader, the dismissal of Glubb Pasha, the Al-Nabuisi 
government, the alleged Zarqa plot, the federation of Egypt and Syria, the 
overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq and the development of the new challenge 
of the PLO - is highly informative and analytical, the work only partly achieves 
its goal. Dann has been able to provide a relatively satisfying answer to the 
question of how Hussein survived all those challenges, yet he leaves until the 
concluding few pages consideration of the second part of the question why 
Hussein survived. Thus it is no wonder that he provides a shallow 
interpretation, focusing on the personality of Hussein and his qualities as a 
ruler, going so far as to claim that Hussein survived because of his singleness 
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of purpose which his adversary Nasir in wishing his destruction lacked, in 
addition to good luck. This is a far cry from academic analysis, providing no 
insight into the study of either Hussein or of the period under consideration. 
Yet one might say such an answer fits logically with the methodology of the 
book, where Hussein is the centre-piece and the discussion revolves around 
him. Because of this the book lacks any examination of the socio-economic 
context and the political power configuration of Hussein's rule, which are far 
more important than Hussein's personality and good fortune. Another problem 
faced by the reader is the reference to Jordan throughout the book as the 
'Jordan Entity' or the 'Hashemite Entity', without any explanation being provided 
for an idiosyncratic choice of terminology. If it is meant to illustrate the lack of 
durability of the Jordanian polity it contrasts oddly with the main aim of the 
book, which is precisely to explain a miracle of durability. If it illustrates the 
artificial division of the Levant, it is strange coming from someone who 
obviously has strong distaste for Nasir, and for pan-Arabism and what it stood 
for. This brings us to another problematic usage in the book, that of the term 
Arab radicalism. Although the phenomenon central to the book the author 
does not provide any definition of it, and the reader is left with the assumption 
that he equates it with pan-Arabism. As a final remark, while Dann is more 
successful than Bailey in providing the context in which the events of the 1950s 
and the 1960s took place, he fails to highlight the Palestine issue, hence the 
impact of Israel and its creation on the developments of Nasir, pan-Arabism or 
'Arab radicalism'. 
Jordan, Israel and a Peace Settlement 
The works by Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv and by Adam Garfinkle provide 
stimulating material and an insight into the third theme of this critique of the 
literature on Jordan, namely, the role of Jordan in a future peace settlement. 
These two recent books confirm the fact well-known, but always denied by 
Jordan, of the secret relation that existed for years between Jordan and the 
Israelis and behind-the-scenes negotiations for a peaceful settlement. The 
interesting thing about these two books is their timing. If any of the information 
given in these books was published only a few years ago it would have been 
extremely damaging to the Jordanian ruling class legitimacy and prestige. But 
the release of such sensitive information attests to the dramatically changed 
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situation in the Arab world and its acquiescence to the idea of accepting and 
recognising the state of Israel. 
Melman and Raviv's book Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians and 
Palestinians is an apt journalistic account of the secret and clandestine 
meetings and negotiations conducted by Jordan and Israel over the past few 
decades. One might wonder about the appropriateness of the title of the book 
and the fact that only the first chapter discusses the 'intifada'. But if the implicit 
aim of the book is considered the title can be seen as most befitting, since the 
authors wanted to show the necessity of Palestinian participation in any future 
settlement and the futility of years of negotiation between Jordan and Israel. 
The 'intifada' highlighted that fact and emphasised that the Palestinians remain 
the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention disrupting the calculations of 
Jordan, Israel and the United States, whose diplomacy, formal and informal, 
had been based on giving Jordan a special role in any future settlement. 
Melman and Raviv provide detailed information concerning the venues and the 
political figures involved in the secret meeting, as well as those who acted as 
go-betweens such as Dr Herbert, who for years acted as the link between the 
two sides in Britain. In addition they provide details of the topics of discussion 
and other personal exchanges, some of which are highly embarrassing, such 
as the gift to King Hussein on his forty-first birthday of an Israeli-made Galil 
assault rifle and the king's message congratulating the Israelis on their 
successful mission in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976. More significant is the 
security and intelligence co-operation which has led since 1976, following the 
eruption of the Lebanese war, to the setting up of direct telephone and telex 
lines in addition to the frequent visits of Israeli intelligence officers. 
Moreover, the authors trace the Hashemite-Zionist connection back to the 
period prior to the creation of the Israeli state when Abdullah was seeking 
economic co-operation between the two sides, and then co-operated with the 
Zionists and the British in accepting the UN partition plan of Palestine and in 
being instrumental in taking over land allotted to the Arabs according to the 
plan. Yet the co-operation intensified, reaching its zenith after the 1967 war, 
and continued to be motivated on both sides by the same objective, namely to 
prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state. Hence, contacts had been 
aimed precisely at arriving at a settlement that would prevent such an 
57 
eventuality. Although in the end these extensive contacts did not produce a 
formal agreement they were significant as 'an exercise in damage control'. 
Moreover, an extensive network of practical arrangements emerged over a 
number of years described by an Israeli official as ranging 'from anti-
mosquitoes to anti-terrorism tactics'. These contacts, especially the high level 
political ones fluctuated depending on political changes in both Israel and 
Jordan, such as the severance of the high level contacts during Likud 
premiership. But the low level contacts maintained a continuity despite these 
fluctuations, since they involved day-to-day issues. 
One specific discussion in the book that is extremely relevant highlights the 
existence of two main points of views within the Jordanian establishment 
concerning the West Bank, which the authors term the minimalist and the 
maximalist. Basically, the minimalists whose view crystallised after the 1970 
confrontation with the PLO and who - led by Prince Hassan - are fearful from 
what some quarters of the Israeli establishment had been terming 'Jordan 
being Palestine' or the possibility of 'transfer', that is a large number of 
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories being expelled across the bridge to 
Jordan. They also acknowledge Jordan's limited geographical power vis-^-vis 
the more powerful Israel, Iraq and Syria, in addition to its demographic 
predicament. Hence they prefer to relinquish any claims to the West Bank, 
especially since they believe the Israeli occupation led to the formation of a 
new political order and a much more politicised population, whose 
incorporation might again threaten the instability of Jordan. 
The maximalists, who are led by King Hussein, had been adamant about the 
return of the West Bank to Jordan up until 1977, when Likud came to power. 
Its settlement policy and creeping annexation made the possibility of the return 
of the West Bank and Jerusalem weaker by the day. Yet as the authors rightly 
indicated these two divergent positions do not represent a serious wedge in the 
ruling class, since, the official line had been that Jordan wanted to regain every 
inch it lost. This stance has been manifested by the rapprochement between 
the PLO and Jordan during 1984-8 indicating once more their 
interdependence, as they simultaneously struggle to limit each other's 
influence. Hussein cannot talk to Israel without the sanction of the PLO and 
Israel's adamant stand on not talking to the PLO directly emphasises the need 
for a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. Also, and more significantly 
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Jordan has prepared a development plan announced by Prince Hassan himself 
and based on Israeli-Jordanian co-operation in order to restrain the influence of 
the PLO and create enough economic interests and benefits to allow the 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to make peace without the involvement 
of the PLO. 
The unexpected Palestinian 'intifada' followed by Jordan's severing ties with the 
West Bank changed the situation for both the PLO, Israel and Jordan. Thus, at 
the height of negotiations between Jordan, Israel and the US on the one hand, 
and Jordan and the PLO on the other, for convening an international peace 
conference came the uprising to put a halt to the whole process though not for 
long. The Gulf War, if it did not succeed in bringing down Saddam, succeeded 
in changing dramatically the balance of power in the region in favour of Israel, 
Jordan, and the Gulf states, once more at the expense of the Palestinian 
people. 
Adam Garfinkle's book Israel and Jordan In the Shadow of war can be 
characterised as a more scholarly version of Melman and Raviv's work, 
focusing on the same subject but within an academic methodological frame. 
The author takes the secret relation between Jordan and Israel as a unique 
case in studying the significance of functional contacts in the mediation of 
political change, especially since despite the extensive informal arrangements 
that developed over time between the two parties, these did not prompt them to 
conclude a formal peace treaty, yet they were instrumental in containing the 
conflict. Garfinkle, in contrast to Melman and Raviv, is interested in putting 
forward a case for the necessity of a significant role for Jordan in a future 
peace settlement irrespective of the 'intifada' and the subsequent 
disengagement of Jordan from the West Bank. 
Garfinkle specifically identifies three major elements as constituting the 
continuing significance of Jordan's role during a negotiated peace settlement 
and aftenA/ards. These are the procedural, protective and practical elements, 
deriving their strength from Jordan's extensive functional ties and informal co-
operation with Israel. The procedural contribution of Jordan is seen in its 
helping to avoid stalemate in negotiations due to Israeli unwillingness to talk 
directly with the PLO, and also to overcome Jordan's inability to participate in a 
negotiated settlement without the PLO. Consequently, a joint Palestinian-
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Jordanian delegation solves the dual problem while ensuring that any future 
Palestinian entity will not be fully sovereign. Hence it achieves the shared 
objective of Jordan and Israel of limiting the expression of Palestinian 
nationalism. 
As to the protective element of Jordan's role, this is seen as decisive in the 
implementation stage of any settlement, since any such settlement will involve 
many concessions which might end up threatening the very process of 
implementation. In other words, Jordan will be instrumental in imposing the 
settlement and keeping the Palestinians docile. By doing that it is also 
protecting itself and Israeli interests simultaneously. As for the practical 
element, it consists of what Jordan can contribute in terms of its experience in 
practical co-operation with Israel. That experience as well as the already 
existing extensive web of arrangements covering a wide range of issues, will 
be instrumental and particulariy needed during the implementation stage of the 
settlement. 
The case Garfinkle puts forward implies the continuation of Israeli-Jordanian 
control over the Territories irrespective of the settlement, be it a state or an 
autonomy entity, in order to safeguard the interests of both Jordan and Israel. 
Thus what has come about of the informal co-operative regulatory environment 
and the effective condominium over the West Bank will continue, but this time 
within a framework of 'peaceful' coexistence of all parties. This also implies 
that the kind of political system that might eventually evolve will be manipulated 
by both Israel and Jordan. In retrospect, that is exactly what has been 
happening with the peace process. The role of Jordan has proved to be 
essential, and the contours of the discussion, so far as one can see, point to a 
settlement where the Palestinian expression of nationalism will be extremely 
limited and poised between Jordan on the one hand and Israel on the other. 
To substantiate his case Garfinkle probes into the long history of the 
Jordanian-Israeli secret meetings and uses it as the basis of his argument. He 
maintains that even if these contacts did not produce a peace settlement they 
contributed to limiting regional instability and effected regional balances as well 
as the establishment of low and high level of contacts were extremely 
beneficial in pushing the peace process fonward and would be immensely 
helpful during the implementation stage of a peaceful settlement. He uses 
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similar material to disclose this part of the unwritten history of Jordan as 
Melman and Raviv. In addition, he provides an interesting discussion of the 
most recent example of the condominium co-operation over the territories, 
namely the attempts to undermine the 'intifada'. 
Garfinkle sees the severing of ties with the West Bank, which entailed stopping 
the salaries that Jordan had been paying to civil servants since 1967, as part of 
the reinforcement of the economic squeeze which Israel was practising in the 
hope of starving the uprising financially. This has been supplanted by other 
measures, including limiting the amounts of money carried through the bridges, 
and putting quotas on agricultural produce crossing the bridges. But the 
ultimate objective has been the forcing of the PLO into acknowledging the 
mutual dependence of Jordan and the PLO on each other in any future 
settlement. Hence, after the severing of links Yasser Arafat met Hussein in 
Amman and agreed to co-ordinate strategy while announcing that co-ordination 
with Jordan 'was a necessity that cannot be ignored'. In other words Jordan 
has forced the PLO into a more moderate position and has maintained an 
influence on the ultimate shape of Palestinian nationalism. 
The Economic Development of Jordan 
The last theme in this critique is the most important from the point of view of 
this research, yet where the available literature is most sparse. The economic 
development of Jordan has not yet generated the same interest in the 
academic community as its political history. My review will be limited to 
discussing the work of Michael Mazur, the books edited by Bichara Khader and 
Adnan Badran, and Rodney Wilson, and the Ph.D. thesis of Anan Ameri. 
Mazur's book Economic Growth and Development in Jordan covers the period 
1959-79 and is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the 
development of Jordan prior to the 1967 war, the second part the post-war 
economy, and the last part the development policies and future prospects. The 
work is informative and rich in data, yet it is very limited in providing substantive 
socio-economic analysis of the development of Jordan. It is typical of a good 
conventional macroeconomics treatment of the subject focusing on economic 
sectors and sub-sectors and devoid of any social context. As a result the book 
lacks a central argument and any understanding of the complex changes in the 
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social structure of the society. That said, the book is a useful reference in so 
far as it provides some understanding of the various sectors and the overall 
performance of the economy supported by the relevant data as a prelude for a 
more in-depth analysis of Jordan's development. 
The book edited by Bichara Khader and Adnan Badran The Economic 
Development of Jordan is a collection of articles presented at a conference in 
Belgium in 1985. Consequently it treats a variety of topics, such as the role of 
foreign aid, the use of remittances, the role of commercial banking, agricultural 
development, labour migration, industrial development and development 
planning. All of these articles provide interesting and relevant data, but there is 
no compelling analytical view or a central argument concerning the process of 
economic development in Jordan except an emphasis on its remarkable 
achievement in spite of its dire economic resources and the turbulent political 
history of the region. The approach of all the contributors is based on 
conventional economic analysis with no reference to socio-economic context. 
As a general review of the economy of Jordan the book is useful, especially 
articles such as Khalil Hammad's on the role of foreign aid, Francois Rivier's 
discussion of the regional dependence of the economy on the oil economy, 
also Michel Chatelus's article discussing the positioning of Jordan between a 
'rentier' economy or a producer economy and the effects of the oil surplus 
revenues on its development. 
The book edited by Rodney Wilson Politics and the Economy in Jordan, is one 
of the most recent publications on the economic development of Jordan. Like 
the previous book it is based on a conference, one held in London in 1987. It 
includes several articles covering a variety of issues, grouped into five parts. 
The first three parts focus on the economy and take up issues such as foreign 
aid, the role of the private sector, the trade deficit and Islamic banking. The 
remaining two parts concentrate on some major domestic and international 
political issues such as the electoral law of 1986 and the implications of the 
Iran-Iraq war for the Arab Israeli conflict. Although the book claims to 'break 
fresh ground' in the discussion of Jordan's economy, society and politics, it fails 
unfortunately to meet such an ambitious aim. 
The parts that deal with the economy provide the usual conventional 
macroeconomics analysis devoid of any substantive analysis of or reference to 
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the socio-economic context. For instance, the article that discusses foreign aid 
is concerned with concluding that there is a positive correlation between foreign 
aid and economic development. This is too simplistic an approach for such a 
crucial factor in the development of Jordan without even mention being made 
of the resultant economic dependence and its political implications. Similarly, 
agriculture, a central and problematic sector, was discussed without any 
reference to the effects of the state-led strategy of promoting export crops on 
distorting agriculture production and the food dependence of the country. The 
same can be said of the rest of the articles, which serve to provide data, 
information and analysis to support the basic position of the contributors, 
namely the resilience of Jordan against all odds. 
Secondly, although the book is based on a conference convened in 1987 (prior 
to the economic crisis of 1989), it was published in 1991. Hence an attempt 
should have been made to either add a chapter discussing the recent drastic 
economic changes that necessitated the imposition of an IMF structural 
adjustment programme or to make reference to the crisis in the introduction. 
Similarly, mention should have been made of July 1988 disengagement policy 
of the regime towards the West bank, especially since the editor refers to it as 
part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and refers to the loyalty of West 
Bank Palestinians to the Hashemite regime. 
The most important article in the book is Yezid Sayigh's Jordan in the 1980s; 
legitimacy, entity and identity, primarily because the argument he advances 
appears to be enjoying wider acceptance and needs to be reconsidered ^ The 
core of the argument is as follows. The legitimacy of both the Hashemite 
monarchy and the Jordanian nation-state is no longer in question or under 
challenge; in addition a specific Jordanian identity based on combining East 
Bankers and Palestinians has been consolidated, although its success still 
depends on the dynamics of the Palestinian-Jordanian relation. In taking this 
position Sayigh vacillates between two very different claims that cannot be 
entertained simultaneously; on the one hand acknowledging the development 
and consolidation of a specific Jordanian identity and on the other claiming that 
such an eventuality depends on what happens on the Palestinian front: which 
he presumably means depending on the outcome of a peace settlement. 
Moreover, Sayigh's analysis of the Palestinian-Jordanian is cluttered with 
confusing historical facts and issues in order to present a politically motivated 
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argument without presenting any compelling understanding or explanation of 
the dynamics of the relationship. 
Thus, Sayigh claims that the Palestinians have posed a challenge to 
Hashemite rule since 1921. Accordingly, the Hashemites have been fighting 
the battle to achieving an identify distinct from the Palestinians since the 
mandate period. Although they won such a separation, the events of 1948 
forced a change by absorbing a large part of the Palestinian population, while 
the consequences of the 1967 war were seen as positive since they relieved 
the regime of the Palestinians as a potential source of conflict. Moreover, the 
1970-1 was seen as marking the beginning of the end of the conflictual relation 
and the start of the phase of consolidating a specific identity based on welding 
the population of Palestinian origin with the East bankers. 
There are two problems with this. Firstly, the creation of and the boundaries of 
Jordan, as mentioned before, were the outcome of British strategic interests, 
and not of the Hashemites striving for a separate identity from Palestine. 
Significantly, this proposition contradicts with the raison d'etre of the 
Hashemites during the First Worid War as the force behind the idea of Arab 
kingdom, which included Palestine. Secondly Sayigh's argument blurs the 
significance of the creation of the state of Israel in determining the dynamics of 
the relation between the Palestinians and the Jordanian regime. Moreover, to 
present the PLO and Palestinian nationalism simply in terms of a rival 
movement and a threatening development to the stability of Jordan is to deny 
the most significant part of the history of the Arab region, since the time of the 
mandate, namely the Palestine-Israel conflict. In this light Sayigh's reference 
to the Palestine issue as the Palestine phenomenon is understandable, 
although in no way acceptable historically or academically. 
Other than lacking due emphasis on Israel, Sayigh's interpretation of the 
Palestinian-Jordanian relationship lacks also the regional context, just as some 
of the previous studies have done. The rise and fall of pan-Arabism and the 
emergence of the Gulf States as the main actors in the region have been the 
major factors behind the increasing legitimacy not just of the regime in Jordan 
but of other states in the region. Consequently, the stability of the regime is not 
a matter of ridding itself of the PLO presence, although that was a contributing 
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factor, but due primarily to the changes brought about by the oil boom. In that 
context alone can the increased legitimacy of the Arab states be explored. 
More important - and this is the crux of the misinterpretation that Sayigh's 
argument represents - is the fact that this increased legitimacy has not been 
based on the construction of new norms of legitimacy. Thus the assumption 
that a new Jordanian identity has been consolidated is far from reflecting the 
reality, since this necessitates a complete restructuring of the basis of state 
legitimacy and power. The ruling class in Jordan still relies on traditional 
informal forms of legitimacy and on patronage system of social and political 
interaction as well as on its ability to manipulate the regional divide of the 
society between Palestinians-East Bankers, and the minorities. Although 
Sayigh is right in indicating the declining influence of tribal affiliation, but that 
had not been replaced by civil or citizenry identity but rather by familial 
connections. This particular continuity, despite the new process of 
'democratisation', is brought out very well in the article following Sayigh's. 
Philip Robins discussion of the electoral law of 1986 clearly shows how the 
regime, instead of welding the two regional groups and the minorities, is still 
guided by the need to manipulate and fragment the population. Such laws 
which determine the composition of the parliament make the success of the 
'democratisation' process in producing the change in citizen-state relations 
based on formal institutionalised civil rights as opposed to primary solidarities 
and affiliations very doubtful. 
Last I shall review Ameri's Ph.D. thesis 'Socio-economic Development in 
Jordan 1950-1980' which focuses on testing the application of the dependency 
theory to Jordan's pattern of development with the aim of contributing to both 
the theory and the study of Jordan. She takes the period 1950-80 as a whole 
in order to investigate the suitability of the two major assumptions that underlay 
the dependency theory. The first concerns the exploitative relation between 
the core and periphery, characterised by the transfer of surplus value from the 
periphery to the core; which accounts for the underdevelopment of the 
periphery while the core continues to grow and accumulate wealth. The 
second, which extends from the first, is that the character of the periphery is 
the outcome of this exploitative relation. Thus Ameri's project centres around 
proving/disproving these assumptions as they apply to Jordan. 
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Even if one is to accept that the transfer of surplus is the primary reason 
behind the 'underdevelopment' of the 'Third Worid', Ameri does not provide any 
operational definition of such a controversial concept, especially in the light of 
the fierce criticism that dependency has come under. She seems to use the 
term as meaning the transfer of money-capital, hence she proceeds to prove 
that the transfer of surplus in the case of Jordan has taken the opposite 
direction, that is from the core to Jordan and in latter years, from the periphery 
to the periphery, that is from the Gulf states to Jordan. Ameri also, in this 
discussion, misses a very important element in examining the direction of 
capital in that the real inflow, especially from the late 1960s onward, might not 
be as she claimed, since the outflow in terms of servicing external debt of 
Jordan (payments of interests and principles) witnessed a huge increase due 
to the expansion in loans, in addition to Jordan's chronic trade deficit which 
implies a large outflow of capital from Jordan. This means that huge amounts 
of aid in effect had been recycled back to the West through demand on 
commodities, machinery and services. Moreover, to assume that because of 
the smallness of the market and the population, as well as the West's 
overriding political-strategic concern in Jordan, there has been no economic 
exploitation of Jordan is a simplification and misinterpretation of the pattern of 
development of Jordan and its intermediary economic role in trading on behalf 
of foreign capital as manifested by the saturation of its domestic market with 
foreign capital, goods and commodities. 
The soundness of testing the second assumption is naturally affected by the 
conclusion regarding the first. Thus Ameri, after considering the sectoral 
development of the major sectors of the economy, maintains that Jordan has 
much in common with 'developing' societies. But since Jordan is not exploited 
by the core its underdevelopment is then the result of internal exploitation. 
Ameri, in her attempt to redress the imbalance inherent in the dependency 
school by its focus on external factors, ignores the effects of global capital and 
the position Jordan occupies within the international capitalist market. Also 
despite Ameri's criticism of the dependency theory as focusing on nations and 
relegating the internal class relation to the background, she is unsuccessful in 
considering it and in redressing this bias via supportive analysis. Her 
discussion of the development of the social structure of the society and the 
class alliances that underpin state power is fragmented and does not produce 
a coherent picture. As a result her conclusions, that dependency fails to 
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explain variation among 'developing' societies and that the character of 
Jordan's peripheral capitalist development is due to internal exploitation are not 
substantiated by her analysis. It is unfortunate that Ameri has limited the 
usefulness of her research by the theoretical frame with which she has chosen 
to work, since the substantive-empirical side of the work is interesting, 
shedding light on many aspects of Jordan's socio-economic transformation. In 
this respect her work remains a very important source to consult. 
In summary this critique highlighted the two major constraints of studying the 
development of Jordan: the first is the lack of an appropriate account of its 
political economy and the second the absence of any studies on the boom era. 
In the following chapter an attempt will be made to redress the former while the 
whole study attempts to redress the latter. Moreover the critique indicated the 
fertile ground for research especially when considering present day substantial 
changes such as the dual process of shrinking state role and emphasis on the 
private sector, the 'democratisation' process and the effects of a 'peace' 
settlement on the triangle of Jordan, Occupied Territories and Israel. These 
challenging issues, with far reaching effects on the region, provide an 
extremely interesting and stimulating research material. 
Notes 
1. See John Roberts (1991), 'Prospects for Democracy in Jordan', Arab 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14 Nos. 3 and 4, Summer/Fall. 
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Chapter Three 
The Political Economy of Jordan 
This chapter aims to address the limitations indicated in the previous chapter of 
the existing accounts of the political economy of Jordan, by producing an 
alternative-critical account over the period 1921-1973, that is, since the 
inception of the state and prior to the oil boom. The period will be treated as a 
whole, although it contains three distinct phases: the formative years of the 
state, 1921-50, the period after the annexation of the West Bank, 1950-67, and 
the period after the loss of the West Bank, 1967-73. Since this account is not 
intended to be a historical review but an attempt to delineate the most crucial 
and characteristic attributes of the political economy of Jordan, specifically the 
East Bank, prior to 1973, the Palestinian dimension will be discussed in so far 
as it bears directly on the subject of the research. 
This discussion will help in laying the grounds for understanding the changes 
engendered by the oil boom, as well showing that the crisis of development 
and state ineffectiveness is a structural crisis directly associated with the 
particular formation of Jordan's political economy, rather than a temporary 
phenomenon resulting from the international and regional recession or the 
reduction of the level of external state resources, although these have been 
important contributing factors. This is further complicated by the tension that 
besotted the state from the outset between creating private economic interests 
while maintaining the significance of the Hashemite ruling family. These 
economic interests if they become too powerful can capture the state on their 
own, without the need for the Hashemite family. Hence private economic 
interests has been promoted but remained dependent on and subordinated to 
the state. 
The first section of the chapter focuses on disclosing the particular basis and 
nature of the organisation of state power and the process of legitimating 
Hashemite rule, while the second examines the nature of the private economic 
interests induced and fostered by the state and the overall class structure of 
the society that has evolved since the imposition of central rule, which has 
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emphasised Jordan's place as a commercial and service oriented economy 
and the high dependence of private interests on the state. This will make clear 
the fact that despite the close association of the state with the ascendancy of 
the Hashemites and irrespective of how powerful are the state's political and 
economic structures, the Hashemite family could not have ruled by remaining 
divorced from society and/or by resorting to repressive measures, although 
these have been very important. The very process of establishing the authority 
of the Hashemite family necessitated the creation and sponsorship of social 
forces attached to it while maintaining a central role for the Hashemites. 
The Organisation of State Power and Structures of Legitimacy 
The determining role played by the political realm in the formation of the state 
and its ruling class has, since the very inception of the state, made the question 
of its legitimacy a critical one. This has been a problem for other states in the 
region (Hudson 1977) but more so for Jordan; owing specifically, other than the 
essential problem of lack of legitimacy of a capitalist class, to four factors: lack 
of a separate political and/or urban entity prior to the creation of the state, (In 
contrast for instance with Syria, Palestine and Lebanon), the Hashemite ruling 
family being a force from outside the area; the sponsorship of an imperial force 
and the persistence of very close and special ties with the West, and most 
importantly Jordan's relation to the Palestine issue. These four factors 
continuously cast doubts over the economic and political viability of the state. 
Yet Jordan has been among the most stable states in the region and its ruling 
class seems to emerge triumphant after each major challenge, in particular the 
two most serious challenges, posed by the nationalist government of Sulaiman 
Nabuisi in 1956-7 and by the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1970-1, as 
will be discussed In the following sections. 
The relevant question, then, is, how were the state's power and its structures 
organised to create and maintain the legitimacy of the Hashemite family and its 
class alliance? In order to answer this question, the discussion focuses on 
elucidating the economic and political underpinnings that characterise state 
power. The separate discussion of the economic and the political domains 
does not in any way imply a dichotomous relationship between the two, rather 
they are treated separately for analytical purposes in order to detail the aspects 
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of each domain. The dynamism of the relationship will be clear from the 
discussion. 
The Economic Foundation 
The imposition of central rule on a predominantly subsistence economy meant 
that the emerging ruling class lacked the internal economic resources to 
empower itself and facilitate the building of the state. This has been 
compensated for, however, by the significant size of external capital receipts 
provided by the West in exchange for use of Jordan's most important asset, 
namely its geographical location. From the outset Jordan's location has been 
Britain's primary motivation for establishing central rule given its desire to 
safeguard its sphere of influence by preventing French access to Palestine and 
to create a buffer zone for the Zionist project that was then in the making. The 
boundaries of the territory were appropriately drawn by the British to reflect 
their prevailing interests. As Antonius eloquently puts it in describing the 
frontiers of Jordan: 
in following its destined course as the permanent dividing line 
between the French and British spheres it [the frontiers] violated 
almost every known law of physical and human demarcation ... It 
has stood as an artificial wall on either side of which each of the two 
powers has established her own language and currency, and 
instituted altogether different systems of administration, of education 
and of economic regulations and planning. (Antonius 1961:357) 
The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 further emphasised the 
importance of Jordan's location as a buffer zone for the security of Israel and 
as instrumental in absorbing and controlling the displaced Palestinian 
population as well as suppressing the development of a 
nationalistic/progressive movement east of the state of Israel, which has 
rendered the Jordanian ruling class and the Palestinian cause inseparable. 
Jordan's location also became an asset in enhancing the security of the oil rich 
Gulf states across its north-eastern borders to the peninsula, due to the 
securing of a conservative pro-Western regime and of the vital transit route, the 
importance of which had been further emphasised following the consolidation 
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of oil as the major factor underpinning the development of the region. Thus 
Jordan's aptness, which first appeared as part of the dynamics of inter-
imperialist rivalry over the Levant, emerged over the years and proved to be 
extremely expedient. It is the perpetuation of this political subservience of 
Jordan to Western and American interests in the region that has produced a 
state and has helped In sustaining an interest on the part of the West in 
maintaining it, a responsibility that has slowly shifted to Gulf states, especially 
following the 1973/4 oil boom. 
Externally-derived funds, therefore, made possible the building and 
maintenance of the state and provided the necessary funds to stimulate the 
creation of an economy offering an opportunity for the emergent key social 
forces to benefit and prosper, hence cultivating their allegiance and loyalty to 
the Hashemites. Simultaneously, the base of state revenues was from the 
outset located outside the domestic economy, increasingly dependent on the 
inflow of external capital, which gave state institutions, in particular the military 
establishment, a prominent economic and political position, owing to their 
appropriation of a large part of the assistance. Thus the basis of the state's 
power and the prominence of the state lie in the state's ability to extract the 
necessary funds from abroad in exchange for a political-military role that 
safeguards Western interests, and its ability to channel these funds in society 
via state institutions and agencies. 
The significance of external resources in sustaining the state and stimulating 
economic activities is illustrated in Table 3.1. Foreign capital during the period 
1924/5-73 constituted on average more than half of state revenues. This share 
has increased from 26 per cent in 1924/5 to 48 per cent in 1973, and has 
exceeded 70 per cent in some years. Foreign capital had to a large degree 
determined the levels of state expenditure which became by far the most 
important source of expenditure in the economy and the major creator of 
economic activities. As can be seen from Table 3.2, foreign revenues 
accounted on average for more than a quarter of the GNP. 
The sources and the nature of the external funds have varied according to the 
major shifts in international and regional power structures and the evolving 
strategic/political significance of Jordan. Thus, as a reflection of the 
international shift from a pax Britannica to a pax Americana and the emerging 
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Table 3.1 Relative Importance of domestic and foreign revenues for the period 1924/25 -1973 
($ million) 
Domestic Foreign Total Total Foreign revenue / 
revenue revenue revenue expenditure total expenditure 
% 
1924/5-1933/4 0.64 0.22 0.86 0.86 25.58 
1934/35 0.75 0.28 1.03 1.03 27.18 
1939/40 1.03 1.28 2.31 2.31 55.41 
1943/44 1.79 5.48 7.27 7.27 75.38 
1955/56 22.34 30.43 52.77 49.36 61.65 
1956/57 24.03 35.05 59.08 59.69 58.72 
1957/58 27.69 43.74 71.43 66.80 65.48 
1958/59 30.46 55.19 85.65 82.15 67.18 
1959/60 37.38 51.52 88.90 85.96 59.93 
1960/61 38.75 50.54 89.29 91.95 54.96 
1961/62 41.10 52.89 93.99 92.34 57.28 
1962/63 59.08 49.67 108.75 105.05 47.28 
1963/64 53.90 42.95 96.85 110.15 38.99 
1964/65 66.70 75.71 142.41 122.13 61.99 
1965/66 75.38 67.20 142.58 163.85 41.01 
1967 71.37 125.78 197.15 190.82 65.92 
1968 73.60 127.80 201.40 225.46 58.68 
1969 91.06 122.50 213.56 247.55 49.48 
1970 84.73 106.12 190.85 225.96 46.96 
1971 100.10 118.83 218.93 232.80 51.04 
1972 120.00 156.40 276.40 284.31 55.01 
1973 129.30 159.71 289.01 334.63 47.73 
Source: (Aruri 1972:61) and (Qaralbeh 1987:202). 
Table 3.2 Relative importance of foreign resources to the GNP for the period 1959-1973 
(%) 
1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 
31.20 20.62 17.53 16.32 26.19 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
20.26 18.27 15.47 25.96 22.70 
Source: (Hammad 1987:17). 
importance of Jordan in America's overall Interests In the region, the United 
States in the mid 1950s supplanted British patronage which had been crucial 
during the first four decades of the creation of the state. As stated by American 
officials, the principal objective of United States in Jordan stems from its 
greater Middle East interests of: 
1. Maintaining good relations with all Middle East states and 
stimulating a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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2. Neutralising Soviet influence in the Middle East and preventing 
polarisation of the area. 
3. Protecting oil resources in the Arabian peninsula and Persian Gulf. 
(Report to Congress 1973) 
Jordan's function in this stems primarily from its strategic position as a buffer 
state that separates Israeli and Saudi territory from Iraq and Syria, a position 
which might be threatened if a change in regime occurred in Jordan or if either 
Iraq or Syria absorbed Jordan. The United States continued to provide 
assistance predominantly in grant form to support state structures, in essence 
the military establishment. Although it officially became the major source of 
Jordan's external assistance only in 1957, a variety of economic assistance 
measures preceded that, beginning in 1952, when approximately $4.7 million 
was given in grants. With the signing in July 1957 of a technical and economic 
assistance agreement, the level of assistance increased to $59.4 million, 
bringing the total for the whole period 1952-72 to around $692 million, as 
illustrated in Table 3.3. The grant element of this assistance was 95 per cent. 
Table 3.3 Total US assistance to Jordan for the period 1952-1972 
($ million) 
1952-1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 
Economic assistance 
Loans 23.0 1.8 1.5 8.3 1.2 1.7 37.5 
Grants 544.9 17.2 10.3 3.9 20.6 57.7 654.6 
(budget support) (368.8) - - - - (55.0) (423.8) 
Total economic 567.9 19.0 11.8 12.2 21.8 59.4 692.1 
Military assistance 71.7 0.4 14.2 0.2 59.3 49.3 195.1 
(Grants) (56.7) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (29.3) (39.3) (125.6) 
Total assistance 639.6 19.4 26.0 12.4 81.1 108.7 887.2 
Source: (Report to Congress 1973:29). 
most of it given directly to the state as budget support. Also, Jordan received, 
within a decade and a half, $195 million in military assistance, of which 64 per 
cent was in grant form, bringing total American assistance to over $887 million. 
Moreover, Britain's ability to continue subsidising Jordan after the Second 
World War was determined largely by the one billion dollars of military 
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assistance it received from the United States during the period 1949-61 (Chase 
1977: 169). 
The switch to American sponsorship brought with it one significant occurrence, 
a new focus on the development of the domestic economy and the expansion 
of economic opportunities through the initiation of state development 
programmes. This approach was an integral part of the American strategy, 
following the dismantling of the colonial system and the emergence of the 
Soviet Union as a counter global power, of using the mechanism of 
development planning, under the auspices of Western inspired and dominated 
international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UN, to 
maintain Western interests and influence in 'developing' societies, and combat 
the 'threat' of communism. Another important underlying reason for adopting 
the mechanism of development planning is connected to the new reality 
created in Jordan following the establishment of the state of Israel. The 
extension of Jordanian rule over the West Bank and the change in the 
constitution of the population to a Palestinian majority, coupled with the rise of 
Arab nationalism, directly threatened the hegemony of the Jordanian ruling 
class, not to mention the security of Israel. The expansion of economic 
opportunities was, therefore, intended as an effective mechanism for 
quietening political demands and establishing vested economic interests as a 
means of giving the state more viability and continuity. It was also 
accompanied by a new thinking, first voiced by Prime Minister Hazza' Al-Majali 
and later by Wasfi Al-Tal, emphasising the promotion of economic benefits to 
East Bankers as well as increasing their share in official state positions through 
the spread of education, in order to counter the instability caused by the 
Palestinian population. 
It was in this context that the government established the Jordan Development 
Board in 1952, fittingly headed by a British secretary general and an American 
representative of the Point Four Programme (for technical and financial 
assistance). It acted in its first years as an administrative unit channelling 
British and American financial and technical assistance. As a result the first 
development plan for the country was prepared by a World Bank mission, in 
1957, which made an extensive study of the economic situation and 
recommended a ten year development programme. It was not adopted 
because of the political turmoil and instability of the 1950s, which further 
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emphasised the need to bolster the economy as an instrument of political 
pacification and co-optation. Thus the first development plan to be adopted 
was the seven year programme of 1962-8 prepared by the Jordan 
Development Board. It undenwent substantial changes due to its 
overestimation of the level of American financial support and a new version 
was prepared covering the period, 1964-70, implementation of which was 
interrupted by the 1967 war and the loss of the West Bank to Israel. The 
planning process resumed in 1971 for the East Bank alone under the authority 
of the National Planning Council (NPC), which replaced the Jordan 
Development Board. Although the NPC was endowed with a special planning 
law, in addition to its right to contract foreign loans, it remained more an 
instrument of administering and channelling external financial resources to 
various state agencies. In 1972 the Council prepared the second development 
plan for the period 1973-5, beginning a new phase in the country's 
development, based on an unprecedented flow of external resources, as will be 
seen in Chapter 4. 
The importance of this new emphasis on the economy is that it has been 
accompanied by the emergence of loan capital as another important source of 
external resources to fund the expansion of the state's economic role, further 
concentrating capital in the hands of the state. The availability of loan capital 
also facilitated the state in its emerging policy of funding its development effort 
mainly from loan capital and giving little attention to the costs, especially since 
a large part of these loans were spent on infrastructure projects, mainly 
transport and communication, limiting the ability of the domestic economy to 
repay these loans. This policy helped to release as much as possible of the 
grant-capital assistance to sustain the increase in state consumption 
expenditure, while allowing loan capital to increase significantly. The 
proportion of loans in total foreign receipts grew from 2.1 per cent in 1953 to 10 
per cent in 1970, and to 16.5 per cent in 1973. It is still small, but showing 
signs of upward movement. The volume of loans contracted over the period 
1968-72 reached JD40.4 million and so came close to the volume contracted 
over the period 1950-67 of JD50.7 million (Tarief 1984: 42). These loans were 
to increase in later years, leading to a serious debt problem in the late 1980s. 
Arab assistance started to figure prominently since 1967. Prior to that it had 
been insignificant, totalling only JD21.4 million for the period 1959-66 
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(Hammad 1987:24). This increase was the result of the emerging wealth of the 
oil Gulf-states and the shift in regional power towards Saudi Arabia, and the 
increased importance of Jordan as an important factor in the security of oil 
sheikhdoms. During the Khartoum Arab summit, following the 1967 war, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Libya committed themselves to subsidising Jordan by JD40 
million annually, in addition to $42 million given by Saudi Arabia and $14 million 
by Abu Dhabi as immediate emergency funds. In the period 1967-73 Jordan 
received JD224 million grant-in-aid from Arab countries, half of which was 
designated to the Occupied Territories as 'steadfastness' funds to be 
channelled by Jordan (ibid.). More than just assistance to alleviate the effects 
of Israeli occupation, these funds were aimed at maintaining the influence and 
connection of Jordan's ruling class to the Occupied Territories to offset the 
increasing popularity and support of the emerging independent Palestinian 
national movement. They permitted Jordan to continue paying salaries to its 
ex-civil servants, to subsidise municipalities and religious and charitable 
institutions (Bailey 1984: 103). Thus, following the 1972 municipal elections, 
the majority of mayors, such as Elias Freij, Ma'zouz Al-Masri, and Mohammad 
All Al-Ja'abari were pro-Hashemites, taking into account the fact that the 
elections were boycotted by the Nationalist Front. Besides containing the 
independent Palestinian movement, the threat of the legitimacy of Gulf states 
being undermined necessitated the lending of financial support to the 'front-line' 
states, Jordan, Syria and Egypt, in addition to increase their leverage upon and 
influence over events in the area. 
The assistance designated for Jordan was used, in particular, to modernise 
and expand the army in terms of equipment and manpower. It also served to 
compensate for the reduction in American assistance, which was kept at a 
minimum level partly as a punitive measure for Jordan's participation in the 
1967 war and partly as a consequence of US policy having changed towards 
relying on its ally Saudi Arabia to act as Jordan's major donor state. After the 
military confrontation in 1970-1 between the Jordanian army and PLO forces in 
Jordan, Libya suspended its aid permanently, and Kuwait temporarily, 
resuming it retrospectively in 1973, while Saudi Arabia continued with its 
assistance. The Americans as a sign of support to the ruling class action 
against the PLO resumed its assistance to higher levels than ever before. The 
real surge in the volume of Arab aid occurred after the 1973 oil boom. Suffice 
to say that Arab subsidy was geared too as much as British and American 
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subsidy to nurturing the Jordanian ruling class through providing the needed 
capital to maintain the state, in particular the military establishment, for the 
purpose of maintaining a balance of power in favour of the conservative pro-
Western regimes in the area. 
Beginning in late 1950s another source of external resources started to figure 
as a source of income, namely remittances, although their importance during 
this period is incomparable to that of post-1973/4 oil boom in the region. The 
migration process primarily to the Gulf area, started in the late 1950s as a 
consequence both of the displacement of the Palestinian population and the 
loss of their livelihood and of the limited economic opportunities on the West 
Bank. The 1961 population census of Jordan indicated that of 62,863 
Jordanians working abroad, the ovenwhelming majority were from the West 
Bank (Kanovsky 1976: 365). The volume of remittances during the 1960s and 
early 1970s was relatively low and fluctuating, as shown in Table 3.4. They 
started to surge to unprecedented levels after 1973, accentuating the 
dependency on external capital, as will be seen in the forthcoming chapter. 
Table 3.4 Volume of remittances fertile period 1961-1973 
(JD million) 
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
5.25 6.17 9.10 6.60 6.92 5.54 4.97 7.41 14.70 
Source: (Saket 1985:26). 
The Political Foundation 
Although the economic power of the state and the concentration of capital in its 
hands constituted the most important element in building and sustaining the 
state, not to mention being the means by which a ruling class was created, this 
was not enough on its own. Two other factors were significant, namely the 
ideology - that is, the generalised political cultural values and sentiments that 
the ruling class instilled - and the political structures of the state. The 
articulation of both the political and economic foundations make up the whole 
structure of state legitimacy. 
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The Ideological Legitimacy 
Initially, Abdullah who had been motivated by his personal ambition of creating 
an Arab kingdom in the Levant, was not interested in Jordan per se, hence his 
attempt to appeal to a wider Arab audience by associating himself with 
members of Hisb Al-lstiklal, who represented a threat to French rule in Syria 
and a direct threat to the process of establishing a Jordanian polity subservient 
to British interests. The influence of the Istildalis in the eariy years of the 
administration of the Emirate and their alliance with Abdullah was subsequently 
short lived. The British put an end to it by either eliminating their presence and 
influence or co-opting them into the project of building the new state - an 
example is Ibrahim Hashem who, twice became Jordan's Prime minister during 
the formative years of the state. This was done with the minimum of resistance 
on the part of Abdullah, who recognised his need to and dependence on the 
British, if he is going to have any base from which to rule. 
Attention came to focus then on building a local power base, especially given 
the continuous resistance of both the tribal and sedentary population to central 
rule and the emphasis, therefore, lay on exploiting the well established centres 
of localised power as well as the traditional forms of affiliations and loyalties to 
which the population was receptive considering the prevalent political culture. 
This explains why the Hashemites were successful in Jordan, in comparison 
with Iraq, where the political culture was more developed and urbanised, given 
to republican, nationalistic and anti-imperialist attachments (Hudson 1977: 
272). Thus local leaders were co-opted through economic inducements, 
political favours etc., while the state relied on their local power structures to 
maintain order; this is not to mention the creation of the military and the role it 
played in pacifying and integrating nomads and semi-nomads. Additionally 
there was manipulation of the rivalry and conflicts existing among the various 
tribal groups, notably the southern tribes of Al-Huwaitat and Bani Sakher and 
the northern tribes. The northern tribes exhibited less cohesion than the 
southern tribes, and were fragmented into numerous leading families 
representing various areas such as the Al-Rusan from Samha, the Al-Batainah 
from Irbid, the Al-Shraidah from Kura, the 'Ubaidat from Kfarat and the Fraihat 
from Irbid (Robins 1988: 54). This division and its manipulation has survived 
up until the present. 
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Kinship, familial and tribal affiliations were not the only primary forms of identity 
and solidarity that were exploited. The presence of two minorities, a Christian 
one accounting for 7.5 per cent of the population, and a Circassian and 
Cheshan, accounting for 2 per cent, provided another established channel to 
appeal to (ibid. 47, 229). From the start these two groups were relied upon in 
both military and civil administration and were represented beyond the 
justification of their numerical positions (Aruri 1972: 39-41). Thus the 
ideological foundation of Jordan's ruling class was laid during the formative 
years of the state. 
This ideological foundation had been strengthened during the reign of King 
Hussein, by adding a new dimension that was missing in the person of 
Abdullah, namely personality and charisma as well as a better exploitation of 
the history of the Hashemites. Hussein successfully invoked his blood ties (the 
Bani Hashem is a clan of the quraysh tribe of Mecca which had ruled Mecca 
and the Hijaz since the tenth century and to which the prophet Mohammad had 
belonged) as a significant qualification for Hashemite rule (Richards and 
Waterbury 1990: 317). This was continuously referred to in his speeches and 
the media along with emphasis on the Hashemites 'reputed' historical role in 
the Arab revolt. Moreover, Hussein had fused this with paternalistic rhetoric, 
that also characterised his speeches and public statements as when he 
referred to himself as a 'father' figure, a head of a 'family', or the 'shepherd' of 
sheep that sometimes err, which implies that he is above all factions, his role 
being that of an arbiter who maintains the cohesiveness of society and without 
which chaos will prevail (ibid.: 318). 
The exploitation and manipulation of the diversity of sub-statal traditional forms 
of identity and affiliations continued with the addition of a newly imposed 
regional division between Palestinians and East Bankers. It must be stressed 
that this cleavage has been a post-1950 development, following the creation of 
the state of Israel and Jordan's annexation of the West bank. Prior to that, the 
engagement of a large number of Palestinians in the various agencies of the 
state, who were drawn from the urban educated stratum and who were 
experienced in running state affairs, did not have the same implications. Since 
the historical context during the first decades of the development of the state 
was qualitatively different. Jordan never knew a separate political existence, 
and has had closely knit ties with Palestine and Syria. Many Syrians and 
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Palestinians have settled in Jordan prior to the creation of the state and 
economic and social ties with Palestine have been significant. It was only due 
to the establishment of a Zionist political entity in Palestine and the subsequent 
diaspora and loss of the Palestinians of their homeland that a new historical 
context of division and conflict emerged, not just between the Arabs and the 
Israelis but also among the Arabs themselves. 
The most noticeable conflict among the Arabs has been between on the one 
hand Palestinian nationalism, first expressed within a pan-Arab ideology and 
later within an independent Palestinian national movement, and on the other 
Jordan's ruling class Political/strategic role, which is closely tied to the 
enhancement of Western interests in the region. The co-operation and 
acquiescence of some Palestinians, notably the wealthy leading landowning 
and/or merchant families, who in fact made possible the annexation of the 
West Bank in 1950 and their loyalty to the throne gave further impetus to this 
wedge, since it gave the ruling class in Jordan a basis of legitimacy to the West 
Bank and its claim of championship of the Palestine question^. In many 
instances individuals of Palestinian origin were appointed to see through 
difficult and unpopular policies, such as giving Sulaiman Toukan the post of 
military governor in 1957 in order to head the clampdown on the opposition 
movement and the heading of the military government of September 1970 by 
Mohammad Daoud. These Palestinians who have benefited economically and 
politically became part and parcel of the ruling class in Jordan. 
The Political Structures 
The second element in the political foundation of the legitimacy of the 
Jordanian ruling class is political structures. These are in themselves an 
important source of legitimating the political system (Hudson 1977: 22). In 
addition, they effectively and concretely translated the ideological basis of 
power and legitimacy; thus they functioned on the basis of representing the 
various traditional affiliations and emphasising a patronage system of 
appointments and promotions. This facilitated the concentration of the 
governing class among leading landowning and/or merchant families, cutting 
across tribal, regional and minority affiliations. Moreover, these manifest the 
establishment of a political system where ultimate power rests in the hands of 
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the king, who acts as the final guarantor of the maintenance of ruling class 
hegemony. These structures are the cabinet, the parliament, and, most 
significantly, the military. 
The Cabinet: The king is empowered to appoint and dismiss the prime 
minister and by custom sanctions the other ministerial posts; hence he directly 
controls and regulates who runs the government and who benefits from access 
to prestigious and powerful positions. Considering the highly centralised 
decision-making process and in light of the historical marginalisation of the 
parliament, which means the executive lacked accountability to the populace 
and had been relatively independent in pursuing policies, this political body is 
particularly important. 
Appointments to the cabinet, therefore, were concentrated among a few 
prominent and economically influential families, with a sub-statal balance in 
view. It must be stressed that what appears to be a representation of the 
various social groups in society is simply political manipulation to ensure the 
Hashemite's continued importance to the system. Also, the cabinet rotation 
has been used as an important mechanism to absolve and detach the 
Hashemite family, especially the king from unpopular policies. Thus ministers 
and top level management become the focus of public resentment and 
disaffection; hence dismissal or changes in incumbency aim to curtail 
opposition, but without effecting any real changes. Additionally, the diversity of 
political figures' reputations is utilised depending on political events. Some are 
favoured among the Palestinians, others have good relations with Iraq or Syria, 
etc. Some ministerial posts such as the Interior have been reserved for East 
Bankers although three Palestinians whose credentials were beyond doubt 
have been appointed, Kamal Al-Dajani, Hasan Al-Khatib and Hashem Al-
Jaiyyusi, while Foreign Affairs have been reserved for Palestinians in order to 
allay the fears of the Palestinians that the regime is acting against their 
interests (Bailey 1977:106-7). 
From among East Bankers a regional balance has been maintained between 
the southern axis of Karak-Ma'an-Tafeilah, the northern axis of Irbid-Ajlun and 
the middle axis of Amman-Salt. Hence from the south the Al-Majali family, in 
addition to the Al-Talhouni, Al-Tarawneh, and Al-Madadheh families dominated 
the cabinet, as have from the north the Al-Tal, and Al-Hindawi, while from the 
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middle the Al-Louzi and Al-Faiz2. The privilege for the Circassian community 
rotated among the Al-Mufti, Mirza, and Al-Muiki families, while the Christian 
community was represented by the Mu'asher, Abu Jaber and 'Akasha families. 
Members of the royal family, although they have been few, reflecting the small 
size of the family compared to the ruling families of Gulf states, were extremely 
influential and provided unquestionable support to the king. They included, 
Sharief Zaid Bin Shaker, Sharief Nasir bin Jamil and Sharief Hussein bin Jamil. 
Among the families of Palestinian origin the Toukan, Al-Nabuisi, Al-Dajani, Al-
Jaiyyusi, and Nuseibeh were the key ones. 
It is interesting to note that the prime ministerial post rotated predominantly 
among political figures of Palestinian origin. During the formative years 1921-
50 four key individuals, Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda (seven times), Hasan Khaled Abu 
Al-Huda (three times), Ibrahim Hashem (twice) and Samir Rifa'i (twice) held the 
post. These men have played a determining role during this period and have 
continued to be of service beyond it. As to the period 1950-1973, the post has 
been shared roughly equally between loyal leading families of Palestinian origin 
and East Bankers. Among the Palestinians were Samir Rifa'i and Ahmad 
Toukan, in addition to the aforementioned Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda and Ibrahim 
Hashem. The first East Bank prime minister, Hazza' Al-Majali, of the southern 
city of Karak, was appointed in 1955. Others included Al-Louzi, Al-Talhouni, 
Al-Tal, Juma'a and the Circassian Al-Mufti family. Thus, prior to 1973 there 
has been a slow shifting in emphasis towards building an East Bank top 
management and governing body, which was consolidated during Wasfi Al-
Tal's premiership by his emphasising education and embarking on a policy of 
sending East Bankers abroad for training and study. This was to offset the 
highly educated Palestinian populations' monopoly, by virtue of education and 
qualification, of managerial and technical positions. The post-1973 period 
shows a further acceleration of this process. 
The Pariiament: The pariiament represents the second political structure that 
reflects the organisation of state power, and which had been marginalized and 
contained through two important mechanisms. The first is the king's 
prerogative to dissolve it by a royal decree. This has been the case since the 
first legislative council elected in 1929, which was dissolved in 1931 after a 
period of tense relations with the Emir and the British, since it had debated 
controversial issues and voiced disagreement on issues such as the ratification 
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of the Anglo-Jordanian Agreement of 1928, the Rotengerg concessions and 
the budget (Aruri 1972: 82-85). The following four councils 'acted as rubber-
stamp legislatures' (ibid.: 85). The new constitution promulgated in 1947, 
following the official independence of Jordan from the British, stipulated the 
creation of a bicameral parliament with a chamber of elected deputies and a 
chamber of appointed notables. But no change was stipulated concerning the 
King's effective control over it. Nine chambers of deputies have been elected 
between 1947 and 1973; seven of these were dissolved by a royal decree. 
The last chamber of deputies was elected in 1967. Under the pretext of the 
special emergency state in the country, due to Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank, it was extended to two years. In 1974 it was suspended, and in 1976 
dissolved, and elections were postponed indefinitely - they were allowed again 
only in 1984. The suspension of Parliament came less than a month after the 
Rabat Arab summit, which recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people, formally ending the Jordanian ruling 
class-PLO rivalry over who represented the Palestinians. In the chamber of 
notables appointed after 1974 only eight Palestinians were appointed out of 
thirty members, compared to the previous policy of equal representation, and 
the same was true in the cabinet formed in 1974, which reduced the number of 
Palestinians from ten to four. This is an example of the manipulation of the 
Palestinian-Jordanian division and its use as a pressure card on the PLO and 
the Palestinians to the advantage of the ruling class in Jordan. 
The second mechanism has been the manipulation of election law, making it 
possible to secure a loyal majority drawn predominantly from the prominent 
and loyal families. The essence of parliament's factionally-based allocation of 
seats has not changed since the law was first enacted in 1928. This law 
formally perpetuated society's traditional-parochial attachments and loyalties 
and controlled the distribution of seats in a manner that overrepresented 
communities and areas that were presumed safe and loyal. For instance, the 
Christians, the Circassians and the Bedouins have reserved seats filled by 
appointment: two seats for each the Christian and the Circassian community 
and three seats for the southern, the northern and the middle Bedouins (Aruri 
1972: 78). Furthermore, the rest of the seats are accorded on the basis of 
granting the minorities fixed seats. For instance, Amman the largest 
conglomeration has eight seats, two of which are for Christians and of the 
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remaining seats the Circassians have one (Nyrop et al. 1974: 139). This not 
only exaggerates the electoral power of the minorities but, more importantly 
grants them seats in areas that may have few or no inhabitants (Aruri 1972: 
411). East Bankers and West Bankers have equal representation, which had 
underrepresented Palestinians, considering their numerical strength. In 
addition, a higher number of seats are given to areas such as Karak, Ma'an 
and Tafeilah on the East Bank and Hebron and Bethlehem on the West Bank, 
thus overrepresenting areas that are considered safe (Bailey 1966:118-120). 
The absence of organised political activities and the banning of political parties 
had played a significant role also in permitting the dominance of parliament by 
loyal personages. Thus it is easier to run for elections on the basis of 
traditional connections and associations, candidates propped up by the 
government having the better chances. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior 
has the power to qualify and disqualify candidates, in its capacity of 
determining the final list of candidates for each district; hence the manipulation 
of elections takes place at the level of nominations rather than at balloting 
(Nyrop et al. 1974: 140). This explains the concentration of the same key 
families in the chamber over the years such as the Al-Mufti, Mirza, Mu'asher, 
Abu Jaber, Al-Talhouni, Al-Majali, Al-Faiz, Al-Hadid, Al-Tarawneh, Toukan, Al-
Khatib, and AI-MasrI. 
The only exception to this rule has been the fifth chamber, elected in 1956, 
where political parties were allowed to form and run for office; and the army 
was excluded (as it has been ever since). This brought about the nationalist 
government of Sulaiman Al-Nabuisi, whose policies aimed at curtailing the 
power of the king and at modifying the political system and establishing a 
parliamentary democracy. When the process began to take its toll on the 
authority and dominance of the ruling class the cabinet was dismissed, and the 
resignation forced of fourteen elected members of the chamber. 
As for the chamber of the notables, whose members are appointed by the king. 
It has been an important body for rewarding long serving loyal individuals to the 
throne, and sometimes means of retiring individuals whose usefulness has 
ceased to be of any significance. Its composition over the period 1947-73 
indicates a concentration of the same leading families. Four people rotated in 
heading the nine appointed chambers, including Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda, Ibrahim 
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Hashem, Sa'id Al-Mufti and Samir Rifa'i. The rest of its members were also 
drawn from the same economically prominent families: Sha'sha' and Mirza of 
the Circassian community, Mu'asher, 'Akasha, and Abu Jaber of the Christian 
community; Toukan, Al-Nashashibi, Al-Jaiyyusi, Al-Dajani and Nuseibeh of the 
Palestinian community; and Al-Majali, Al-Tarawneh, Al-Louzi, Al-Talhouni, Al-
Hadid, Al-Hindawi, and Abu Taiyh from the East Bankers. Although there had 
been no formal provision for representing the Palestinians King Hussein tended 
to appoint equal numbers of them, as mentioned above, until the Rabat 
summit. 
The system of partisan political loyalties for appointments and promotion is not 
exclusive to these two state bodies, it permeates the whole structure of state 
institutions: the military, the civil administration, other key institutions such as 
the Intelligence Service and Public Security, semi-autonomous and 
autonomous institutions. In addition, this patronage system in the upper 
echelons of the state fosters a similar trend throughout the society, permitting 
nepotism, favouritism and corruption to thrive. Favourable appointments, 
tendering and the distribution of state funds to key individuals, companies and 
institutions are the predominant aspects of the system, and the wastah (go-
between) is the most common medium of communication and exchange. 
The Military Establishment: The military establishment is the third political 
structure that must be addressed in order to understand the organisation of 
state power and the basis of its legitimacy, especially considering the 
significant role it has played in the consolidation of the state and the 
maintenance of its ruling class. Accordingly, it will be discussed in some detail. 
In 1923, the British created and commanded a military unit whose primary task 
was to overcome the major constraints upon the establishment of central 
government and authority and internal security 3. The task included the 
subjugation and subduing of the tribes, ending tribal raids, especially in the 
areas bordering Iraq and the Arabian peninsula, and securing Jordan's Eastern 
border, especially after the fall of Hijaz at the hands of Al-Saud (Murad 1973: 
30). This original unit (from which the Arab Legion developed) has been, 
during the first decade of the development of the state oriented towards 
creating a sedentary army drawn from recruits among the peasants and 
townspeople. Captain F.G. Peake, its first commander, noted that his policy 
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was to raise a Force from the sedentary, or village, Arabs, which 
would gradually be able to check the Bedouin and allow an Arab 
government to rule the country without fear or interference from the 
tribal chiefs. (Vatikiotis 1967:69) 
With the continuity of tribal raids, however, and resistance to central rule, 
especially among the southern tribes, and the insecurity of the state's eastern 
borders, the British in 1930 summoned J.B. Glubb from Iraq, where he had 
been successful in subjugating the tribes, to serve as second-in-command to 
Peake. By 1939 he had replaced Peake in commanding the army, and 
remained its commander until he was dismissed by King Hussein in 1956. 
Glubb was the architect of present day structure of the military, by shifting its 
foundation towards recruits drawn predominantly from nomadic and semi-
nomadic tribes, hence strengthening its Bedouin character (ibid.: 72). This 
proved the most effective means of absorbing and integrating the various tribes 
into the state and making them the backbone of Hashemite rule. What better 
way to ensure the allegiance of the resisting tribes than by making them the 
guardians of the new state, and successfully exploiting their traditional forms of 
legitimacy and loyalty under dramatically new socio-economic conditions, that 
is, a modern army and state. The deterioration of the local subsistence 
economy, due to the development of money and commodity markets coupled 
with the neglect of agriculture, has helped in boosting the importance of the 
military as a viable alternative source of income for both village people and 
Bedouins. Thus the state's legitimacy was based in rural areas on the military 
while in urban areas on commerce and trade (Ameri 1981). 
This very special constitution of the military underlined the three most important 
characteristic of the military in Jordan. First, it emphasised its internal political 
function as a security force. Overriding concern with internal security served to 
keep the Public Security Forces as part of the military establishment until July 
1956 when it was then separated and placed under a director of public 
security, attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The force did not exceed 
6,000 in the late 1950s, and by 1973 it increased by 1,500, to 7,500 (Nyrop et 
al. 1974: 237). Its relatively modest size and lack of resources testify to the 
military having real power in matters affecting internal security. In addition, as 
opposed to the military the Police have a higher proportion of Palestinian, thus 
in times of difficulty the state relies on either the desert police force (the Badia 
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forces), which is also predominantly tribal, or the military. Secondly, it explains 
the qualitatively different role it played in comparison to armies in other Arab 
states, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and its preclusion from presenting itself 
as a possible alternative political force. The military was kept well outside 
politics until it was required to act on behalf of the ruling class, as will be seen 
in the discussion of the 1956/7 and 1970/1 events. Thirdly, it accounts for the 
ruling class successful manipulation of the Palestinian-Jordanian regional 
division of the society, in order to present the Hashemite family as the only 
viable means to preserve a 'Jordanian' identity for the country. Hence the 
highly personalised relationship between the military and the Hashemites, in 
particular King Hussein who put a strong emphasis on his relationship with the 
military and basing it on his role as a ruler/chief and head of a family/tribe. 
The army grew from a small military force of a few hundred in 1938, to 8-
10,000 in 1948 and 25,000 in 1956. In 1970, it totalled 50,000, rising to 70,000 
in 1973 (ibid.: 221,225). The growth of the army in numbers and complexity of 
organisation, thus, started prior to the 1948 war and has continued unabated 
since. This was necessary, first to facilitate Jordan's implementation of the UN 
partition plan of Palestine, secondly, for the defence of the regime against the 
emerging threats of regional and internal instability following the creation of the 
state of Israel, and, thirdly, to secure a regional balance favourable to the West 
and to Israel by suppressing the development of an independent Palestinian 
National movement and/or a Jordanian national movement threatening to both 
Israel and the Jordanian ruling class. 
This expansion and the development of the technical needs of the military 
necessitated its opening up to urban population and to those of Palestinian 
origin. Nevertheless, its composition remained predominantly Bedouin, in 
particular, in the operational ground units of the infantry and armoured car 
regiments (Vatikiotis 1967: 29). This was possible because it could draw 
recruits outside the boundaries of the state, in particular the Sarhan Bedouins 
from neighbouring Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia (Murad 1973: 139,152). 
According to one estimate the proportion of non-Jordanian Bedouins in the 
army stood at 30 per cent, equal to that of Jordanian Bedouins (ibid.: 46). In 
addition the loyalty of the military has been secured by concentrating most of 
the command and senior staff positions in the hands of Bedouins, loyal East 
Bankers and members of minority groups. Christians and Circassians. 
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The economic significance of the military establishment extends beyond its 
being a major source of employment to having immense influence on the 
character of the economy by contributing to its large service sector. Its 
expenditure has been the largest single item of state expenditure. As 
illustrated in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, until 1963/4, average military expenditure 
exceeded 60 per cent of total government expenditure. Although the 
proportion since then has declined steadily except for the two years following 
the 1967 war, reaching a level of 35.4 per cent in 1973, it still constituted the 
largest single item of state expenditure. It is difficult to interpret this data as 
indicative of actual decline in the proportion of military expenditure since 'it is 
generally acknowledged that a significant amount of foreign aid in the form of 
military equipment is not included in the budget accounts' (Mazur 1979: 124). 
In particular US military aid in kind has not been accounted for in the budget 
(Kanovsky 1976: 69). Thus, an increasing number of military purchases were 
made without official acknowledgement under the pretext of military security 
especially in the post-1967 period with the commencing of large inflows of Arab 
assistance particularly from Saudi Arabia. The real reason was to obscure the 
actual level of military expenditure because of the high commissions which 
accrued to key individuals and their close associates. Also, high military 
expenditure and the expansion to members of the military of services such as 
housing, health facilities and educational services along with a Consumer 
Corporation selling goods at subsidised rates, meant a large number of supply 
and construction contracts, which have been a very important source of income 
to influential merchants and construction companies. 
Although the regime has justified the large resources consumed by the military 
since the establishment of the state of Israel as necessary for the defence of 
the country - Jordan has the longest borders with Israel - this is not the full 
picture, especially given that the military has been consuming a large share of 
state resources even prior to 1948. Its share has been, on average 47 per cent 
of total state expenditure during the period 1928/9-1945/6, and it stood at 74 
per cent in 1945/6 (Table 3.5). Secondly and more importantly, Jordan and 
Israel had shared mutual security concerns in spite of the ideological rhetoric of 
the government and the official state of 'war' between them f Israel on several 
occasions came to the rescue of Jordan's ruling class, especially during the 
1950s and the 1970-1 turmoil ^. Moreover, Jordan on more than one occasion 
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Table 3.5 Relative Importance of military expenditure to total government expenditure for the period 1928-1946 
fPalestinian Pound thousand) 
Military Total Military expenditure / 
expenditure expenditure total expenditure % 
1928/29 121.32 301.22 40.27 
1929/30 128.14 338.46 37.86 
1930/31 135.33 350.53 38.61 
1931/32 144.57 344.98 41.91 
1932/33 141.68 340.88 41.56 
1933/34 140.29 331.92 42.27 
1934/35 138.79 328.43 42.26 
1935/36 147.48 381.30 38.68 
1936/37 156.49 435.04 35.97 
1937/38 160.56 462.71 34.70 
1938/39 168.60 n.a -
1939/40 210.64 874.84 24.08 
1940/41 259.30 810.13 32.01 
1941/42 724.13 1109.42 65.27 
1942/43 848.43 1232.06 68.86 
1943/44 1668.98 2318.53 71.98 
1944/45 2243.09 3129.35 71.68 
1945/46 2400.40 3249.62 73.87 
Source: (Al-Mahafza 1973:94) 
Table 3.6 Relative importance of military expenditure to total government expenditure for the period 1950-1973 
(JD million) 
Military 
expenditure 
Total 
expenditure 
Military exoendlture / 
total expenditure % 
1950/52 5.86 9.15 64.04 
1951/52 8,98 13.79 65.12 
1952/53 9.01 13.43 67.09 
1953/54 9.52 15.46 61.58 
1954/55 9.68 16.56 58.45 
1955/56 10.63 17.63 60.29 
1956/57 13.54 21.32 63.51 
1957/58 13.42 23.86 56.24 
1958/59 16.73 29.34 57.02 
1959/60 18.06 30.82 58.60 
1960/61 18.43 32.84 56.12 
1961/62 18.72 33.09 56.57 
1962/63 19.11 37.62 50.80 
1963/64 21.02 39.34 53.43 
1964/65 21.03 43.63 48.20 
1965/66 21.61 46.99 45.99 
1966* 14.37 38.70 37.13 
1967 24.16 68.15 35.45 
1968 35.16 80.45 43.70 
1969 41.47 88.41 46.91 
1970 33.07 80.71 40.97 
1971 33.78 82.18 41.10 
1972 39.25 100.06 39.23 
1973 42.01 118.59 35.42 
Note: * - nine months. 
Source: (Al-Hindi 1976:125). 
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has solicited Israeli agreement to the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry 
from the Americans, in addition to there being a high level of intelligence and 
security co-operation which was stepped up following the 1970-1 crisis 
(Melman and Raviv 1989: 71-6). 
The full dimension of the significance of the military establishment can only be 
seen by taking account of its internal security role which proved decisive during 
the two most threatening crises of the ruling class hegemony, namely the 
turmoil of the 1950s, in particular, the 1956-7 crisis and the confrontation with 
the PLO in 1970-1, as the following discussion will illustrate. Equally important 
the discussion will show the regional environment slowly changing towards 
accommodating the state of Israel and towards strengthening the idea of Arab 
'nation' states in the region. Thus the seeds of the changes effected by the 
1973-4 quadrupling of the price of crude oil were rooted in the previous 
decade. 
The 1956-7 turmoil During the 1950s the Arab region was gripped by a strong 
wave of nationalistic feeling and anti-western sentiments following the 
establishment of the state of Israel, feelings heightened by the emergence of 
Nasir in Egypt. Jordan was particularly influenced because of its geographical 
proximity to Israel, its annexation of the West bank and its pro-western 
allegiances. A highly active and politicised environment prevailed in the 
country, culminating in the coming to power in October 1956 of the elected 
nationalistic government of Sulaiman Al-Nabulsi. This signified a shift in the 
balance of social forces towards the emerging urban educated stratum with its 
nationalistic/secular ideology and its mass support among the proletarised, 
dispossessed Palestinians and a large part of the masses in the East Bank. 
Hence the ability of the emerging opposition movement to gather thousands in 
demonstrations across both Banks. The traditional forces of the Palestinian 
leadership and the Jordanian regime, that have been blamed for bringing about 
the catastrophe of 1948, came under heavy attack and were slowly being 
marginalised. The ensuing struggle between King Hussein and the Al-Nabulsi 
government epitomised, therefore, the conflict between the old and new social 
forces; a conflict which was ultimately resolved via the military and the 
interference of the Americans. 
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The American embassy in Amman actively participated in rallying and 
organising the traditional forces in the country, tribal leaders and Muslim 
Brothers, and other key military and political figures such as Sharief Nasir bin 
Jamil and Bahjat Al-Talhouni. Its staff increased between April and May 1957 
from 250 to 320 (Abu Hajla 1957: 44). This American involvement is not to be 
underestimated in setting the scene for King Hussein to make his move against 
the opposition movement, although it is 'unpublicised and on occasion denied' 
(Dann 1989: 47), and which was preceded by Hussein's acceptance of the 
Eisenhower-Dallas doctrine, under whose terms the Americans will lend 
support and protection to countries seeking it against the so-called 'communist 
threat'. It was not made public by the king but was related to the United States 
through its ambassador in Amman in January 1957 (Smith 1984: 108). 
Ironically, this happened on the same day that the doctrine was being debated 
in parliament and emphatically rejected by the House of representatives (Aruri 
1972:136-7). Yet the myth of a 'communist threat' was utilised most efficiently 
by both the palace and the Americans to gather support from the traditional 
quarters and heighten the atmosphere of confrontation. 
In April 1957, the king dismissed the elected government of Sulaiman Al-
Nabulsi, and this was followed by the orchestration of a pre-emptive military 
coup d'6tat. The Americans in a show of power and support ordered the sixth 
fleet into the Mediterranean, as well as made public announcements in support 
of the palace. It was imperative for the Americans to secure a decisive victory 
for the ruling class in Jordan, in order to maintain a balance in the region 
favourable to them and to Israel. The defence co-ordination with Syria and 
Egypt and the creation of a unified command, in October 1956, was especially 
alarming. In addition, the Americans were aiming at augmenting the Saudi 
Arabia-Jordan-Iraq axis to contain the Egypt-Syria axis, and at cultivating Saudi 
Arabia as the most influential leader in the region. The purging of the military 
of its nationalistic officers was the last move in the reversal of the anti-Western 
tide of the country and the retaining of Jordan in the orbit of the West. 
Following the 1948 defeat and the performance of the military under British 
control, a number of educated army officers began to assert themselves and 
express displeasure with the British command and control of the military, and 
western influence in the country. It was in response to these nationalistic 
feelings and the general anti-Western mood of the country, that King Hussein 
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dismissed John Glubb in March 1956 and Arabised the army, in the hope of 
boosting his popularity and containing the volatile mood of the country. In 
addition, the king was very much aware of and indeed himself concerned with 
Glubb's reluctance to relinquish visible control of the army. The British 
commanded most of the regiments and all higher formations, as well as all 
sensitive staff appointments. This was defended by Glubb on professional 
grounds; hence when asked by the king about the timing of when Jordanian 
officers could take command his answer was, not until the 1980s (Murad 1973: 
75)1. It must be noted that these army officers, who called themselves the 
'Free Officers of Jordan', were known to the king and contact with them was 
made through the king's personal aide All Abu Nowar, who, contrary to the 
commonly held view, was not a member of the 'Free Officers' movement^. 
The 'Free officers' programme did not at any point include the overthrow of the 
king. They were to be seen as being in harmony with the orientation and 
policies of the Nabuisi government striving for Arab military unity to liberate 
Palestine and for independence from Western influence, as well as a more 
democratic political system in the country (ibid.: 81; Abu Shahout 1987: 57). 
Another important fact about them, in contrast to their claimed image, is that 
they represented a wide range of political views and ideological adherence, 
with few among them actively involved in political parties. The direct influence 
and co-ordination between them and Nasir's Egypt and Ba'thist Syria has been 
excessively exaggerated The palace, in collaboration with two predominantly 
tribal regiments: the Princess Alia regiment and the First Armoured Regiment, 
created chaos in the Zarqa camp, claiming the disclosure of a coup, with the 
former regiment moving to Amman under the pretence of saving the king. In 
what has often been described as a courageous act the king took All Abu 
Nowar - who had been promoted by then to chief of staff and who was 
presumably the leading figure in the coup - to the concerned camp to calm 
down the angered loyal officers and soldiers and to quell the concocted coup. 
The aftermath of the event is indicative of the true intentions and objectives of 
the ruling class. The 'Free Officers' were rounded up and falsely tried, since 
neither the plot itself, nor foreign intervention had been 
demonstrated by the authorities in Jordan. The Zarqa affair, and the 
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treason charges provided the justification needed to restore royal 
authority and suppress the nationalists. (Aruri 1972:147) 
Thus the military trials resulted in their detention in prison for several years. 
Other political activists and political party members were arrested. Also, 
martial law was imposed, political parties dissolved, the security forces placed 
under the command of the army and parliament suspended. Some of its 
members were put under house arrest while others were expelled or their 
membership abrogated, thus assuring that parliament lost most of its vocal 
members and that when it resumed its activities it returned to operating as a 
'rubber-stamp' parliament packed with loyal members (ibid.: 147-150). In short 
all signs of democratic life were suppressed. At the same time, a new 
approach was formulated for containing opposition elements, both Palestinians 
and East Bankers, focusing on integrating them into state apparatus, coupled 
with a general orientation towards expanding the social base of the regime 
through the above-mentioned process of economic development and increased 
expenditure funded by the Americans and other Western agencies. As part of 
this new approach, in the early 1960s, a large number of the tried military 
officers were pardoned and those sentenced in absentia permitted to return. 
Some of these officers were entrusted with important and sensitive posts in the 
military and security apparatus; others held ministerial or ambassadorial posts 
(Murad 1973: 116). The king appointed also the hard core of the nationalist 
rule to the upper house of the parliament, namely Sulaiman Al-Nabuisi, Abdul-
Halim Al-Nimer and Hikmat Al-Masri. Even members of the Al-Husayni and 
Anabtawi families, staunch opponents to the Hashemites, accepted ministerial 
posts. Other leading opponents, such as Musa Nasir, Hana Atallah and Qadri 
Toukan, served as foreign ministers (Bailey 1984:17). 
It must be stressed that this policy has been successful because of its 
coinciding with the beginning of the decline of the ideology of Arab nationalism 
which was precipitated by the failure of the two attempts at unity between 
Egypt and Syria, and Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The plausibility of Arab unity was 
increasingly diminishing and seen as fraught with immense difficulties 
rendering it 'well-nigh'. The 1967 Arab defeat came only to confirm this and to 
increase frustrations and disillusionment of Arab masses, but on the other hand 
helped in increasing the legitimacy of the ruling class in Jordan and it became 
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clear that parochial political interests of individual Arab states override any 
other concern including Palestine. 
The events of the mid-1950s revealed the effectiveness of the military as well 
as its significance as one of the most important instruments for protecting the 
interests of the ruling class. This also became very clear to the United States, 
who in May 1957, just after the clampdown on the opposition movement 
provided the military with a $10 million emergency grant for the purchase of 
American weaponry and for increasing army salaries, followed by another $20 
million at the end of June, and a further $10 million in November (Smith 1984: 
109), in addition to the signing of the technical and economic assistance 
agreement of July 1957. The year 1957 marked the beginning of a long and 
close relationship between the United States and the Jordanian ruling class at 
the expense of both Palestinian national rights and the majority of Jordanians, 
whose livelihood increasingly became dependent on a state obliging to US 
foreign policy objectives in the region. 
The Jordanian regime-PLO confrontation The 1970-1 confrontation with 
the PLO represented the second most important occasion in which the military 
was brought onto the political stage as the ultimate recourse for restoring ruling 
class legitimacy and hegemony. The 1967 Arab defeat and the loss of the rest 
of Palestine dealt a blow to the legitimacy of Arab states, in particular those 
that have been championing the cause for more than two decades: Egypt, 
Syria and Jordan. The crystallisation of the independent Palestinian national 
movement, precipitated by this defeat, with its ideology of armed struggle, 
further challenged their legitimacy, and, more importantly, it provided an 
alternative base of appeal and legitimacy to Arab masses. The Fedayeen 
movement and its operations against Israel inspired and rallied the support of 
the Arab masses as well as raised much hope for the restoration of Arab 
honour, especially after the battle of Karameh in March 1968. The Palestinian 
commandos and the 'local' command of the Jordanian military in the area 
withheld an Israeli offensive, despite huge losses. 
Following this, the prestige and popularity of the PLO skyrocketed. At the 
outset the PLO numbered a few hundred, but by 1969 its membership had 
risen to 12,000. Their training sites and supply and operational bases were 
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spread in the Jordan valley and the outskirts of major cities, including Amman, 
Ajlun, Salt, Irbid and Jerash, in addition to having headquarters in the refugee 
camps in Amman and Zarqa. Besides the building of the military side of its 
operations, the PLO was developing separate Palestinian social and political 
structures and institutions. In other words, it sought to establish a territorial 
base where the majority of the population are of Palestinian origin, with the aim 
of achieving national self-determination for the Palestinian people on their own 
land Palestine. These developments with general sympathetic support, 
including that of the military, which the Karamah battle exemplified, heightened 
the challenge of the PLO to the ruling class in Jordan and increasingly 
threatened its security and authority, not to mention the fear of that what 
happened at Karamah might reoccur. A placard displayed in Amman in the 
name of the 'Unified Fedayeen Forces' affirmed the unity of the Fedayeen and 
the Jordanian army and praised the bravery of the two sides (Pollack and Sinai 
1977: 51). Following that, Hussein in a broadcast was impelled to emphasise 
that 'we are all Fedayeen,' while fears grew among the Israelis, the Americans 
and the ruling class that they were losing control over the military (ibid.). 
At the same time, the PLO was undermining the possibility of a negotiated 
peace settlement. The United States, Egypt and Jordan were involved, since 
the 1967 defeat in pushing for the Rogers peace plan, which called for a 
negotiated settlement with Israel based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 
of 1967 (Kerr 1977: 131), in spite of the rhetoric of the Khartoum Summit, held 
following the 1967 war, and its famous 'three nos': 'no' to peace with Israel, 'no' 
to recognition of Israel and 'no' to negotiation with Israel. The PLO's adamant 
stand against this process - which stood in sharp contrast to Palestinian 
national aspiration, and the very ideology of armed resistance - as well as its 
increasing legitimacy, made its containment and the reduction of its 
effectiveness an imperative requirement for a political settlement along the 
lines of Resolution 242. The September confrontation was the first of a series 
of events aimed at achieving that objective, including Camp David, Syria's 
intervention in Lebanon in 1976, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and, 
more recently, the Gulf War. 
The ruling class in Jordan bought time with a series of agreements on 
controlling and regulating PLO activities and presence in Jordan until the right 
moment arrived. That was when Nasir announced Egypt's acceptance of the 
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Rogers plan in July 1970. Jordan followed suit and the preparations for the 
final showdown accelerated. The Palestinian-Jordanian division was 
heightened through the intensification of a propaganda campaign that 
succeeded in narrowing the implications of the conflict and presenting it as a 
Palestinain take-over, especially within the army. This had been immensely 
facilitated by some of the strategic mistakes of the PLO. In the first place, it 
lacked a clear policy towards Arab states, and its vague slogan of 'no 
interference in internal Arab states' was not helpful, particularly not in Jordan, 
considering the historical ties of the two populations, the majority of the 
population being Palestinian and the historical role of the ruling class in Jordan 
towards the Palestinian issue. Secondly, its pursuit of the 'Palestinisation' of 
the cause, brought about its failure to capitalise on the general sympathy and 
support that was widespread especially after the Karamah battle {Hamlat Aiylul 
1971: 26). Add to this some practices of the PLO such as checking people's 
Identity cards, confiscating cars and interrogating people, in other words 
resisting all state control and assuming all towns and areas to be battlefields. 
These, in combination with the intensive propaganda campaign of the 
government alienated large segments of the population and made the 
mobilisation of the military possible without risking a popular uprising or 
encountering civilian resistance. 
In August the government raised the salaries of army personnel, and in 
September a military government was appointed, headed by General 
Mohammed Daod, of Palestinian origin. Other appointments were made to the 
army and security forces to secure the presence of reliable officers and state 
personnel. The expected split in the army which all factions of the PLO banked 
on did not materialise; only a very limited number of army officers sided with 
the PLO and disobeyed orders (ibid.: 20, 42). The military stood solidly behind 
the Jordanian ruling class, in addition to the public security service and the 
intelligence service. The army attacked both the Fedayeen strong-points and 
Palestinian population centres in general, especially the slum areas around 
Amman crowded with refugees. Zarqa City suffered similar attacks, while the 
fighting in the northern cities of Salt, Jerash and Irbid was less intensive (Kerr 
1977: 149). 
The acquiescence of the Arab states facilitated the task immensely and 
exemplified the fact that the interests of the Palestinian national movement and 
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the Arab states are mutually exclusive and inherently diametrical. Thus it is 
understandable that the Iraqi force of 12,000 troops stationed in Jordan not 
only failed to intervene but was called back to Iraq, while the Syrians withdrew 
an armoured column that crossed into the border near Irbid after a few days 
(Bailey 1984: 58). The dispatching of the American Sixth Fleet to the 
Mediterranean and Israel's reinforcement of its army at the Syrian border 
played a role in the withdrawal of the Syrian force (Nyrop et al. 1974: 152). 
The Cairo summit in September 1970 did not pass any formal censure on 
Jordan and its efforts were very slow in stopping the fighting and observing the 
truce. The suspension of aid to Jordan by Kuwait and Libya was only a gesture 
to appease Arab public opinion. 
Thus, despite the Cairo agreement fighting continued, particularly in Amman, 
Jerash and Irbid, until July 1971. By then the military had completely rooted 
out any presence of the Fedayeen in the country and had achieved its 
objective of destroying all their bases and totally eliminating commando 
presence. Nevertheless, the PLO's political influence, which has been rising 
steadily during the 1970s, culminated in the Rabat summit officially conferring 
on it its role as the sole legitimate representation of the Palestinians, but 
increasingly becoming under the tutelage of the Arab states especially the Gulf 
states. Despite the Rabat resolution, the rivalry between the PLO and the 
Jordanian regime continued to be a source of internal conflict. It was, however, 
subdued by a strong intelligence service and suppression of political freedoms, 
in addition to the expansion of economic opportunities and benefits in the post-
1973 period, as will be seen in the following chapters. 
Once more the Palestine/Israel issue was at the centre of undermining the 
Jordanian ruling class legitimacy, and once more the military proved to be the 
most crucial force for maintaining the ruling class. The United States as a 
reward resumed its military and economic assistance, which has been kept at a 
very low level since 1967. Despite these two crucial events neither the PLO 
nor the nationalistic/progressive forces in Jordan were able to come up with a 
political programme that addressed the specific situation in Jordan without 
adversely affecting the Palestinian cause and the nature of a settlement with 
Israel. This worked very well to maintain the ruling class by maintaining Al-
Iqlimiyyaor regional division which debilitated the opposition. 
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The discussion so far had focused on examining how state structures were 
organised in order to create the legitimacy of the Hashemite family and its class 
alliance. To complete the analysis the following section will focus on the 
elucidating the emergent social structure of the society, emphasising in 
particular that the Hashemites did not rule supreme but through creating and 
maintaining a prosperous private sector and by attaching a large segment of 
the population to the state. 
The Development of the Social Structure of the Society 
The fact that the state and state structures preceded the development of the 
society, coupled with the concentration of capital in the hands of the state, 
attests to both the crucial role the state played in the formation of the ruling 
class alliance and to the evolution of the social structure of the society. This is 
not to ignore the influence of its pre-capitalist formation as well as its place 
within the international capitalist system economically and politically 
subservient to Western interests, a factor which kept its markets open for 
Western goods and maintained its strategic role in the region as part of the pro-
Western axis. The following discusses in some detail the social structure that 
evolved since the creation of the state having in view the total effect of these 
factors, as well as highlights the fact that despite the close association of the 
state with the Hashemite family and irrespective how powerful state's political 
and economic structures, the Hashemites could not have ruled by being 
divorced from society and/or by resorting to repressive measures, although 
these have been very important. In other words the very process of 
establishing the authority of the Hashemites, necessitated the creation of social 
forces that have vested interests in the state. 
The Local Bourgeoisie 
The eminence of state institutions and enterprises and their influence on 
stimulating commercial activities, and the marginal development of the 
productive sectors, explains the dominance of the service sector and its 
contribution to domestic output (amounting to 70 per cent of the GDP in 1973), 
and illustrates clearly the intermediate nature of the economy. In other words. 
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the process of growth and development has been stimulated by state 
expenditure and funded by external resources, reflecting the circulation and 
accumulation of capital rather than the creation and expansion of domestic 
productive facilities. Hence, this process largely stimulated the emergence of 
the commercial bourgeoisie as the most important private sector interest, as 
well as the state bourgeoisie tied to the preponderance of state structures and 
their substantial economic role. Although, state bourgeoisie represent an 
awkward stratum in terms of its power not being rooted in private property and 
of its being incapable of reproducing itself, nevertheless it derives its power 
from access to state funds and its control over them (Richards and Waterbury 
1990: 214-8). The other significant propertied class that emerged as an 
important part of the ruling class alliance is landowners, who were able, 
through state land registration and privatisation policy in the early 1930s to 
register large plots of land in their names, and hence enhance their position in 
society. 
The extension of the state economic role during the 1950s and 1960s through 
the initiation of development planning, coupled with the increased human and 
financial resources (Palestinian businessmen and capital, the increased level of 
foreign assistance, the expansion of state enterprises and the population 
increase), provided further stimulus for the commercial class to expand into 
new fields such as banking, real-estate and contracting, and an opportunity for 
the landed class to become either prosperous farmers or land traders, while 
increasing the power of top executives, managers and directors due to 
increased resources and expansion of state agencies. The following is a more 
detailed discussion of the development of the propertied-class. Although they 
are classified primarily by their major field of activity, one must bear in mind 
that the core of the local bourgeoisie represents a small clique whose activities 
extend to all these fields, concentrating power in a few hands. 
Merchants 
Merchants became one of the most significant social groups, whose prosperity, 
and subsequently vested interests, played a major role in building the 
legitimacy of the state. The economic benefits of the initial period of the 
commercialisation of the economy have been seized predominantly by the 
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Syrian community tliat settled in Amman during the 1920s and 1930s and the 
Palestinians, who had trade links with the area prior to the creation of the state. 
Their experience in money-market and trading practices gave them an 
advantage, in addition, British and Hashemite policy was geared towards 
cultivating special links with these merchants (Robins 1988: 301). It was during 
this time that Syrian families such as the Taba'a and Bdair made their initial 
wealth and established strong links to the Hashemites, in addition to them 
having established a chamber of commerce as early as the 1920s. This 
chamber remained dominated by them until the beginning of the 1950s, when 
Palestinian merchants started to compete with them (ibid.: 306). 
The enlargement of state area, population and resources after 1950 
augmented the wealth of the key families that have dominated the sector, but 
also provided new opportunities for certain families among the Palestinian 6lite, 
especially those that supported and facilitated the annexation of the West Bank 
in order to strengthen their economic status and power. These families include 
the Toukan, Nashashibi, Jarallah, Al-Dajani, Abdul Al-Hadi, Tannous, and Al-
Jaiyyusi. Thus import and wholesale trade had been dominated by a few 
leading families who monopolised the various foreign agencies, dealing mostly 
in consumer goods as well as state supply contracts. Usually these families 
have a wide range of commercial interests examples being the Taba'a, whose 
interests encompass items from luxury automobiles to heavy mining machines 
and surveying instruments, and tiles, and the Ka'awar family, with interests 
ranging from clothing to shipping and tourism. Thus, these prominent 
merchants became increasingly linked to the international capitalist market, 
trading on behalf of foreign capital rather than being associated with the 
developments of domestic production - hence the epithet 'compradore' 
bourgeoisie. 
The lopsided trade pattern that emerged dominated by imports with exports 
making an insignificant contribution is, therefore, not surprising. Imports grew 
from a few thousands in 1936 to over JD10 million by 1950, while exports for 
the same year were JD1.5 million. The trend continued with vigour during the 
1950-73 period, imports growing from the 1950 level of JD10 million to JD108 
million by 1973, amounting to a tenfold increase. Although export earnings 
improved from a level of JD1.5 million to JD14 million for the same years. 
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reflecting the increased exports of agricultural produce in addition to exports of 
phosphate, the gap between the two remained huge (Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7 Trade pattern for the period 1936-1973 
(JD million) 
Imports Domestic exports Trade balance 
1936 0.7 0.2 -0.5 
1938 1.3 0.4 -0.9 
1940 1.4 0.7 -0.7 
1942 2.1 0.7 -1.4 
1944 3.1 1.4 -1.7 
1946 8.7 2.0 -6.7 
1948 12.6 0.7 -11.9 
1950 10.7 1.5 -9.2 
1952 17.3 1.2 -16.1 
1954 19.8 2.4 -17.4 
1956 27.8 4.3 -23.5 
1958 34.0 3.1 -30.9 
1960 42.9 3.4 -39.5 
1962 45.6 4.8 -40.8 
1964 56.5 7.0 -49.5 
1966 68.2 8.7 -59.5 
1968 57.4 12.1 -45.3 
1970 65.8 9.3 -56.5 
1971 76.6 8.8 -67.8 
1972 95.3 12.6 -82.7 
1973 108.2 14.0 -94.2 
Source: (Statistical year book 1973:154-155). 
The high rate of commercialisation of the economy is reflected by the heavy 
reliance of the tax system on indirect taxes, the share of which by 1952/3 was 
50 per cent of total domestic revenues, increasing to 61 per cent in 1970 and to 
further 65 per cent in 1973 (Saket 1985: 17; Central Bank of Jordan 1989). It 
also indicates the bias of the tax system towards protecting landowners and/or 
merchants, whose wealth has actually been tax exempted through the 
exemption of tax on capital gains (shares, dividends, and interests), urban and 
rural property, and agriculture income. Although in the seven year 
development programme 1964-70 specific recommendations have been made 
to improve the tax system and shift the burden from low income brackets to 
high income brackets, since indirect taxes tend to be regressive, they have not 
been adopted since any such shift will influence the affluent families who 
benefited mostly from the present structure. 
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A major contributing factor to the expansion of trading activities had been the 
dominance of government consumption expenditure, being on average more 
than 80 per cent of total government expenditure during the period 1950-1973 
(Al-Hindi 1976: 51). State reliance on imported goods and the rising levels in 
the purchasing power of the population have accelerated the establishment of 
a consumer-commodity market heavily dependent on foreign goods, especially 
considering the neglect of rural areas and agriculture, as well as domestic 
manufacturing - not to mention the fact that the state has not imposed any kind 
of regulation or control on the ever-increasing levels of imports. On the 
contrary, its policies have actually encouraged and supported the expansion of 
consumerism and facilitated the merchants augmentation of their wealth. 
These policies included the monetary policy, which kept the currency value 
high: in fact the dinar was revalued in 1973 by 11 per cent from an equivalent 
to $2.80 to $3.11. Neither values reflect the strength of the economy but rather 
the abundance of external resources. As rightly pointed out if it 'were not for 
the large inflow of aid Jordan has been receiving for over two decades, the 
exchange value of the Dinar would have been much lower' (Mazur 1979: 138). 
This policy made imports extremely competitive, stunting the development of 
domestic production, and allowed for the high level of consumerism and 
improved living standards way above the capacity of the domestic economy. 
No restrictions on import licences or higher taxes prioritising the needs of the 
society were imposed, despite the fact that the seven year development 
programme (1964-70) recommended the imposition of a luxury tax to curb 
luxury consumption. Furthermore, the state totally exempted its imports from 
customs and duties, including all its agencies - government departments, public 
institutions, municipalities, universities, as well as the military establishment 
and its associated Consumer Corporation, the intelligence service, and the 
public security service without even invoking a discussion concerning the 
effects of such a policy on the domestic economy. Consumption, both 
government and private far exceeded GDP reaching a level of 139 per cent in 
1973 (Table 3.8). 
Commercial activities were not confined to trade in goods and services, 
especially in the aftermath of the 1948 war, which was followed by the 
annexation of the West Bank. The influx of Palestinian refugees and the 
overnight tripling of the population of Jordan induced a significant increase in 
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Table 3.8 Uses of gross domestic product for tfie period 1954-1973 
(JD million) 
1954/55* 1964 1966 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Consumption expenditure 60.4 155.7 188.8 183.3 211.5 222.1 245.7 263.1 
Government 46.2 31.1 37.3 55.9 58.7 60.4 68.3 80.1 
Private 14.2 124.7 151.5 127.4 152.8 161.7 177.4 183.1 
Gross capital formation 5.5 18.8 27.7 27.1 25.2 30.7 36.3 47.2 
GDP (at factor cost) n.a. 135.5 149.6 138.2 154.7 166.1 182.8 188.9 
Share of total consumption to GDP - 114.9 126.2 132.6 136.7 133.8 134.4 139.2 
Share of capital formation to GOP - 13.9 18.5 19.5 16.3 18.5 19.8 24.9 
* Taken from (Aresvik 1976:47) 
Source: Based on (Central Bank of Jordan 1989:58,59). 
demand in the real-estate market, which had the consequence of raising rents 
and land values. Thus it substantially expanded the sphere of activities of the 
commercial bourgeoisie and landowners into trading in land and real-estate, 
not to mention the benefits accruing to the intermediate stratum of real-estate 
agents and commission agents. Another reason for the real estate boom has 
been the growth of state capital outlays from a level of only JD2 million in 1950 
to JD41 million in 1973, more than twentyfold increase, and its concentration 
on infrastructure projects as well as mining facilities. The expansion in the 
housing sector and state's projects has been reflected in the increased 
contribution of the construction sector to GDP. This grew from 2.5 per cent in 
1954 to 8 per cent in 1973. 
Bankers 
The end of the British mandate in Palestine and the annexation of the West 
Bank marked the expansion of a new stratum of commercial businessmen, 
namely bankers. Prior to that, banking activities had been concentrated in the 
hands of the British mandatory government in Palestine. The monetary unit 
was the Palestine pound issued by the Palestine Currency Board, which was 
created in 1926 and whose members were appointed by the British 
government in London. There was also the Ottoman Bank - a British entity, 
established in 1925 in Amman to act as the fiscal agent of the government and 
its commercial bank (Hayek and Zreikat 1976:1-7). Only one private bank was 
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operating in Jordan, the Arab bank, owned by the Palestinian Shoman family. 
It opened a branch in Amman in 1936 and following the war of 1948 moved its 
main office from Jerusalem to Amman. A Jordanian Currency Board which 
exchanged Palestinian pounds for Jordanian currency was thus established 
only in 1950, but it was not until 1964 that a central bank of Jordan was 
established, replacing the board and handling the monetary system. These 
institutional changes, coupled with the increased state resources and the 
assets of a large number of Palestinian refugees that were brought to Amman 
estimated at around JD20 million prompted a marked growth of investment in 
banking (Hilal 1974: 71). Most of the banks operating in Jordan were 
established during the 1950s and 1960s. By 1973, the commercial bank sector 
consisted of four Jordanian banks with thirty-three branches, while foreign 
banks consisted of five banks with twenty branches (Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9 Commercial banks and their branches for the period 1964-1973 
Jordanian banks Foreign banl<s 
Number of banks Number of branches Number of banks Number of branches 
1964 4 13 6 18 
1965 4 16 6 18 
1966 4 21 6 20 
1967 4 22 6 22 
1968 4 23 6 22 
1969 4 23 6 24 
1970 4 25 6 32 
1971 4 25 6 32 
1972 4 28 7 34 
1973 4 33 7 40 
Source: (Ibid.: 4-5). 
Commercial banks have been the most important source of funding for the 
commerce sector, which had enjoyed the lion's share of the bank's credit 
facilities, amounting to approximately half of total credit advanced in 1964. 
Although this share declined to 41 per cent in 1973, commerce still has the 
highest share (Table 3.10). By comparison the share of the agriculture sector 
has been insignificant in terms of absolute value or relative share, amounting to 
less than 3 per cent in 1964 growing to only 3.3 per cent in 1973, while the 
industrial sector has been better off, with a share of 11.4 per cent in 1964, 
declining to 9.5 per cent in 1973 despite an increase in absolute value. Access 
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to this credit has been monopolised by key families because the loan 
conditions, especially that 60 per cent of collateral be personal, can only be 
met by those wealthy families (Fanek 1965: 55). Commercial banks played a 
key supportive role for contractors as attested by the growth of credits to the 
construction sector, whose share increased from 8 per cent to 23 per cent. 
Table 3.10 Sectoral distribution of outstanding commercial credit for the period 1964-1973 
(JD million) 
Total Commerce & trade Construction Industry Agriculture Others 
1964 29.27 14.41 2.24 3.33 0.86 8.44 
1965 33.30 17.08 2.45 4.32 0.68 8.77 
1966 38.98 20.33 3.27 4.72 0.61 10.05 
1967 38.89 17.35 5.02 4.23 0.77 11.51 
1968 41.00 17.08 6.09 4.01 0.65 13.17 
1969 45.39 19.06 7.10 4.05 0.72 14.46 
1970 45.55 16.89 11.23 4.03 0.58 12.82 
1971 46.93 18.96 10.51 3.92 0.80 12.74 
1972 50.59 21.46 10.67 4.35 0.80 13.30 
1973 61.82 25.08 14.44 5.87 2.06 14.36 
Source: (ibid.: 17). 
The expansion in trading and contracting and the general prosperity of the 
economy is reflected in the growth of the deposits of commercial banks, which 
increased fourfold and the growth of credits which increased sevenfold, for the 
period 1951-63. In the period 1964-73 deposits grew further, from JD49 million 
to JD86 million, and credits expanded from JD29 million to JD62 million. The 
banking sectors' contribution to GDP grew from only 1 per cent in 1960 to 11 
per cent by 1973, while its utilisation of the labour force more than quadrupled 
(NPC1973:2). 
The Arab Bank remained, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the most influential 
of banks and developed a close network of prominent merchants and 
businessmen. These include Sulaiman Tannous, a member of the bank's 
board of directors, who established along with Farid Al-Sa'd and Abu Wafa Al-
Dajani, all prominent merchants, Arabia Insurance Company with offices in 
many other counthes. Fuad Saba, owner of Saba and Company, a leading 
auditing firm, has been the bank's auditor since the establishment of the firm in 
1930, and Amin Shahin, who owned a large construction company, has been a 
partner to the Shomans in some of their diversified enterprises (Smith 1984: 
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132-3). The Jordan bank, established in 1960, was intended to countervail the 
economic power of the Arab bank which is seen as a Palestinian Bank, despite 
the very close relation of the Shoman family with the Hashemites and despite 
the fact that, since the annexation, the interests of the propertied bourgeoisie 
as well as the state bourgeoisie have became increasing shared by East 
Bankers and those of Palestinian origin. 
Landowners 
The landed class, or, more accurately its creation, has been an important 
constituent of the ruling class alliance. The policy of land registration and 
privatisation, which the British undertook at the beginning of the 1930s, 
although it was meant to create numerous small landowners and to 
disintegrate the musha'a system of land cultivation (which gives the leading 
family in the area immense power as a result of its control of the rotation and 
allocation of village land) as well as to erode the power of the tribal leaders and 
force nomads to settle, ended up having the opposite result by enhancing the 
existing local power structures of leading tribal figures and leading families in 
settled areas (Robins 1988: 269-271). Tribal leaders, especially in the centre 
and south of the country, augmented their power and established themselves 
as large landowners via the state, registering in the name of the sheikhs and/or 
the most prominent individual in the clan, such as Al-khraisha and Al-Faiz of 
the Bani Sakher tribe, large plots of land; or by selling land to leading families 
such as Al-Adwan's acquisition of large tracts of land in the Jordan valley and 
Balqa hills and Al-Faiz's other acquisition of 30,000 dunums at Jiza (ibid.: 284-
5). 
The position of these leading families was consolidated by the lack of interest 
on the part of the state, during the formative years, in improving rural 
communities; very little support was offered in terms of credit, extension 
services, or even organisation of the most scarce resource, water. It was only 
in 1948 that a law was passed to give the state the right to organise and control 
the water sector. The large landowners were able up until then to monopolise 
water resources at the expense of small farmers (Hourani 1978: 87). 
Pressures arising from the commercialisation of the economy and lack of 
support from the government helped to maintain agriculture concentrated in 
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rainfed highland areas, specialising in field crops with very little change in 
cultivating methods or improvement in technology, yet it was still capable of 
meeting the consumption needs of the population and exporting the surplus to 
Palestine. 
The situation in the post-1950 period changed on two fronts, which created 
ample opportunity for the growth of a small rich stratum of capitalist farmers 
predominantly engaged in the production of fruits and vegetables. The first 
change was the tripling of the population (West bank population and refugees), 
in addition to natural population growth; the second the new focus of the 
government in support of the development of the Jordan valley. Although the 
new focus on the Ghor area was on the east side of the Jordan valley the 
generally conducive situation and the incentives provided by the government 
benefited the landed class and commercial bourgeoisie on both sides of the 
river. Such incentives included the 1951 income law, which exempted 
agricultural income from taxes and the Agricultural mortgage programme of 
1950. Also, the decline in agricultural workers' wages, as a result of there 
being thousands of landless refugees, and the rise of food prices as a 
consequence of increased demand, greatly affected the profitability of the 
sector ( Smith 1984: 42-3). 
Despite this, the investments poured in the Jordan valley - which has been the 
largest investment undertaken by the government - remained the most 
important factor behind the profits accruing from the expansion in production of 
fruits and vegetables. Initially the East Ghor Canal project for the irrigation of 
the valley (planned by United Nations Relief and Work Agency) was part of the 
United States designs to settle the Palestinian refugees. The Americans were 
convinced that this project would reduce the desire of Palestinians to return to 
their lost lands and homes (Amerl 1981: 161). Land reform in Jordan, 
therefore, was carried out only in the Ghor area in order to maximise the 
number of benefiting refugees. Sizes of plots were limited between 30 and 200 
dunums (Aresvik 1976: 255). A 1966 study concluded that 61 per cent of the 
population in the project area were Palestinians, but that the majority were 
sharecroppers (Kanovsky 1976: 144). Thus, large plots of land ended in the 
hands of absentee landowners, mainly merchants and government personnel 
(Ameri 1981:162). 
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While the aim, therefore, had been to create family and owner-operated 
farming units predominantly for Palestinian refugees, the exact opposite 
happened which resulted in a sharp increase in land tenancy on the basis of 
either share cropping or cash rent. Land rent stood at around 39 per cent in 
1961, increasing further to 59.3 per cent in 1973 (Ameri 1981: 163). Thus the 
agriculture development that was supported by the government and foreign 
funds was geared towards a small irrigated export sector, mainly of fruits and 
vegetables, hence furthering the interests of a small stratum of highly 
subsidised, rich farmers. As a consequence the value of cash crops exports 
from Jordan increased dramatically during the 1950s. The export value of 
vegetables, which stood at JD6,300 in 1949, increased by 1957 to 
approximately JD1.5 million. The value of fruits was JD31,000 and increased 
to JD827,000 over the same period (Smith 1984: 95). Fifty-one per cent of 
total agricultural production in 1959-61 came from fruit and vegetables and less 
than one-fifth from field crops. Subsequently, land cropping patterns had 
changed in favour of these crops (Table 3.11). 
Table 3.11 Changes in cropping patterns In Jordan for the period 1956-1972 
(% of cultivated area) 
1956 1961 1964 1965 1972 
Field crops 
Vegetables 
Fruit tress 
93.4 
3.0 
2.9 
86.9 
8.5 
4.5 
85.1 
10.4 
4.4 
80.8 
12.1 
7.0 
83.0 
10.0 
7.1 
Source: (Aresvik 1976:76). 
The other group that had benefited from this development had been the export 
agents and middlemen - basically those who control the domestic and regional 
markets. With this growth of cash crops the need for improving marketing 
facilities became very important and the government established three Central 
Wholesale Markets, the Amman market in 1966, the Irbid market in 1968 and 
the Zarqa market in 1972, yet left the actual operation of the markets in the 
hands of the middlemen allowing a few people to monopolise the market 
(Arabiat 1985: 325). For instance, in the Amman market, where two-thirds of 
the trade takes place, nine middlemen handle 75 per cent of the trade (Aresvik 
1976: 283-4). A similar situation exists in the other two markets. In Irbid five 
middlemen control 70 per cent of the total value of trade, while in Zaraq three 
middlemen organise most of the sales (Arabiat: 329-330). In addition, in other 
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smaller cities such as Salt, Karak and Ma'an smaller wholesale markets 
operate with few middlemen too. Furthermore, a large section of export trade 
bypasses the official markets, especially exports to Syria and Lebanon, which 
means a loss of 4 per cent of municipal fees levied by the municipal authorities 
(Aresvik 1976: 284). 
The monopoly of the fruit and vegetable market by a small number of 
middlemen making huge profits accounts for a large part of total revenues in 
the wholesale and retail trade (Mazur 1979: 73-4), thus making a significant 
contribution to the growth of commerce and, subsequently, the service 
structure of the economy. In the same way that the monopoly of import trade 
attributes to the large size of commerce so does the monopoly in marketing 
cash crops in agriculture. This is why merchants, large farmers, middlemen, 
lorry owners etc., either overlap or enjoy close alliances which allow them to 
squeeze immense profits. In other words a few have control of more than one 
of the essential processes entailed in agricultural production and marketing. 
The development of the Jordan valley and trading in fruits and vegetables was 
affected by the 1967 war and turmoil during the period 1970-1, a large part of 
the infrastructure was destroyed, in addition to the population fleeing the area. 
But this was quickly reversed in the post-1973 period by the huge sums of 
investments poured in to the valley coinciding with rising living standards in 
Jordan and high demand in the Gulf. This promoted lucrative markets for cash 
crops, which further enhanced the wealth of large farmers in the valley. 
The Petty Bourgeoisie 
The petty bourgeoisie will be used here in its broad definition (Longuenesse 
1979) to include the two social groups that the term encompasses, the 'new' 
and the traditional. The 'new' petty bourgeoisie refers to the professional, 
technical and salaried strata whose emergence has been directly brought 
about by the establishment of the state and the growth of its institutions as well 
as the spread of education. Since mandate period and beyond, the state 
sector provided the most important channel for the growth of this class and 
consumed a large share of state funds, especially in comparison with other 
sectors. Thus, central government employment averaged 44 per cent of total 
109 
employment for the period 1968-73, while accounting for two thirds of those 
employed in the service sector (Table 3.12). 
Table 3.12 Government share in employment for the period 1968-1973 
(thousands) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Total employed 251.6 255.3 258.9 267.8 276.9 296.0 
Service sector 147.2 153.5 160.8 169.8 179.2 189.4 
(of which) 
Social services, administration and defence (104.4) (108.9) (114.5) (120.3) (126.0) (130.3) 
Percentage employed 
Govemment / service sector 70.9 70.9 71.2 70.8 70.3 68.8 
Government / total employed 41.5 42.7 44.2 44.9 45.5 44.0 
Source: Based on (Ibrahim 1989:62). 
The 'new' petty bourgeoisie do not represent a coherent social group with 
similar political and class consciousness. The social backgrounds of its 
constituents vary considerably and they occupy a variety of positions in the 
state apparatus with different salary levels, privileges, prestige and power. Yet, 
this incoherence does not preclude it from having vested interests in the state 
(Al-Naqeeb 1988: 41-2), especially considering its dependence on state 
employment. That by itself had imposed a particular political consciousness 
although it does not preclude the development of opposition within this class. 
Thus this class represents both a very important pillar of the regime's stability 
and potentially the most important source of instability if state expenditure 
levels are affected and state's ability to meet the needs of its various 
constituents especially the educated stratum is undermined. One of the 
important ways, during the boom years, that helped in reducing pressure on 
the state as a result of its salaries and wages being not that high especially by 
comparison with the private sector was moonlighting after the official working 
hours which is prohibited under the civil service law. The state ignored that 
primarily because of the vested private interests of most of the top level state 
management. Yet this helped many especially at mid to lower level structures 
of the state echelon to have the security of a state job and to venture into small 
business and/or to have another job in the service sector. 
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Although the growth of the state and state agencies have been the main 
reason for the development of this class other factors have contributed too, 
including the expansion of the private sector into modern sectors such as 
construction, finance and other business services, as well as social services, 
which created a high demand for qualified people. Although in Jordan part of 
the growth came as a response to these new demands in the economy, a large 
part of the growth came as a consequence of the annexation of the West Bank, 
and the influx of refugees into Jordan. The Palestinian population was more 
urbanised, and highly educated and skilled, especially in comparison with the 
East Bankers. Naturally, the expansion of education and the accelerated pace 
of urbanisation have been levelling off these differences. 
Accordingly, the numbers of those classified as professional, technical, 
administrators and clerks stood at a level of 31,600 in 1968 to growing further 
to 46,200 in 1973 (Ibrahim 1989: 63). The highest growth occurred in the 
category of professionals and technicians, who within the same short period 
grew from 15,000 to 25,000, nearly doubling. This numerical strength has 
been accompanied by another very important factor relating to its 
organisational capacity. Professionals have been permitted by law to organise 
into professional associations. Indeed the law stipulates that they can not 
practise their professions without joining their respective association. This 
applies to those working in the state and private sectors. For some 
professions, such as doctors, dentists, nurses, veterinarians, geologists the 
state sector is the most important employer. The only professionals who the 
state would not allow up until present day to organise are teachers. In 1972/3 
they amounted to 14,300 of whom 11,3000 are employed in the state sector 
{Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 1985: 73). Their sheer number and concentration in the 
state educational system has been the reason behind such a decision. They 
would become a very important and influential lobby especially since the scale 
of teachers' salaries has been among the lowest for any profession in the civil 
service. This is why the state tended to promote the secondment of teachers 
to Gulf states, where they can earn higher salaries, as a way to contain 
pressures. This secondment accelerated during the oil boom years. 
Most of the professional associations were created during the 1950s and early 
1970s, including those for lawyers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, engineers, 
journalists, veterinarians, nurses, midwives and geologists {Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 
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1989: 23). In the absence of political organisations and given the ban on 
political parties, professional associations became extremely important as 
political channels. The political vacuum created by the absence of opposition 
politics, especially after the withdrawal of the PLO in 1971, and by state 
repression and the curtailment of political activities further helped in 
concentrating attention on these associations as alternative political channels. 
Capitalist development has been associated with a decline in the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie; shopkeepers, artisans, and traditional handicrafts, in other 
words the self-employed and those with small amounts of capital and 
employing few workers. Yet in Jordan no less than with the 'new' petty 
bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie emerged as a result of the 
establishment of the state and the commercialisation of the economy. At the 
time of the formation of the state Jordan was primarily a subsistence economy, 
and the handicrafts that were predominant were associated with local needs 
such as grain mills, olive pressing, and weaving (Hourani 1978: 163-4). Thus 
an expansion and some mechanisation was introduced following the creation of 
the state. Further growth took place after 1948 as a result of the influx of large 
numbers of landless Palestinians and semi-skilled and skilled labour, the 
population increase itself, as well as the increased demand on a variety of 
services. This induced those with small amounts of capital to engage in what is 
known as Al-mihan Al-hura (independent trading), including a wide range of 
personal and household services such as barbers shops, repair workshops 
tailoring, dressmaking, laundry services, etc. Moreover, the expansion in trade 
provided an opportunity for a wider segment of the population to benefit, 
especially the Palestinian population, which was manifested in the growth of 
retailers, distributors and small shop owners in towns, villages and major cities. 
In general, the pronounced presence of the Palestinian population in 
commerce and trade is partly explained by their numerical strength and partly 
by the tendency of East Bankers to seek state jobs. 
Another important reason for the growth of the petty bourgeoisie has been the 
structure and size of manufacturing firms, the majority of which have been in 
light industries, family owned and managed with very little hired labour. Ninety 
per cent of industrial enterprises in 1970 were small, employing fewer workers 
than five and accounting for a small share of the value added in industry. The 
industries that emerged included food and beverages processing (bakeries. 
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confectionery, grain mills, olive oil presses, soft drinks and beer, etc.) 
woodwork, clothing, footwear, weaving, stone cutting and quarrying, pottery 
ceramic and glass, tire retreading, soap and detergents, metal working shops 
and goldsmiths. These industries were of a handicrafts nature with low 
technology, and their capacity to develop has been limited by the structure of 
the industrial sector which the state promoted during the 1950s and 1960s 
based on a small number of modern capital-intensive industries, including 
phosphate, petroleum refinery and cement: 
The bulk of production....is produced by a relatively few 
establishments which also employ more people and contribute 
more to production and value added that would be warrant by 
their actual number. (Ameri 1981:182) 
The state was directly involved in this process. It set up these firms by 
commissioning feasibility studies, equity participation, and arranging finances 
from domestic and foreign sources, in addition to granting monopoly rights, for 
instance in the case of phosphate and cement. These measures, in particular 
the equity participation, made investments in these firms attractive and 
lucrative for private investors, especially key economic elite. By subsidising 
these industries the government was in effect subsidising a few wealthy 
businessmen who have assets and concerns in trade, real-estate and 
agriculture. Just as the investments in agriculture furthered the interests of a 
few private businessmen while putting at a disadvantage the majority of 
peasants, farmers and sharecroppers, the same happened in industry. The 
majority of small investors had no access to government funds or incentives. 
In fact they were penalised. The Encouragement of Investment Law is biased 
towards providing very generous exemptions and incentives to large scale 
investors, including foreign firms. Thus, 
investors with small projects generally did not apply at all, perhaps 
partly because they were deterred by the application requirements 
and partly because it was evident to them that very small projects 
were unlikely to be given exemptions. (Mazur 1979: 225) 
Another reason that made the climate less encouraging for small investors is 
the ambiguity of the Encouragement of Investment Law concerning the criteria 
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for determining the awarding of exemption. It is left to the discretion of the 
committee of Encouragement of Investment Law and the Council of Ministers 
who have to ratify the decisions taken by the committee. This ensured 
favouritism and, as many critics in Amman claimed, it gave incentives to 
investments that were to be undertaken with or without this law. The penalising 
of small investors while promoting specific investors was also undertaken via 
the licensing policy. Licensing was used to restrict the number of enterprises 
established, on the grounds that the sector was saturated. This in effect led to 
monopoly power being held by a few and to excess profits. 
Although at the end of 1972 this policy changed and the market was open to all 
investors, the sectors that were considered 'saturated' were given less 
exemptions (ibid.: 220). The owners of similar establishments formed 
monopolies and employed the most common and effective way in controlling 
the market, namely, by limiting supplies of their commodities and raising prices 
(Ameri 1981: 188). In addition, the influx of high quality imports stunted the 
development of local competitive production units. These imports were 
cheaper and of a better quality because of the adverse effect of the 
government's currency exchange policy, as mentioned before, which supported 
compradore merchants at the expense of local producers. Hence the 
economic 6lite were provided with an opportunity to invest with a guarantee 
from the state, while the small manufacturers struggled to survive the hard 
competition of imports. The industrial sector in 1974 comprised 7,467 
establishments, of which 7,000 were small scale (Ameri 1981:190). 
The Marginalised Classes and Social Groupings 
The process of social change and economic development has either 
marginalised some existing social strata such as peasants, nomads and semi-
nomads or created new disadvantaged social groupings, such as waged 
labour. Also, political events have had an influence, primarily in the creation of 
a large segment of Palestinian refugees who came to the East Bank in two 
waves; the first as a result of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the 
second following the 1967 war and the occupation of the rest of Palestine. 
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As mentioned before, the government's focus on the creation of an export 
capital intensive agriculture, coupled with the lack of support for traditional field 
crop production in general, had a detrimental effect on peasants and small 
farmers, since its policies resulted in making farming lucrative for those with 
large plots of land and capital who were able to exploit the situation effectively 
and increase their profits as well as use their accumulated funds for 
investments in improved agricultural technology. This caused growing 
disparities between a few rich large farmers and smallholders, who constitute 
the majority of the farming community. The agriculture census of 1965 noted 
that 70 per cent of the total land holding are less than 50 dunums while 36 per 
cent are less than 10 dunums (Development Plan 1973-5: 59). These small 
land holdings are further fragmented among a number of owners making these 
plots economically unfeasible. 
Yet the government did not attempt any land reform or land consolidation, 
except in the Ghor area. The majority of these farmers were caught in a 
vicious circle of decreasing incomes: their low income does not allow them to 
invest in new modern methods such as machinery, improved seeds, fertilisers, 
etc., to increase their productivity and competitiveness, and their inability to 
employ these methods keeps them economically none viable. This 
disadvantaged position is further aggravated by the lack of access to 
government credits, since institutional credit is concentrated among a limited 
number of well-to-do farmers and the agriculture credit co-operative does not 
cover all small farmers: 
Only a small number of the small farmers in Jordan are touched by 
institutional credit. ACC [the agriculture credit co-operation] is not 
reaching those farmers who own less than two hectares in land area 
(who constituted about 25% of East Bankers total number of 
holdings in 1965) in addition to not reaching non-owner 
operators(sharecroppers and renters). (Aresvik 1976: 281) 
As a result they resort to borrowing at high rates of interests from middlemen, 
(who become important not only for marketing but for providing the bulk of non-
institutional credit) as well as from landowners, businessmen or merchants in 
the area. Low incomes have also forced many small farmers to either augment 
their income by selling their labour or to leave rural areas completely, hence 
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either joining the urban poor or finding a state job at the lower echelon of the 
state. The population of rural areas decreased between 1961 and 1971 from a 
share of 48 per cent of total population to 27 per cent. Consequently waged 
labour in agriculture stood at 27 per cent in 1961, increasing to 32 per cent in 
1967, and by 1975 it stood at 63 per cent and the owner operated or family 
operated farming declined too from 73 per cent, to 68 per cent to 37 per cent 
for the same period (Ameri 1981: 151). Despite the increase in land tenancy 
as the prevalent pattern of cultivation the important question of regulating the 
relation between landlords and tenants has not been addressed and no 
legislation has been enacted. The relationship between tenant and landowner 
has been largely conducted through personal agreement, without any written 
lease; furthermore, these leases are usually for short terms (Aresvik 1976: 
262). Hence the relation is not equal and is temporary in nature precluding any 
incentives on the part of tenant to invest or to have a sense of security. The 
government, aware of this constraint on farmers, proposed in the three year 
plan 1973-5 the 'enactment of laws to organise the relationship between 
landlords and tenants or sharecroppers, and to secure adequate incentives for 
tenants to invest more in agriculture' (Development Plan 1973-5: 66). Yet up 
until now this has not come into effect. 
Similarly, nomads and semi-nomads were adversely affected. Although the 
British undertook one significant economic measure during the mandate period 
by registering and privatising land, this was neither accompanied nor followed 
by any other supportive policies on the state's part to convert the nomads to 
settled agriculture or to enhance agricultural production in rural areas in 
general. Also, landowners tended to use Palestinian peasants to work the land 
and did not use the nomads or semi-nomads, especially since they look down 
on this activity (Robins 1988: 282-7). 
Although the development of industry and manufacturing had been very 
limited, it did not preclude the growth of a working class in Jordan as the 
second marginalised group in the society. Although there is no data for the 
period pre-1950 indicating the number of workers, since most of the growth 
that occurred in mining, light manufacturing and construction took place during 
the 1950s and 1960s it is safe to assume that these numbers were then 
insignificant. There are still no separate statistics indicating the growth of a 
working class but the overall growth of the share of labour in industry and 
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construction might give an indication of its growth. The work force engaged in 
industry stood at 48,200 in 1968, growing to 58,400 in 1973, with equal share 
for both mining and manufacturing, and construction. This is significant growth 
considering that this was the period of turmoil and adjustment after the 1967 
war and the 1970-1 confrontation with Palestinian commandos in Jordan. 
Despite that, the fragmentation of the industrial base into small units with few 
workers dispersed over a variety of subsectors, precluded any effective 
organisation that could press for improved working conditions and pay. There 
Is no minimum wage In Jordan and very little protection in terms of health, 
Injuries at work, etc. Consequently it is no surprise that there have arisen a 
number of workers' associations amounting to thirty-six in 1955. Of these, 
only twenty-five associations were part of the General Labour Union. 
Membership grew during the period 1958-68 from 9,566 to 26,400, reaching 
40,000 in 1970, the members being dispersed among forty different 
associations {Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 1984: 21,33). 
As for the Palestinian refugees, their distinct political and socio-economic 
situation has been recognised by both the government and the International 
community. The UNRWA was created especially to deal with the refugee 
problem In the wake of the 1948 war, while the government established a 
Ministry of Refugees In 1949, and a year later changed its name to Ministry of 
Development and Reconstruction. This ministry had a political significance 
rather than an economic one, since the burden of the refugees had been 
carried predominantly by the UNRWA. Also, its status kept on changing from 
being a separate ministry to being connected to a variety of other ministries. 
Thus, it had been associated with ministries as diverse as agriculture, health, 
public works, defence, commerce, transport, foreign and communication. 
While the government acknowledges the distinct status of the refugees, in 
some important areas It treats them In a manner that attempts to blur their 
distinctiveness. For Instance, the population census does not treat them as a 
separate group; hence no accurate statistics exist on their numbers, and they 
have been granted Jordanian citizenship just like the rest of the Palestinians. 
Also, the election law, while granting special status to other social groups who 
do not suffer any grievances, such as the Circassian and the Christian 
community as well as the Bedouins, does not grant the refugees such a 
privilege. Thus although the refugees constitute approximately a quarter of the 
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population in Jordan, not one single camp member has sat in the cabinet or the 
parliament (Nyrop et al. 1974: 86). It is evident that these inconsistent policies 
are politically motivated. While the refugees' domestic influence had to be 
curtailed, it is imperative to emphasise and maintain their distinctiveness in 
order to use them as a bargaining chip during a negotiated peace settlement 
with the Israelis as well as to extract resources from Gulf states, under the 
pretext of alleviating their conditions. 
Although it is difficult to arrive at an accurate number of refugees, the official 
figures of the UNRWA indicate that there were 536,000 Palestinian refugees 
registered with its offices in the East Bank in 1971, including 227,000 who 
came after the 1967 war. Not all of these were living in the camps. Amman 
government sources put the figure for those living in camps at around 208,000, 
approximately half of the total number of refugees, while the rest live in cities 
and rural areas, and continue to receive aid from UNRWA (Kanovsky 1976: -
147-8 ). Naturally, one can expect low living standards and poverty associated 
with living in camps, and since permanent settlement of the refugees is a very 
sensitive and controversial political issue, neither the UNRWA nor the 
Jordanian government wants to be implicated in any such attempt. Yet some 
means of relieving their harsh conditions could be found without effecting the 
ultimate solution of the Palestine question. UNRWA has provided the bare 
necessities of schooling, health facilities and employment. As to the non-camp 
refugees they have been engaged in a variety of menial jobs or owned small 
workshops, shops, etc. Camps and refugees in general represented, naturally, 
the strongholds of the PLO, and hence a source of tension and careful 
weighing by the government. 
Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has attempted to provide a critical account of the 
political economy of Jordan during 1921-1973. It focused in particular on how 
the state's power and its structures were organised in order to legitimate the 
rule of the Hashemite family and its class alliance of commercial bourgeoisie, 
state bourgeoisie and the landed class. The most important factor for that has 
been the concentration of economic power in the hands of the state, due to its 
being based on external resources, which underpinned from the outset the 
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ability of the Hashemite family to create vested economic interests in the state, 
In addition to link a large part of the livelihood of the population in the state via 
the military, the civil administration, and other state institutions and enterprises. 
The entreatment of sub-statal traditional forms of affiliations and loyalty, and 
their perpetuation in the society, formally through state institutions and 
informally through ideology (the prevalent political culture, values and 
sentiments), helped to represent the Hashemite rule as the unifying force of the 
society, above these cleavages, and to ingrain the idea that without their 
'unifying' and 'neutral' role chaos will reign. This established patterns of social 
and political interaction which are highly personalised, not to mention the 
politicisation of social structures such as the tribe and the family. Most 
significantly it masked the fact that economic interests and class interests play 
a role in state power and its actions and policies, as well as restricted the 
possibility of the propertied class posing a political alternative to the 
Hashemites. 
This also explains why the process of state-building precluded the development 
of a civil identity and/or a national Jordanian identity, except in a very parochial 
sense and one which equates such a national identity with allegiance and 
loyalty to the Hashemite family. Furthermore, the centrality of the Palestine-
Israel question after 1948 and the strong identification of the politicised 
elements of the society with the Palestinian struggle combined with the 
regime's continuous provocation and incitement of the regional division of 
Palestinians-East Bankers, accentuated the situation. On the one hand, it 
submerged the nationalistic and/or progressive Jordanians within the ideology 
of pan-Arabism and later, under the umbrella of the PLO, who were foremost 
concerned with the Palestinian national struggle, hence, undermined the 
development of an independent Jordanian national movement and relegated to 
the background the voicing of concerns over the specific socio-economic 
problems of the Jordanian society. On the other hand, the overriding concern 
with the Palestinian issue maintained the struggle with the regime centred 
around this, giving the state an edge in containing and/or persecuting 
opposition elements, and making the Palestine issue a central theme in the 
legitimacy crisis of the regime and in fragmenting social forces. Thus, the 
Jordanian ruling class was able to create legitimacy based on the dominance of 
the state over society in both spheres the economic and the political. 
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subordinating the private domain to the state. Against this background what 
the period of the 1970s produced, as will be seen from the forthcoming 
chapters, was increasing tensions in the essential parameters of the political 
economy of Jordan which by 1989 led to a serious economic and political crisis 
necessitating dramatic changes in both domains. 
Notes 
1. For more details see the work of Jamil Hilal (1974) Al-Daffa Al-Garbiyya: 
Al Tarkib Al-ljtima'iy wal Iqtisadiy 1948-1974 (The Socio-economic 
Development of the West Bank 1948-1974) and Pamella Ann Smith 
(1984) Palestine and the Palestinians 1876-1983. 
2. The names of all political figures in this section are taken from Al-sijil Al-
Tarikhi li Majalis Al-wuzara, Al-Barlaman, wal Al-Majlis Al-lstishari 1920-
1990 (The Recorded History of the Council of Cabinets, Parliament, and 
the National Consultative Council 1920- 1990). 
3. The seeds of the military establishment was sown prior to the 
emergence of the state. In 1920 the British mandate government sent 
Captain Brenton to Amman to establish a military force, and thus the first 
regiment was created in July 1920. 
4. For more details see Youssi Melman and Dan Raviv (1989) Behind the 
Uprising and Adam Garfinkle (1992) Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of 
War. 
5. On 25 April 1957 an agreement was reached between Golda Meir and 
the American ambassador in Tel Aviv to allow the aircraft of the sixth 
American fleet to use Israel's air space and to allow the movement of 
American Marines from Lebanon to Jordan if that was necessary to 
rescue the regime. 
6. The unpublished memoirs of Shaher Abu Shahout, a member of the 
"Free Officers' movement, indicate that Ali Abu Nowar was distrusted 
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and disagreement emerged among the officers as to whether to permit 
him to join the movement. 
7. Shaher Abu Shahout indicates in his memoirs that both Egypt and Syria, 
when approached by the 'Free Officers', were not supportive. 
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Chapter Four 
The State's 'Development' Role in the Wake of the Oil Boom 
The discussion will turn, now, to analysing the political economy of Jordan in 
the wake of the oil boom starting off with the analysis of the effects of the 
accelerated accumulation of oil wealth on the consolidation of the state's 
economic power, in particular its 'development' role and development 
structures. One of the most influential consequences of the quadrupling of the 
oil price in 1973/4, was the strengthened significance of Jordan's strategic 
location in the security and stability of the Gulf, as well as the use of its labour 
force in order to overcome the severe labour shortages, in particular in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. Consequently, remarkable expansion in economic linkages 
took place and, which due to their intensity and nature, it became common to 
describe Jordan as 'an oil economy without oil'. What it meant was that Jordan 
was 'living off' the oil wealth through its increased and substantial dependence 
on remittances and financial assistance, which at the same time implied the 
vulnerability of its development. These resources provided prosperity and 
growth without a concurrent development in the productive facilities of the 
domestic economy establishing living standards and social mobility that were 
beyond the means of the domestic economy to either generate or maintain. 
This was not a novel situation, and, as shown in the previous chapter, state 
dependence on income accruing from abroad had been a major feature of the 
political economy of Jordan since the very inception of the state, and migration 
for employment purposes had been evolving as a characteristic of the domestic 
labour market since the eariy 1950s. Yet, significant change occurred on the 
level of the transfusion of financial resources, bringing about an expansion of 
the state's 'development' role and a general expansion in economic 
opportunities. Moreover, oil wealth underiined the emergence of a sharply 
variant regional setting through consolidating the changes that had been seen 
to evolve during the 1950s and 1960s. These changes consisted of firstly, the 
decline in the threat from the ideology of Arab nationalism and its replacement 
with the notion of Arab 'nation' states; and secondly, tendency towards 
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accommodation with Israel and containment of the independence and scope of 
action of the PLO. 
Thus, the oil wealth provided a unique chance for the ruling classes, both in 
Jordan and in other Arab states, to enhance their legitimacy and increase the 
state's central control over resources, which underpinned the high economic 
growth rates experienced during the 1970's and early 1980s and which gave a 
new significance to state-sponsored development. Illustrating the substantial 
strengthening of the state's economic power in Jordan and emphasising that it 
was underlined by the increased influx of capital resources from the Gulf will be 
the focus of the first section of the chapter. The second section will show how, 
firstly, the state increased its capacity to expend and to broaden its economic 
role, in particular its 'developmental' role and secondly how its development 
policy was geared towards augmenting the existing economic interests as well 
as enhancing its own power. 
The Consolidation of the State's Economic Power 
Following the two upsurges in the price of crude oil, the first in 1973-4 from 
£3.011 per barrel to £11.651, and then, in 1979-80 the further surge to $30 per 
barrel, massive oil surplus-revenue accumulated in the Arab oil-exporting 
states. In 1974 their total revenues stood at $67 billion compared with $9 
billion in 1970, and it further increased to reach $205 billion in 1980 (Gerner 
1985: 3). Although since then a slow decrease in revenues replaced the 
steady upward turn of nearly a decade, the total revenues were still substantial. 
In 1981 it decreased to $185 billion and by 1985 it stood at a level of $79 
billion. This large accumulation of revenues had been accompanied by frantic 
expenditure programmes in the Gulf as well as huge transfers of money 
resources to the 'Third World' in general, and to the Arab world in particular, 
not to mention the increased level of expenditure on arms, investments in the 
West and the huge levels of imports. It is within this new context of the search 
to realise the surplus revenues as well as to guarantee the stability of the 
region, that the twin movement in opposed directions of labour and capital 
among the Arab states can be understood. Jordan's export of labour reached 
considerable levels and it received substantial amounts of capital in return, in 
the form of workers' remittances, as well as financial assistance. The following 
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discussion is an elaboration of the magnitude of these transfusions and their 
implication for strengthening the state's economic power. Each of these 
resources will be treated separately. 
Financial Assistance 
The post-1973 period represented the second phase in the shift of financial 
sponsorship of the Jordanian state, this time to the Gulf sheikhdoms, in 
particular Saudi Arabia. In contrast to the previous shift, from the initial British 
sponsors to the Americans, which was a by product of the decline of the British 
empire, this shift was associated with the strengthening of the US-Saudi Arabia 
alliance and the augmentation of Saudi Arabia as the leading political force in 
the region. Actually, the shift had been evolving prior to the oil boom, when 
Arab oil-states pledged financial support to the three 'front-line' states of Syria, 
Egypt and Jordan, during the Khartoum summit, in the aftermath of 1967 war 
as discussed in the previous chapter. 
The vast and rapid accumulation of oil-revenues gave a new impetus and 
dimension to this support, incomparable with previous periods. The reasons 
behind this are primarily twofold. Firstly, since the very ambitious development 
plans of the Gulf states were not enough to invest oil-surpluses, non-oil Arab 
states, in particular 'front-line' states, became one of the important channels for 
the realisation of this surplus revenue, substantially increasing regional aid 
programmes and official capital transfers. Secondly, and equally important, 
was the contribution of these capital transfers to the political stability of the 
region. This became particulariy significant and was essential in maintaining 
the supply of oil to the West and preserving the pro-Western ruling families of 
the Gulf, who presided over the 'black gold'. The region enjoyed increased 
levels of economic prosperity accompanied by the spread of political apathy 
among the vast majority of the population, in striking contrast to the 1950s and 
1960s. This, coupled with the 1967 Arab defeat which epitomised the failure of 
Nasirism, and followed by the evacuation of the PLO from Jordan in 1971, 
facilitated the imposition of the new political orientation propagated by Saudi 
Arabia, of 'co-operation' among 'independent' Arab states and the relegation to 
the background of the ideology of Pan-Arabism and the very idea of Arab 
integration. More importantly, the liberation of Palestine, a key component of 
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pan-Arabism, was substituted with the over riding concern of the security of the 
Gulf (Ibrahim 1982). 
Within this changing environment and the new parameter of the oil-security of 
the Gulf, the traditional role of the state in Jordan became even more valuable. 
The unprecedented economic growth of the Gulf and the increase in demand 
for goods substantially expanded transit trade through Jordan, which explains 
the high investment of the state in the transport sector (roads, the port of 
Aqaba, free zones, etc.). Besides being the inland route to the Gulf, Jordan's 
continued ability to subdue the Palestinian element of the population and 
prevent the development of a Palestinian and/or a progressive alternative to 
the Jordanian ruling class further contributed to the security of the Gulf. This 
was in addition to its maintaining ties with the Occupied Territories through the 
aid-programmes of the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee, established in 
March 1979. This committe has been dressed up as a development enterprise 
for helping Palestinian steadfastness in the face of Israeli occupational polices, 
whereas in effect it was a tool of the competing allegiances between the PLO 
and those supporters of a substantial role for Jordan in a future peace 
settlement. For the period 1974-8 Jordan's usual levels of financial support to 
the West Bank were cut drastically as a response to the Rabat summit, 
conferring sole legitimacy on the PLO in representing the Palestinians and as a 
pressure card on the new radical mayors to co-operate with Jordan. The West 
bank municipal elections in 1976, reflecting the upsurge in PLO allegiances 
and influence, gave a decisive victory to the national blocs representing radical 
candidates, PLO supporters, communists, and former members of the Arab 
Nationalist parties, replacing many of the traditional allies of Jordan. In 
Hebron, for example, Fahd Al-Qawasmeh replaced Mohammad Ali Al-Ja'bari; 
in Nablus Bassam Shak'a replaced Ma'zouz Al-Masri; in Ramallah and Tulkarm 
mayors Karim Khalaf and Hilmi Hanun, staunch supporters of the PLO, were 
re-elected (MECS 1976-7: 209). 
The PLO found a way around the financial squeeze Jordan was applying 
through the 'twin cities' arrangement, whereby mayors could obtain grants from 
any Arab city approved by the PLO, but Jordan circumscribed that by insisting 
on the depositing of the funds in the Arab Bank in Amman. This effectively 
maintained Jordan's control over their release as well as its ties with the 
mayors - who will have to travel to Amman for these funds (Bailey 1984: 103). 
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The joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee proved to be an effective mean for 
both the PLO and Jordan to pursue their respective policies promoting and 
maintaining a constituency in the Occupied Territories. 
Thus, the huge amounts of aid were motivated by these specific 
considerations, in addition to the above general ones, for which it was 
necessary to secure the hegemony of the ruling class, in order to maintain their 
important political role in support of the stability of the Gulf regimes and as an 
important party in the pro-Western-Arab axis. The extraordinary level of this 
financial support is illustrated in Table 4.1. Arab aid in 1973 did not exceed 
JD24 million but by 1983 it reached a level of JD258 million. Its highest level 
was in 1981 with a contribution of JD395 million. The increase between 1978 
and 1981 was due to new commitments made at the Baghdad summit in 1978, 
following Sadat's visit to Israel. An Arab 'Support Fund" was set up, which 
would for ten years make annual allocations to 'front-line' states, of which 
Jordan's share was $1200 million, around JD300 million (Seccombe 1984: 3). 
Of total disbursements to 'front-line' states Jordan received 14 per cent during 
1974-8. It grew to a level of 41 per cent during 1979-1983, the period in which 
aid to Egypt was severed due to its peace treaty with Israel (Porter 1988:193). 
This excludes military support, which quantitatively far exceeded these levels, 
but about which little information is available. 
Table 4.1 Official transfer payments to Jordan for tfie period 1973-1983 
(JD million) 
Total aid Arab US Otfier 
1973 61.09 23.66 30.83 6.60 
1974 84.43 46.60 25.31 12.52 
1975 138.01 105.65 22.44 9.92 
1976 122.75 77.59 26.13 19.03 
1977 166.94 132.31 15.62 19.01 
1978 102.63 66.26 18.56 17.81 
1979 318.05 299.66 4.59 13.80 
1980 390.85 370.43 6.15 14.27 
1981 415.33 394.92 0.00 20.41 
1982 363.72 335.83 0.00 27.89 
1983 290.06 258.31 0.00 31.75 
Source: (Hammad 1987:17). 
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Such high levels of support were not to continue for long. The recession of the 
regional oil economy in 1982 caused a 35 per cent reduction in aid between 
1981-3 from its level of JD395 million in 1981 to JD258 million in 1983 (see 
previous table), and since then a fluctuating flow of aid replaced the steady and 
rising previous levels. Although the Gulf states were not the only source of 
assistance, they were the major and most significant donors, providing by 1983 
around 90 per cent of the total aid, as compared with only 39 per cent in 1973. 
That most of the official aid was in grant form given as budget support to the 
government, is quite indicative of the intrinsic relation between the inflow of 
these funds and the maintenance of the Jordanian ruling class. This very fact 
has made the economy 
almost unique in world terms as a recipient of external budgetary 
assistance. IMF statistics indicate that world average for grants to 
central government between 1972-1983 was about 0.25 per cent of 
the value of the GDP. In the Middle East (including Jordan) grants 
were higher than elsewhere, at about 3 per cent of the GDP. 
Singling out Jordan one finds an astonishing level of external grant 
support averaging 20.2 per cent between 1974-1983. (Findlay 1987: 
3) 
The overall picture of the strengthened economic position of the state is 
incomplete without addressing the increasing significance during this period of 
loan capital. Although the economic implication of such capital is different, in 
that it carried financial obligation and was a burden on the economy, while 
financial transfers (remittances and grants) were additional income 'free of 
charge'. The volume of loans had increased substantially especially when 
compared with previous periods. As seen from Table 4.2, loans stood at JD91 
million in 1972, growing to more than a billion within a decade. This 
spectacular growth was directly connected to the huge financial resen/es piling 
up in international banks after the 1973 oil boom, causing an international shift 
from official or government commitments in giving assistance to 'developing' 
countries to a more prominent role of the private sector (Marcussen and Torp 
1982: 11-26). Thus the share of private bank lending, of total loan to Jordan, 
had increased from 8 per cent in 1972 to 29 per cent in 1982 (Tarief 1984:41). 
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Table 4.2 Total foreign loans contracted by the government for the period 1972-1985 
(JD million) 
Loans Debt service Outstanding debt Outstanding debt /GNP Outstanding debt / GDP 
% % 
1972 91.048 3.166 61.227 27.7 29.5 
1973 125.264 3.617 68.306 28.3 31.3 
1974 146.006 4.777 79.842 28.6 32.3 
1975 183.716 6.384 108.007 28.7 34.6 
1976 248.268 8.364 132.582 23.6 31.4 
1977 409.828 12.969 193.067 29.2 37.5 
1978 536.399 17.277 244.449 31.3 38.7 
1979 624.121 18.333 306.264 33.2 40.7 
1980 840.522 40.461 382.742 32.2 38.9 
1981 954.311 73.713 507.737 34.2 43.6 
1982 1042.567 70.723 602.188 36.0 45.6 
Note: GNP and GDP at martlet price. 
Source: Based on (Tarief 1984:42,55,59) . 
What that meant was a much harder terms for lending and a heavier debt 
burden. The average interest rate from official sources was around 5 per cent 
compared to 9 per cent for the private sector, while the maturity date had been 
24 years for the former and 9 years for the latter (ibid.: 25). Loans were not 
exclusive to the West, and the different development funds set up by Gulf 
governments also played a major role in funding joint projects in mining, 
industry and agriculture. Thus, debt service (principles and interest) in 1972 
did not exceed JD3.2 million, but increased to JD70.7 million in 1982. 
Outstanding external debt in 1982 was ten times the level of 1972, increasing 
from a level of JD61 million to JD602 million, while its share to the GDP 
increased from a level of 30 per cent to 46 percent for the same period. The 
problem was exacerbated by the manner in which loan capital was utilised, 
since the majority of loans were contracted to finance infrastructure projects, in 
particular those associated with the transport sector, and industrial projects that 
brought limited economic returns, thus weakening the state's ability to sen^ice 
its mounting debts. In addition, the reduction of grant capital since 1982 was 
compensated for by a huge increase in loan capital, which by 1989 resulted in 
a sever debt crisis. 
The total external financial support available to the state had been remarkable. 
As seen In Table 4.3 it grew from a mere JD80 million in 1973 to more than 
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JD495 million by 1981, approximately a sixfold increase. That figure excludes 
the large military assistance in terms of grants and loans. As a share of the 
total revenues, external finances averaged around two thirds of total 
government revenues. Even with this level of external support, revenues did 
not keep pace with expenditures, resulting in a rising overall budget deficit, 
which was financed by further foreign borrowing, not to mention increasing 
levels of domestic borrowing. The failure of domestic revenues was largely 
due to an ever-expansion in extra-budgetary expenditure and a structural 
weakness in the tax system which depended on indirect taxes, and no serious 
effort was taken to tax more heavily those who were benefiting from the 1970s 
boom. 
Table 4.3 Relative Importance of external revenues to total government revenues for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
External Domestic Total External / Total External /GDP External / GNP 
revenues revenues revenues % % % 
1973 79.92 46.18 126.10 63.38 36.61 33.09 
1974 99.50 65.74 165.24 60.22 40.23 35.62 
1975 170.70 82.63 253.33 67.38 54.69 45.40 
1976 238.17 107.59 345.76 68.88 56.49 42.35 
1977 168.71 142.24 310.95 54.26 32.81 25.56 
1978 391.75 158.49 550.24 71.20 61.97 50.16 
1979 479.39 187.90 667.29 71.84 63.66 52.03 
1980 562.36 226.15 788.51 71.32 57.13 47.25 
1981 494.49 309.20 803.69 61.53 42.47 33.35 
Source: Based on (previous tables). 
Remittances 
In response to the expansion in economic opportunities in the Gulf, in terms of 
both job availability across a wide range of skill levels and high salaries and 
wages, the labour migration movement increased substantially. Prior to 1973 
labour from Jordan migrated primarily to seek employment as a consequence 
of the political and economic upheavals created by the 1948 and 1967 wars 
and the displacement of the Palestinian population with their loss of livelihood 
\ With the new levels of wages and salaries creating an enormous gap 
between labour-sending and labour-receiving states in the Arab region, 
pecuniary motives became as important as seeking a job (Sakat 1983: 3). For 
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example, an engineer could double or triple his salary by going to Kuwait, while 
managers and administrators could double their earnings in Saudi Arabia. 
Such differences or even greater existed for unskilled workers too. Another 
significant change was that migration was not only exclusive to Palestinians 
from Occupied Territories or those living in Jordan - increasing numbers of 
East bankers were attracted too. Consequently the outflow of labour, the 
majority of which went to the Gulf states, reached quite a proportion. In 1973 it 
stood at 152,000 workers and within a decade it more than doubled, 
accounting for more than two thirds of the labour force, (Table 4.4). Jordan 
ranked third after Egypt and Yemen among Arab labour-exporting states, and 
its labour provided above average shares in professional, technical, managerial 
and clerical occupations (Share 1987: 33). 
Table 4.4 Relative importance of Jordanian migrant worker's to labour force for the period 1970-1985 
(thousands) 
1970 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1982 1984 1985 
Labour force 299.90 332.80 355.40 379.50 402.30 435.40 451.20 484.70 502.40 
Migrant workers 103.50 152.90 198.40 235.80 280.20 312.30 317.80 334.30 339.30 
% Labour force 34.51 45.94 55.82 62.13 69.65 71.73 70.43 68.97 67.54 
Average growth rate 8% 
Source: (Ibrahim 1989:50, 74). 
Given the new scale of out-migration, and the levels of salaries and wages the 
volume of remittances grew spectaculariy from a mere JD15 million in 1973 to 
JD403 million in 1985, (Table 4.5). It reached its high peak in 1976 with an 
increase of 156 per cent, but from then on the steady rise experienced 
between the years 1972-6 was replaced with a fluctuating rate during 1977-85, 
varying between 44 per cent and a negative rate of 15 per cent in 1985, 
despite the continued growth in absolute numbers. This data should be 
considered with caution since it includes only formally recorded remitted 
earnings, that is, only those passing through the banking system and the 
amounts declared and classified by licensed money-exchangers as 
remittances. Remittances carried through informal channels such as being 
sent with friends, trusted agents or with migrants during home visits or upon 
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repatriation, in addition to undeclared or unclassified transfers by the money 
exchangers, were unknown. Thus, formal data underestimates the real size of 
these capital inflows. 
Table 4.5 Growth of inflow of remittances for tfie period 1970-1985 
(JD million) 
Inflow of remittances Rate of annual increase 
% 
1970 5.5 -19.9 
1971 5.0 -9.1 
1972 7.4 48.0 
1973 14.2 91.9 
1974 24.1 69.7 
1975 53.3 121.2 
1976 136.4 155.9 
1977 154.8 13.5 
1978 159.4 3.0 
1979 180.4 13.2 
1980 236.7 31.2 
1981 340.9 44.0 
1982 381.9 12.0 
1983 402.9 5.5 
1984 475.0 17.9 
1985 402.9 -15.2 
Source: (Central Bank of Jordan 1989:26,29). 
Some sources have suggested that official figures underestimated the flow by 
30 per cent (Zaglool 1984: 32). Others have put the figure as high as 50 per 
cent (Banawi and Abu Al-Sha'ar 1982: 26). Given these varying estimates it is 
difficult to say accurately how much official data underestimates the actual size 
of remittances, but it is clear that a much higher proportion was remitted. 
Another constraint on official figures was the fact that it lacked data indicating 
the amounts that were destined for the West Bank. This has been estimated at 
around 20 per cent of the total official remittances (Zaglool 1984: 38). The 
balance between what is included and what is excluded still meant that Jordan 
received a much higher volume of remittances than the official data indicated. 
The fact that a large part of remitted earnings entered the economy unrecorded 
led to what Choucri termed the 'hidden economy', that is, the structures of 
transactions generated by unrecorded capital flows (1986: 700). Thus the 
importance of unrecorded remittances is much more significant than just 
arriving at the accurate figure. It had a wider implication for the whole 
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economy and the government. In Jordan money-exchangers were the most 
important financial intermediary for informal flows of remittances. Perhaps 
contrary to the experience of other states, these were pampered by the 
government and had very little control imposed on them, until the economic 
crisis of 1989. The government then cracked down on them ordering the 
closure of their businesses and accusing them of currency dealings and 
blamed them for the plummeting of the value of the dinar. In other words, they 
were used as a scape goat for a very complex economic situation. 
The inability to establish the accurate size of the remitted income, together with 
the dimension of the hidden economy, limits the usefulness of conventional 
indicators and, as stated by Choucri requires new methods of investigating 
remittances in order to disclose their full impact on the economy. However, in 
view of the absence of such methods, comparisons of remitted earnings to 
major macro-economic variables provide some insight into the significance of 
remitted income to state and society. As seen from Table 4.6 remittances 
Table 4.6 Relative importance of remittances to national and domestic income for tfie period 1970-1985 
(JD million) 
Remittances Remittances/GNP Remittances / GDP 
% % 
1970 5.5 2.9 3.2 
1971 5.0 2.5 2.7 
1972 7.4 3.3 3.6 
1973 14.2 5.9 6.5 
1974 24.1 8.6 9.7 
1975 53.3 14.2 17.1 
1976 136.4 24.3 32.4 
1977 154.8 23.5 30.1 
1978 159.4 20.4 25.2 
1979 180.4 19.6 24.0 
1980 236.7 19.9 24.0 
1981 340.9 23.0 29.3 
1982 381.9 22.8 28.9 
1983 402.9 22.8 28.3 
1984 475.0 25.6 31.7 
1985 402.9 21.4 25.1 
Source: Based on (Central bank of Jordan 1989:26-29,58) 
contributed, on average, 20 per cent of the national income, high by any 
standards. Although remittances do not contribute directly to the GDP, since 
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they count as income derived outside its activities, and in excess of the 
domestic output. It is essential to see their correspondence. On average they 
equalled 24 per cent of the GDP. When compared to exports and imports their 
importance is further highlighted. The share of remittances to imports in 1973 
did not exceed 13 per cent, but by 1985 it stood at 38 per cent with an average 
share for the period 1973-85 of 25 per cent. As for exports the magnitude is 
even greater as the value of remittances in 1973 exceeded that of exports and 
by 1976 it was nearly threefold. Its importance declined by 1985 and stood at 
more than one and a half that of exports, see Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Relative Importance of remittances to Imports and exports for the period 1973-1985 
(JO million) 
Remittances Remittances / Imports Remittances / Exports Remittances / Exports 
(Merchandise) (Merchandise & services) 
% % % 
1972 7.4 7.8 43.5 14.2 
1973 14.2 13.1 58.8 18.5 
1974 24.1 15.4 48.4 21.1 
1975 53.3 22.8 109.0 28.7 
1976 136.4 40.2 198.5 41.0 
1977 154.8 34.1 188.6 39.1 
1978 159.4 34.7 175.3 36.2 
1979 180.4 30.6 149.2 33.0 
1980 236.7 33.1 138.1 31.8 
1981 340.9 32.5 140.5 32.8 
1982 381.9 33.4 144.4 34.0 
1983 402.9 36.5 191.3 36.5 
1984 475.0 44.3 163.4 37.8 
1985 402.9 37.5 129.6 33.0 
Source: (Central Bank of Jordan 1989:26-29). 
The apparent pivotal position remittances acquired in the economy was 
reflected in the state's policy - although remittances, as against grant and loan 
capital, did not accrue directly to the state, and although a large part was 
captured by the 'hidden economy' - which promoted labour as Jordan's major 
export item. In addition, the state was directly involved in seconding both its 
military and civil servants to Gulf governments. In accordance with that, 
remittances were seen as a return on investment in human-capital and were 
recorded as factor income from abroad. This method is in contrast to IMF 
standard procedures, which are accepted internationally, to record such flows 
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as 'unrequited private earnings' in the balance-of-payments statistics (ibid.: 
700). In recent IMF structural adjustment programme only 10 per cent of 
remittances are recorded as factor income from abroad in order to take into 
account the migrant labour that stays less than a year. Although the difference 
in the recording will not change the positive effect of remittances on the overall 
account of the balance of payments, it will give a more accurate picture of the 
development of the economy, illustrating that such inflows were but private 
transfers of individuals to their families contributing very little to long term 
development and the productive capacity of the economy. 
Therefore, the foremost concern of the government was to guarantee a 
continuous inflow of remittances, which necessitated not restricting the outflow 
of labour and also devising various mechanisms for increasing the amounts 
remitted. These included favourable bank policies which allowed commercial 
banks to open non-resident accounts in foreign currency, (in 1974 their share 
of total bank deposits was only 3.2 per cent, growing to 17.3 per cent by 1984). 
Another mechanism was the issuing of development bonds and, since 1979, 
the allowing of dealing in these on the Amman financial market. This very 
liberal policy was maintained despite the shortages witnessed by the domestic 
labour market since the mid 1970s, which created a unique situation in Jordan 
whereby it became both an exporter and importer of labour, that is, both a 
recipient and a sender of remittances. 
The expansion in the domestic economy, especially in the construction and 
service sectors, increased the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour, 
which Asian and Egyptian labour markets provided in abundance. They 
provided cheap and alternative labour to Jordanians, willing to take wages 30-
60 per cent lower than those demanded by local labour. However, many 
people, including government officials, attributed the imbalances of the labour 
market to the emigration of labour, although an examination of the occupational 
structure of imported labour suggests that this was not the case 2. The 
imported labour was predominantly semi-skilled and unskilled labour, filling 
shortages in the agriculture sector, construction, and services, especially in 
households, restaurants and hotels, with a very small proportion replacing 
migrants in skilled and technical occupations, whereas the emigrant labour was 
predominantly skilled. It is beyond the scope of this research to analyse the 
domestic labour market, but it is important to make this distinction and to point 
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out that the problem was more complex, caused only partly by emigration and 
mainly by a configuration of several factors including internal migration, the 
wage structure and the educational system. Consequently, the huge inflow of 
remittances coincided with a growing movement in the opposite direction 
beginning in 1976. This year showed for the first time an outflow of 
remittances which was still small, especially in comparison to the inflow, but 
which was increasing substantially over the years. It constituted on average 15 
per cent of the total remittances for the period 1976-85, (Table 4.8). However, 
despite the growing outflow of remittances, net remittances remained very 
high, which further encouraged the state to leave labour migration open both 
ways, into the country and out of the country. 
Table 4.8 Outflow of remittances for the period 1976-1985 
(JD million) 
Inflow of Outflow of Net Outflow / Inflow 
remittances remittances remittances % 
1976 136.4 6.8 129.6 5.0 
1977 154.8 15.0 139.8 9.7 
1978 159.4 20.0 139.4 12.5 
1979 180.4 24.0 156.4 13.3 
1980 236.7 46.0 190.7 19.4 
1981 340.9 52.0 288.9 15.3 
1982 381.9 62.4 319.5 16.3 
1983 402.9 72.8 330.1 18.1 
1984 475.0 97.5 377.5 20.5 
1985 402.9 92.9 310.0 23.1 
Source: (ibid.). 
The state also maintained a very liberal policy towards the usage of 
remittances and lacked a strategy or mechanism to influence investment 
patterns. This took place in spite of the assertion by government officials of the 
wasteful effects of remittances as well as their influence on fuelling the 
consumer market and the ever growing dependence of this market on imports. 
A survey carried out by the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society, described the 
investment behaviour of migrant workers as 'the outstanding sour note from the 
perspective of development has been the discouraging picture of savings and 
investment behaviour' (1983: 159-160). Still the state put in little effort to 
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resources away from consumption and into what it considered important 
alternative investment channels. 
This might suggest that remitted income did not have these negative effects as 
the government claimed, but rather improved the welfare of a large section of 
the population and covered their basic needs. As indicated by the very survey 
that laments the wastefulness of remittances, remitted income was spent on 
essential household items and maintenance in general, in addition to basic 
services such as education, health and securing land to build houses and/or 
purchase houses. Such data confirms that the large chunk of remitted income 
had alleviated social problems and reduced levels of poverty for many people 
in rural and urban areas, while enriching a small minority that was able to 
maintain special contacts with the ruling families in the Gulf or some powerful 
business communities. Moreover, the channelling of remittances into 
productive sectors would have challenged the dominance of the commercial 
bourgeoisie and the subservient role of the commodity market to foreign goods. 
Another significant contribution of migration was its alleviation of 
unemployment. In 1973 unemployment stood at 11 per cent. This was 
reduced to 4 per cent by 1981 after which it started to grow, reaching 6 per 
cent in 1985, and more than doubling by 1989 (Ibrahim 1989; 80). Interestingly 
those who were hit hardest by rising unemployment were the educated stratum 
such as engineers, doctors, etc., in other words, those who were in high 
demand prior to the decline in the oil economy. 
Jordan's total external resources available during this period were remarkable, 
providing exceptional levels of support to the state and society, especially, 
when considering the small size of the population. They grew from a level of 
39 per cent of the GNP in 1973 to 72 per cent in 1979, and have declined since 
then to a level of 56 per cent in 1981, (Table 4.9). A large part of the increase 
in the gross national product therefore was due to these huge capital receipts 
and not a result of domestic activities. Thus, the remarkable expansion of 
Jordan's foreign exchange reserves from a level of JD98 million in 1970 to 
JD730 million in 1983, and stagnating around JD781 in 1985, was 
predominantly due to the grants and remittances and not to improved 
production and the export capacity of the economy. In the next section 1 will 
explore how these resources expanded the development structures through 
which local capital prospered. 
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Table 4.9 Relative importance of total external resources for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Remittances Total loans & grants Total external resources Total external / GNP 
% 
1973 14.20 79.92 94.12 38.97 
1974 24.10 99.50 123.60 44.25 
1975 53.30 170.70 224.00 59.57 
1976 136.40 238.17 374.57 66.60 
1977 154.80 168.71 323.51 49.01 
1978 159.40 391.75 551.15 70.57 
1979 180.40 479.39 659.79 71.62 
1980 236.70 562.36 799.06 67.14 
1981 340.90 494.49 835.39 56.34 
Source: Based on (previous tables). 
The Augmentation and Broadening of the State's 'Development' Role 
The unprecedented amount of external financial assistance and the 
concomitant political stability of the region gave further strength to the state's 
control and management of the economy under the aegis of development 
planning. Through that very effective mechanism, the state was able to 
broaden its own activities and create or expand state structures, in particular, 
those of 'development', which resulted in its enhanced ability to determine who 
would benefit, in other words enhance the state's ability to promote and nurture 
private sector interests, while maintaining their subordinate and dependent 
position on the state. The following discussion will focus on illustrating the 
enlargement of the state sector and its expenditures through the mechanism of 
development planning which underpinned this enhanced ability to distribute 
benefits to key economic interests. 
'Development' Planning 
In contrast to the two attempts in the previous period - the world bank 
development programme in the 1950s and the seven year plan of the 1960s -
the period 1973-85 witnessed the preparation and execution of three 
consecutive plans: a three-year development plan 1973-5 and two five-year 
plans in 1976-80 and 1981-5. The first three-year plan noted, in answering the 
question 'why plan', that the aftermath of the 1967 war and the 1970-1 
confrontation with the Palestinian commandos, together with the meagerness 
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and scarcity of natural resources, the reliance on foreign aid and the need for 
foreign currency made it necessary to plan in order to adjust and to revitalise 
the economy and also restore the development momentum (Development Plan 
1973-5: 18-9). The second plan indicated that its aim was to further the 
momentum established by the implementation of the first one, while the third 
aimed to capture the positive response to investment of the Arab states, the 
international funding agencies and the private sector in Jordan (Development 
Plan 1981-5:). The government throughout these plans maintained its original 
position concerning its role as a facilitator, with a development strategy based 
on free enterprise and private initiative. Within this framework, the 
government has played a pioneering role by participating with the 
private sector in implementing large-scale industrial projects and 
providing incentives and an appropriate entrepreneurial climate for 
private investment. (Development Plan 1981-5: 2) 
The participation of the private sector in the process of preparation, elaboration 
and finalisation of the plans was taken as an indicator of this unique and 
efficient co-operation between the private and state sectors (World Bank 1983: 
24). 
Yet behind this rhetoric a different reality existed. In the first instance the plans 
were merely expenditure programmes, lacking an integrated development 
strategy. The most important element of these plans was the projects which 
were divided according to economic sector and were presented to funding 
agencies and various Western governments for approval and endorsement. 
However, the government could not just provide a list of nationally desired 
projects, although that's what the whole process boiled down to; it needed to 
present a 'plan' document with a frame and overall objectives in order to make 
the process more polished and legitimate (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 1988: 85-6). 
Many projects were undertaken when and if funds were forthcoming, and 
preference depended greatly on the priorities set by these funding agencies, in 
addition, to the power wielded by a ministry/minister or enterprise, which in 
many instances reflected the connection of the head of the enterprise to 
funding agencies or to the ruling class. Accordingly, the 1973-5 plan was 43 
per cent dependent on foreign funds, while the 1976-80 was 42 per cent (ibid.: 
85). 
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Moreover, the plans were further undermined by the lack of a consistent link 
with the annual budget: that is, there was no functional integration between the 
plans as expenditure documents and the annual budget, which highlights the 
government's dependence on external funds and its inability to predict either 
their level or availability. Additionally the unchanged particular classification of 
the government budget - whereby the division of its outlays was guided by the 
source of the revenue rather than the function or purpose of the activity 
indicates the high significance placed on guaranteeing the funds from abroad 
rather than focusing on the purpose of the outlay (Al-Hindi 1976: 43). This 
from a development perspective limited the ability to asses economic 
performance and to provide accurate indicators for decision-makers to arrive at 
appropriate development policies. Also the persistence of the fragmentation of 
the state budget and lack of augmented accounts including all state tiers, 
severely restricted the assessment of the overall impact of the state's 
'development' role in terms of the size of the state sector, the share in the 
formation of domestic product and the share in gross investment. Most 
statistics refer only to central government, which substantially underestimates 
the actual size of state involvement in the economy as well as making it very 
difficult to assess the structural orientation of the state sector. Although the 
Central Bank classifies expenditure according to function it still includes only 
central government, and development expenditures are not classified by 
sector. 
All these elements point to the fact that the adoption of development planning 
and the production of these plans was the most appropriate mechanism for 
dispensing with the huge resources, as well as for soliciting funds, without 
actually engaging in proper planning procedures that necessitated a qualitative 
change in data and information-gathering and analysis in order to arrive at 
appropriate economic polices and strategies. As a result it is understandable 
the reiteration of essentially the same overall objectives in these plans: the 
reduction of dependence on external assistance and the diversification of the 
economy by increasing commodity production; in addition to the reiteration of 
the same specific sectoral objectives as well as the organisational and 
procedural measures. 
The inability to deliver this did not happen, as some would like to suggest, as 
the result of a lack of administrative and technical expertise. To have 
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implemented these objectives of reducing dependence on external resources 
and of creating a more productive economy would have entailed a fundamental 
reorganisation of the power structure of the state. In other words, it would have 
undermined the economic prominence of the social groups that give legitimacy 
to the state and would have been in sharp contrast to the process engendered 
by the oil wealth; that of giving further impetus to the ruling classes in the Arab 
region and not altering the raison d'etre of Jordan and its ruling class as an 
important pillar of the status quo in the area in favour of Western interests. 
This illuminates the constraints of the state's economic role even when 
controlling the access to investment capital, since it could not embark on a path 
that would undermine its own legitimacy. The role of the state subsequently 
was beyond that of a mere facilitator who enjoyed a unique co-operative 
relationship with a dynamic private sector. It provided the channel for 
extracting the necessary capital and for its allocation and disbursement in a 
manner that maintained the existing domestic power structures. In other 
words, it significantly enlarged the state sector and broadened the scope of its 
activities, which aimed at increasing the proportion of these dependent on the 
state. Simultaneously, it enhanced state capacity to influence the prosperity of 
the key participants in the private sector. This meant the increased legitimacy 
of the state and its ruling class under the umbrella of supporting the 
development effort and through these structures that legitimated the very 
process of development and planning. Therefore, private sector participation in 
plan preparation had been but an exercise in lending legitimacy to the state's 
development project while being in fact the major beneficiaries. Those that 
participated in the various preparation committees of the plans represented the 
powerful interests in the economy, hence no serious discussions ever arose 
about structural problems but only concerning differences about technicalities 
and sectoral investment shares, etc. 
Broadening of 'Development' Structures 
Consequently, development planning extended the boundaries and the 
influence of the state through the flourishing of its various layers and the 
expansion of its levels of expenditure. Although there is no consensus on how 
to delimit the boundary of the state sector, the criterion used here is based on 
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the subordinate relation of these layers to central government. That is firstly, 
they are capital dependent on central government not only in terms of financial 
transfers but also advances, grants and the guaranteeing of domestic and 
international loans. Secondly, they are centrally controlled regardless of the 
different forms and organisational structure that each possessed (autonomous 
semi-autonomous, etc.) or their different functions. Thirdly, central government 
enacts rules and regulations as well as laws that directly affect their status, 
organisational structure as well as expand or curtail their privileges and 
benefits. 
Based on this definition the different tiers that constitute the totality of the state 
sector are, besides central government, the local councils, the autonomous 
governmental enterprises, and the public share-holding companies, or what is 
more commonly known as the mixed sector, (Table 4.10). These were as 
important as central government in terms of expenditure, creation of jobs and 
economic activities. It is this very fact that made the government reluctant to 
either integrate their accounts together and/or with central government 
accounts, since that would have stood in sharp contrast to its proclaimed role 
as a facilitator and supporter, and its priding itself on a thriving private sector, 
and would have illustrated the significance of the state sector as the base of 
the economy and the major creator of economic opportunities. 
Thus, the proliferation of local authorities, autonomous enterprises and public 
share-holding companies, and the governments' presentation of them as being 
separate from the central government, was very important in giving validity to 
the development effort, whereby the state was seen as a supporter of 
institution-building as well as to show that there were substantial 
developmental changes. Moreover, this process gave these enterprises, 
especially those that yielded huge resources such as the Jordan Valley 
authority, the Water authority, the Royal Jordanian Airlines, to name a few, 
immense power and influence to dispense favours and contracts to maintain 
the existing power structures. 
There follows a more detailed discussion of these four tiers of state agencies 
that will show the increasing importance of 'development' structures. The first 
three tiers reflect the common dimension of state involvement in the economy. 
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Table 4.10 Classification boundary of the state sector 
Central Government 
Covered by Budget Law and include the 
following: 
Public Administration, Monarchy, Parliament, 
Prime Ministers' Office, Council of Ministers 
Audit Department, Civil Service Commission 
and Ministries. 
Others include sem-autonomous departments 
within line mnistries such as; 
Higher Education Council 
Natural Resource Authority 
Broadcast Corporation 
Television Coiporation 
Jordan News Agency 
Jordan Valley Authority 
Local Governments 
Have their own annual budgets 
Totalled 572 councils in 1985, of which 150 
municiple, 375 village and 50 joint councils. 
They have a direct inpact on central 
government expenditure. 
The govemment provides one of their most 
important sources of revenue in the form of a 
share of fuel tax and it carries the burden of their 
indebtness. 
Autonomous Enterprises 
Have their annual budgets 
Receive financial support from the govemment 
and it guarantees their loans. 
Among the most irrportant are the following; 
Jordan Electricity Authority 
Water Authority of Jordan 
Amman Municipality 
Royal Jordanian Airiines 
Public Transport Corporation 
Aqaba Authority 
Civil Employees Consumption Coiporation 
Mixed sector 
Joint private and state 
Recieve substantial govememnt transfers and 
guarantees Its loans 
Recieve substantial preferential treatment such 
as tax and Custom exenption 
Source: Based on (World Bank 1991:28). 
namely the provision of social services and social infrastructure which were the 
predominant type of state outlays, contributing to the heavy service orientation 
of the economy. The last tier reflects the direct participation of the state in 
production, which had been increasing, but was still of much less significance. 
Central Government 
The role of the central government took on a new dimension manifested in the 
new levels of expenditure as well as in the expansion of its apparatus. In 1973 
it consisted of sixteen ministries and thirteen semi-autonomous departments 
related to particular ministries. By 1985 it grew to twenty-one ministries and 
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twenty-three semi-autonomous departments. This was in addition to its other 
administrative units, such as the monarchy, parliament and prime minister's 
office, as well as the expansion experienced in the military and security 
apparatus. Its total expenditure increased from a level of JD119.5 million in 
1973 to JD805.7 million in 1985 amounting to a sixfold increase in a decade, 
(Table 4.11). Up to the beginning of the 1980s the annual increases had been 
substantial but after that the strain of the economic decline in the region was 
reflected in decreasing rates of growth. The year 1982 showed for the first 
time a negative rate of increase of about 1.2 per cent. As for the significance 
of this expenditure to the GDP, the share of central government expenditure 
had been on average more than two-thirds. It reached its highest share of 77 
per cent in 1977 and 1979. 
Table 4.11 Structure of central government expenditure for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Grand total Social Physical Economic 
services infrastructure development 
Total Total / 
Grand total 
% 
1973 119.50 10.9 2.6 27.9 41.4 34.67 
1974 146.90 18.4 3.1 31.5 53.0 36.05 
1975 204.90 23.9 8.0 49.6 81.6 39.82 
1976 262.50 31.7 15.7 43.8 91.2 34.73 
1977 337.80 35.5 17.8 97.6 151.0 44.70 
1978 361.50 40.9 21.2 106.9 169.0 46.75 
1979 515.70 56.1 35.6 115.0 206.7 40.08 
1980 563.10 63.7 32.6 142.1 238.4 42.34 
1981 617.10 85.3 30.4 151.4 267.2 43.30 
1982 693.60 83.2 31.8 151.1 266.1 38.36 
1983 705.30 86.9 31.9 145.9 264.7 37.54 
1984 720.80 87.8 29.0 136.8 253.5 35.17 
1985 805.70 95.2 24.2 159.6 278.9 34.62 
Source: Based on (Central Bank of Jordan 1989: 47, 48). 
Consequently, a marked increase occurred in government expenditure in a 
variety of sectors, most notably the social services and physical infrastructure. 
The expenditure on social services increased from a level of JD10.9 million in 
1973 to JD85.3 million in 1981, an eightfold increase. But then it increased to 
only JD95.2 million by 1985, as a result of the decline in total financial 
assistance, similar trend was seen in the provision of infrastructure services. In 
1973 its expenditure did not exceed JD2.6 million, increasing to JD30.4 million 
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in 1981; a twelvefold increase but decreasing to JD24.2 million by 1985. The 
education sector, accordingly, expanded in terms of the number of teachers, 
students and its various levels of educational institutions, including schools, 
universities, colleges, vocational centres, etc. Health facilities grew immensely 
and the numbers of clinics hospitals and various support facilities expanded. 
Moreover, central government expenditure on what was grouped under the 
term 'economic development' increased, but at a lower rate, from JD27.9 
million in 1973 to JD151.4 million in 1981, a fivefold increase. This then 
fluctuated reaching JD159.6 million in 1985, (see previous table). 
Unfortunately, this item of expenditure was not sub-divided to reveal its sectoral 
distribution. 
However, despite these remarkable expenditures and the improvement and 
expansion in social and infrastructure services, the benefits did not accrue 
across the various areas of the country. Regional disparities were one of the 
most striking characteristics of the development of Jordan, where most of the 
improvement tended to concentrate in Amman. Secondly, the quality of the 
services, especially in health and education left a lot to be desired. In addition, 
a significant part of the expenditure went largely on salaries and wages. More 
importantly, the military and security apparatus remained the major item of 
expenditure, consuming on average a third of government expenditure, (Table 
4.12). This share was, in effect, much higher, since these figures included only 
the current expenditure of the military and an insignificant part of the capital 
outlays of the security apparatus. What was notable in this period was the 
increased importance of the security apparatus, namely the police and the 
intelligence services. Accordingly, the expenditure on the security apparatus 
increased significantly from a mere JD6.4 million to JD43.2 million, a sevenfold 
increase. 
The abovementioned indicators should be considered as showing the structural 
trend of state outlays rather than an accurate assessment, since the imprecise 
distinction of current and capital expenditure persisted. Items that fit under 
recurrent expenditure were often reported under capital in order to lessen the 
inflation of current expenditure. In addition, there was no accurate distinction 
between expenditure of capital development and capital non-development. 
Hence, a sectoral distribution of development expenditures is not available 
(World Bank 1991: 44). Even in the plan documents the sectoral distribution of 
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investment is indicated by using 'capital' expenditure without specifying 
precisely whether it is 'development' expenditure. 
Table 4.12 Total government expenditure on the military and security apparatus for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Total government Internal order Military Total Security & military / 
expenditure and security security & military Total government 
expenditure 
% 
1973 119.500 6.384 42.013 48.397 40.50 
1974 146.900 8.071 44.475 52.546 35.77 
1975 204.900 10.034 48.300 58.334 28.47 
1976 262.500 11.473 93.363 104.836 39.94 
1977 337.800 14.419 82.563 96.982 28.71 
1978 361.500 16.638 88.914 105.552 29.20 
1979 515.700 23.034 114.866 137.900 26.74 
1980 563.100 24.687 118.184 142.871 25.37 
1981 617.100 30.222 138.000 168.222 27.26 
1982 693.600 34.718 156.630 191.348 27.59 
1983 705.300 36.022 168.000 204.022 28.93 
1984 720.800 36.842 168.000 204.842 28.42 
1985 805.700 43.184 190.200 233.384 28.97 
Source: (ibid.). 
Local Governments 
Despite the increase in importance and influence of local governments at three 
different levels - regional, municipal and village - the manner of their 
development during this period attests to the fact that they were used as 
political channels to maintain state leverage and loyalty by dispersing funds to 
rural and disadvantaged areas, rather than as a means for creating more 
economically viable communities and self administered ones. Central 
government exercised a strong hold on the regional level which was divided 
into five governorates, Amman, Irbid, Balqa, Karak and Ma'an through its 
control of the appointment, dismissal or transfer of the governor^. Most 
significantly, these governors fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of the 
Interior, hence emphasising their political role. Accordingly, the most important 
qualification of a governor was his proven loyalty (Nyrop at al. 1974; 141). 
These governors in turn controlled the various municipal, village and joint local 
councils, and most significantly could interfere in their elections by having the 
power to annul them and appoint councils which replaced the elected ones for 
a period of two years. In 1979 the government attempted to pass an 
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amendment to the Municipalities Law in order to increase the period to four 
years. This prompted criticism and opposition from what was then the National 
Consultative Council which viewed it as a further marginalisation of the only 
elected body in the county (MECS 1978-9: 629). 
Thus, these councils which were in principle, the 'agencies for public 
participation in local government in order to meet the needs of local 
communities, including public services and basic facilities and mobilise 
resources for development' and by law were supposed to be administratively 
and financially independent non-government bodies (Development Plan 1981-
5: 332) had been to all intents and purposes subordinated to and controlled by 
central government both through the governorate office and by the Ministry of 
Municipal & Rural Affairs & Environment, or MR&AE. The exception to this 
arrangement was Amman Municipality which operated under the tutelage of 
the prime minister's office. This arrangement was partly due to Amman being 
the largest population conglomeration and hence to the importance of its 
having direct links to the cabinet. Subsequently, the wide range of activities 
and broad powers designated to local councils by law 29 in 1955 had been 
eroded by the continuous enactment of new laws and regulations by the central 
government, enhancing its omnipresence and restricting the development of 
local councils (World Bank 1990: 18). Most of the local activities and 
responsibilities were carried out and/or controlled by the MR&AE and the 
respective ministries responsible for public services. Revenue sources were 
defined and rates, charges and fees stipulated in laws and regulations by the 
central government. Moreover, the fuel tax - composed of revenue from 
custom taxes, motor vehicle licenses and taxes on petroleum products and 
distributed according to a formula that favoured small municipalities - remained 
for the majority of small councils their most important source of revenue. 
In addition, their economic viability and dependence on central government 
had been aggravated by the reduction of the population threshold of local 
councils, which accounted for part of the increase in the number of local 
councils. The number of local councils increased substantially from 158 village 
and 86 municipal councils in 1973 to 90 village, 240 municipal and a few joint 
councils by 1979. At the end of 1985 there were 150 municipal, 340 village 
and 50 joint services councils (ibid.: 19). However, this was seen by the 
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government as part of a process of 'upgrading the sector and supporting its 
activities' (Development Plan 1981-5: 332). 
In what appeared to be a means of increasing their efficiency and viability, the 
government in 1979 replaced the Development Fund of Municipalities and 
Villages with the Cities and Villages Development Bank, or CVDB. It was 
supposed to provide local councils with financial assistance for development 
purposes, and financial management advice and training, in order to create 
income-generating projects, and to increase their economic viability and 
independence. In fact, similar objectives had been reiterated in the 
development plans but to no avail. Nevertheless the need to effectively 
upgrade local councils' abilities became pressing, with the economic and social 
disparities widening between the various regions and the small, far-reached 
areas, and aggravated further by the high level of migration to cities. Ironically, 
instead of upgrading local councils' effectiveness the CVDB affected them 
adversely. They were encouraged, by the CVDB - the institution that was 
supposed to make them into viable development units - to expend on services 
and infrastructure projects which limited their ability to generate funds and 
create employment opportunities. In its first two years the CVDB granted two 
thirds of its loans for the construction of roads and schools (Development Plan 
1981-5: 332). Moreover, funds were not dispersed according to economic 
feasibility or profitability, and there was the widespread practice of spending 
loans on personal items rather on the purpose the loan. By mid 1980s most of 
the local councils had become insolvent. The description of the board of 
directors of the CVDB, therefore, as 'a largely political body who approved 
loans for municipalities which did not meet its lending criteria' is extremely 
accurate (World Bank 1990: 8). 
The persistence of deficits, combined with a continuous readiness on the part 
of the government to bear the brunt of the indebtedness of local governments, 
worsened the situation and it became a habit of Central Government to 
intervene to bail them out. In 1987 it repaid JD13 million in outstanding debt, 
as well as rescheduled their loan repayments for ten years. Still the problem 
persisted and in 1989 the government again repaid JD13 million in outstanding 
debt. This further attests to the importance of local governments as political 
channels to control rural and far reached areas, simultaneously tying their 
material existence to the central government. Yet, after the culmination of the 
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national debt problem, an internal memo of the CVDB emphasised the 
necessity 'to carry out feasibility studies for all projects funded by the Bank' 
(CVDB Internal Memo 1987). It also amended the law of the Bank by 
stipulating that, besides local councils, 'any institutions whose objectives are to 
provide basic services to local communities' would be eligible for loans. This 
meant a move towards the private sector which fitted into the new framework, 
promoted by the World Bank, of reducing the role of the public sector role, 
rather than improving the efficiency of local authorities. 
Autonomous Governmental Institutions 
This layer became the most significant structure in terms of development 
expenditure and for validating the state's 'development' effort. In 1985 it 
consisted of 29 institutions, representing a wide range of agencies across a 
variety of sectors. They included both sellers of goods and services, such as 
the Jordanian Electricity Authority, the Water Authority, the Royal Jordanian 
Airlines, and the Civil Service Consumer Corporation, in addition to those with 
a promotional developmental role, such as the Free Zones Corporation and 
Aqaba Ports Corporation. Although they prepared their own budgets and set 
personnel and pay policies, they were, in principle, part and parcel of central 
government budget, since their surpluses and deficits had to be integrated with 
the central budget. Starting 1979 the budget department had been publishing 
an annual budget document for these enterprises entitled 'Budgets of 
Autonomous Governmental Institutions for the fiscal year...', in an attempt to 
control these enterprises and emphasise their linkage to the central 
department. 
Yet, the document had been inadequate as a mechanism of assessing their 
developmental role as well as to control them. In the first place, it only covered 
some of the enterprises since a number of them did not need the approval of 
the Ministry of Finance to pass their budgets, and the audit department still 
needed a special mandate from the cabinet for submitting any of them to 
departments' control, in accordance to article 4 of the law of the department. 
Secondly, no effort was made to present the data in a unified form which would 
allow for comparison and interpretation, and even those that made their 
expenditures and revenues available had not been either consolidated together 
nor within the central government budget. Their growing eminence should 
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have been a strong motivation for a more accurate and consistent presentation 
of both their expenditures and involvement in the economy, but it was precisely 
this lax environment that made it possible for nepotism and favouritism to 
flourish. 
The power wielded by these institutions varied depending on the interests tied 
up with these institutions and their projects, rather than on economic priority. 
For instance, large sums were diverted to air transport - Royal Jordanian 
Airline, Arab Wings, and Jordanian Airline for Air cargo - because key 
individuals were making fortunes out of the various contracts. The same was 
true for the many capital-intensive projects involving very high commissions. 
Some believed that many of the high costs of projects had to do with the high 
commissions. Moreover, the duplication of the responsibilities among central 
government and these enterphses blurred accountability and created 
inefficiencies, while, most importantly, providing numerous channels through 
which to distribute the largesse. For example the transport sector - the largest 
in terms of investments - had been divided between two ministries: Public 
Works and Transport & Communication, and several other autonomous 
institutions: Aqaba Railway, Port of Aqaba, the Civil Aviation Authority, the 
Royal Jordanian Airlines, the Public Transport Corporation, the 
Telecommunication Department, and the Postal Department. 
I will make a tentative attempt to illustrate the significance of their expenditure 
as permitted by the available data. Table 4.13 includes only four out of the 29 
autonomous enterprises and shows that in 1979 their expenditure amounted to 
JD98.6 million, growing to JD208.2 million in 1982. If these figures are added 
to the total government expenditure for those two years, it would increase the 
state share in the GDP from 77 per cent to 92 per cent and from 55 per cent to 
77 per cent respectively. This supports the estimate provided by Luciani, and 
which puts the contribution of the state at around 85 per cent (1990: 74). Thus, 
one can deduce the actual effect of all these enterprises, and say quite safely 
that state expenditure had been the economy and the circulation of the state's 
funds were the source of the growth of the economy. 
The growth in loans guaranteed by the central government-mostly contracted 
by these autonomous enterprises was another important indicator of the latter's 
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Table 4.13 Total expenditure for selected autonomous enterprises for ttie period 1979-1985 
(JD million) 
Amman Water Electricity Royal Jordanian Total 
Municipality Authority Authority Airlines 
1979 8.7 16.4 8.3 65.2 98.6 
1980 13.8 34.4 15.9 92.2 156.3 
1981 17.9 10.5 54.7 107.1 190.2 
1982 13.6 13.7 52.8 128.1 208.2 
1983 6.3 38.9 67.1 - -
1984 16.5 51.2 73.4 - -
Source: Based on (Annual budget document of autonomous enterprises 1980,1981,1983,1986). 
increased importance. Loans guaranteed by the central government grew from 
a share of only 8 per cent in 1972 to more than 33 per cent in 1980, and while 
dropping to 29 per cent in 1982, they still showed more than a threefold 
increase within a decade, (Table 4.14). Most of these loans were invested in 
the transport followed by mining (Tarief 1984: 50-1). The expansion of these 
two sectors were close tied, since many of the large investments in transport 
were geared towards meeting the needs of mining industries. 
Table 4.14 Relative importance of loans guaranteed by central government for the period 1972-1982 
(JD million) 
Total loans Loans guaranteed by Loans guaranteed / 
government Total loans 
% 
1972 91.05 7.45 8.18 
1973 125.26 8.79 7.02 
1974 146.01 13.28 9.10 
1975 183.72 22.55 12.28 
1976 248.27 29.33 11.81 
1977 409.83 92.12 22.48 
1978 536.40 132.78 24.75 
1979 624.12 151.07 24.20 
1980 840.52 280.98 33.43 
1981 954.31 297.26 31.15 
1982 1042.57 302.35 29.00 
Source: (Tarief 1984:42). 
Consequently, their indebtedness grew significantly, especially the largest 
among them, such as the Water Authority, the Electricity Authority, and the 
Royal Jordanian Airline, which was passed to the government. This excessive 
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borrowing coupled with their inefficient running were the major causes behind 
the financial difficulties they have been experiencing since mid 1980s. An 
example of the seriousness of this situation can be seen in the Water and 
Sewerage Authority, which according to World Bank estimates would have to 
increase its tariff rates by 140 per cent in order to cover its annual cash gap 
and foreign debt (1991: 55). Government support also included financial 
transfers. To give an indication of this Table 4.15 provides a rough estimate of 
part of these transfers as far as the available data allowed. The government 
transferred around JD21 million in 1979, increasing to more than JD42 million 
in 1982, and around JD37.5 million in 1985. 
Table 4.15 Central government financial transfers to autonomous enterprises for the period 1979-1985 
(JD million) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
21.2 18.6 33.7 42.4 36.5 34.1 37.5 
Source: Based on (Annual budget document of autonomous enterprises 1980,1981,1983,1984,1985,1986). 
The Mixed Sector 
The fourth tier that illustrates the growth and total dimension of the state 
'development' role consists of the public share-holding companies, more 
commonly known as the mixed sector. It reflects the state's direct participation 
in the production of goods and services as well as its active involvement in the 
promotion of the private sector. Considering the significance of this layer, it is 
strange to see that it has been completely neglected in one of the most recent 
studies of the World Bank on public expenditures (World Bank 1991: 44). 
Perhaps partly because this tier complicates the structure of state sector and 
makes it hard to delimit its boundaries, since ownership of companies is shared 
by the private and state sectors. The most common criterion that had been 
used in delimiting the state sector is to include those enterprises for which the 
government held 51 per cent of the voting stock, that is, a controlling bloc. 
Although, in practice, the government tended to support financially and other 
wise, even those for which it did not have a voting bloc. Hence, it expanded its 
responsibility way beyond what was legally required in order to validate its 
economic achievements as well as guarantee a profitable environment for local 
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bourgeoisie. Another reason behind the reports' neglect is possibly the fact 
that the inclusion of the mixed sector would reveal the actual size of the state 
sector and undermine the image of an economy based on a thriving private 
sector. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, state initiative and capital were the most 
important factor behind stimulating commodity producing sectors either through 
infrastructure support, as the case in agriculture, or through the expansion of 
public companies. In 1973 the government contributed to twenty-seven public 
share-holding companies with a total of JD36 million paid up capital of which 
the state put a quarter, JD12 million. Of these, seventeen were in the industrial 
sector while the rest were in commerce, finance, and tourism (Royal Scientific 
Society 1975: 12,14). By 1984 these increased to thirty one, and although 
numerically this increase was not substantial, the expansion in investment was 
considerable. The total paid up capital of these firms increased to JD294 
million in 1984, more than an elevenfold increase, while the ownership trend 
shifted further towards the state, (Table 4.16). In comparison with a 37 per 
cent share in 1972, the state share increased to 41 per cent while the private 
sector share decreased from 60 per cent to 37 per cent. Foreign participation, 
which was predominantly Arab, increased markedly from a level of only 3 per 
cent to 22 per cent. 
Table 4.16 Capital growth of public share holding companies for the period 1972-1984 
(JD million) 
Paid up capital Ownership share % 
State Private Foreign 
1972 22.0 36.8 60.0 3.2 
1975 46.0 29.8 63.6 6.6 
1980 173.0 40.3 30.3 29.4 
1984 294.0 41.1 37.3 21.6 
Note: See end of the chapter notes number 4. 
Source: Based on (Dalgamouni 1987:81-82). 
The pattern of concentrating state investments on resource-based industrial 
firms continued with more vigour and without due consideration for commercial 
profitability let alone the overall effects on the economy. Accordingly, the 
biggest share of capital was concentrated in six major companies as follows; 
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the Potash JD63 million. Fertilisers JD55 million. Petroleum refinery JD32 
million, Fuheis Cement JD22.4 million, Phosphate JD20 million and 
Rashiddiyya Cement JD19.9 million (Smadi 1984: 79). However participation 
in equities represented only a small part of state's role. Other supportive 
mechanisms included, firstly, the provision of grants, advances and loan 
guarantees. (Dalgamouni 1987: 87). Secondly, there were the tax 
exemptions, custom exemptions and the exemption of the state from taking 
profits from its equity shares, if profits were less than 10 per cent. Thirdly, 
there was the indirect participation of the government through either its fully 
owned agencies such as the Pension Fund and Social Security Corporation, or 
those for which it held majority shares and which in turn held shares on behalf 
of the government. This, as a result, created a complex network within the 
mixed sector dominated by the government. In such an environment the 
reluctance of the government to allow any firm to go bankrupt is 
understandable, and this caused the diversion of scarce resources to support 
either ailing ventures or those that were economically unprofitable. 
For example, the Industrial Development Bank (IDB), which is a joint venture, 
held shares on behalf of the government in a variety of firms, and, more 
significantly, it acted as a major supporter to state enterprises through its credit 
policy, although the objective of the bank, created in 1965, was to support and 
expand private sector activities in order to establish a dynamic and diversified 
industrial base. By 1982 the proportion of credit lent to large public industrial 
and tourist companies, reached 74 per cent while the proportion of small scale 
industries did not exceed 4.4 per cent. A very negligible proportion one might 
say. The bank's support extended also to participating in underwriting 
operations of the public companies' shares and bonds. In 1982 the bank 
participated in underwriting the operations of four industrial companies. At the 
same time the bank enjoyed the same aforementioned special benefits of 
public sector firms of guaranteeing its loans, the value of its shares and a 
minimum level of profit, in addition to its exemption from customs and duties. 
These generous benefits meant effectively a state subsidy to the private 
shareholders of the bank, namely, the commercial banks who were the primary 
private shareholders. Because of this extensive support given by central 
government to public firms, the government appointed most of the general 
directors and deputies of these firms as well as government representatives on 
the boards of directors. These posts, consequently, were monopolised by a 
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few who either rotated among these firms or actually headed them for years. 
For instance the IDB until recently had been headed by the same person, Ziad 
'Anab, since the 1960s. 
The major problem with the concentration of investment capital in a few large 
industrial firms and the extensive government's support was the fact that their 
contribution to the economy was limited. Some of these enterprises had been 
a continuous liability where the government had to intervene to bail them out 
and the rest were not proving to be economically viable or commercially 
profitable. Total loss of these companies increased from approximately 
JD8,000 in 1974 - accounting for the losses of one firm - to more than JD13 
million in 1982 - accounting for the losses of nine firms of which the Potash 
losses alone accounted for JD11 million. Others such as the weaving company 
had been running at a loss since they were established (Smadi 1984: 109-
110). Ironically by 1986 the government was forced to merge those running at 
huge losses with commercially viable ones, bringing about the merger of the 
Rashadiyya Cement Company with the Fuheis Cement Company and the 
Fertilisers Company with the Phosphate Company, in addition to raising funds 
to salvage the Potash Company. 
The contribution of the mixed sector to the economy was in terms of a balance 
sheet a huge burden. A look at Table 4.17 illustrates the declining rates of 
their ability to contribute to domestic revenues. In 1973 they contributed 44 per 
cent of total income tax, while in 1984 that share just exceeded 20 per cent, 
and more importantly, 86 per cent of the tax revenue came from only three 
companies: the Phosphate, Cement and Petroleum Refinery. Also, in 1973 the 
profits of the industrial companies constituted 95 per cent of the total profits of 
the mixed sector while the financial enterprises accounted for only 3 per cent. 
By 1984 that situation was reversed: the contribution of the industrial 
companies was reduced to 13 per cent while that of the financial enterprises 
increased to 80 per cent (Dalgamouni 1987: 141-144). Thus, in those 
companies that consumed huge amounts of capital and accumulated huge 
debts, profitability was declining to unacceptable levels. 
Another important indicator is a comparison of how much these companies 
were able to pay for imports which reveals their very limited contribution. As 
seen from Table 4.18, although their contribution nearly doubled from a share 
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of 7 per cent to 14 per cent, it still covered a small fraction of total imports. Part 
of this huge import bill was the increasing share of food imports, yet very little 
Table 4.17 Relative importance of income lax on public share holding companies for the period 1973-1984 
(JD Million) 
Income tax Taxes of companies % of taxes 
1973 3.85 1.68 43.60 
1974 5.39 4.36 80.90 
1975 9.28 3.64 39.20 
1976 9.34 4.35 46.60 
1977 13.24 5.25 39.70 
1978 18.56 6.18 33.30 
1979 22.38 8,31 37.10 
1980 26.78 11.38 42.50 
1981 39.98 9.84 24.60 
1982 43.67 6.99 16.00 
1983 46.02 9.16 19.90 
1984 48.70 9.85 20.20 
Average annual growth rate for income tax 23.50% 
Average annual growth rate for company tax 15.90% 
Source: (ibid.: 133). 
Table 4.18 Relative importance of exports of industrial companies to imports for the period 1973-1984 
(JD Million) 
Exports of industrial companies Relative importance to imports 
% 
1973 7.2 6.6 
1974 25.06 16 
1975 25.28 0.8 
1976 23.67 7.0 
1977 22.14 4.9 
1978 24.44 5.3 
1979 32.15 5.5 
1980 52.95 7.4 
1981 66.05 6.3 
1982 69.36 6.1 
1983 91.78 8.3 
1984 145.52 13.6 
Source: (ibid.: 139). 
had been done in terms of encouraging food production. This structure had to 
do with the overall place of Jordan within the international capitalist market but 
also with the domestic configuration of the political power base. Thus, 
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interestingly enough, within this very unfavourable situation private 
shareholders' interests were maintained by the combined effects of 
government's insistence on bailing them out, reducing tax burdens and giving 
priority to the distribution of share profits to private holders while the 
government conceded on taking its profits. Its total profits in the period 1973-
1984, were around JD32 million, most of which came from Phosphate and 
Cement. It grew from less than half a million in 1973 to JD5 million in 1984 
(Dalgamouni 1987:149). 
Yet, the private sector remained reluctant to participate in many of the new 
ventures promoted by the government. For instance, the government ended 
up being the sole owner, in ventures where it was supposed to participate with 
approximately 50 per cent share. These included companies such as the 
Jordan-Syrian Company for Land Transport, the Jordan-Iraq Company for 
Land Transport and the Jordan Syrian Industrial Company. In other ventures 
where the government share was supposed to be only between 1-4 per cent, it 
also ended up being sole owner, such as in the case of Arab Mining, the 
Livestock Development, the Arab Company for Maritime Transport and the 
Jordan Mineral Company (World Bank 1983: 79). 
Conclusion 
The most significant effect of the oil boom and the new levels of capital 
accruing to Gulf states was the search for ways to realise this surplus, and the 
need to maintain the stability of the region and the ruling classes in the Gulf 
presiding over these remarkable oil revenues. In this context Jordan's 
traditional role as an important party for maintaining the status quo and 
Western interests in the region was further emphasised. Moreover, the ability 
of Jordan's labour market to respond to the needs of the Gulf market added 
another crucial dimension to the expanded economic linkages to the Gulf. 
Subsequently, the huge capital inflow of loans and grants increased state's 
control over financial resources and augmented its economic power, while 
remittances provided income, to a large segment of the population, in excess 
of the domestic capacity, hence contributed significantly to the stability of the 
state. 
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The increased access of the state to external funds allowed central 
government to broaden and expand its economic role, in particular its 
development role and development structures and increased its control over 
who benefits. Yet its economic activities and economic policies did not affect a 
change in the production capacities of the economy and/or creating the basis 
for sustained economic development, and its development plans and 
development structures reflected their usefulness as channels to strengthen 
the ruling class as well as to increase stability by widening the spectrum of 
benefiting social groups. This, on the one hand, undermined the very basis on 
which the state's development role could be argued - that is it can act in the 
general interest of society-, while, on the other, attested to state's restricted 
ability to divorce itself from the economic interests that lends it legitimacy, as 
well as its external linkages that underpinned this new enhanced economic 
power. The following chapter will focus precisely on showing how the state's 
economic role is tied to specific class interests. 
Notes 
1. The existing data do not distinguish between those emigrating from the 
West bank and those emigrating from Jordan. 
2. See Ian Seccombe (1984), International Labour Migration and Skill 
Scarcity in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Geneva, International 
Labour Office. 
3. During the preparation of the 1986-1990 development plan the 
governorates were expanded to seven as follows: Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, 
Mafraq, Balqa, Ma'an, Tafeilah. 
4 Dalgamouni's study includes the following twenty, most important, mixed 
sector companies: Phosphate, Potash, Mining, Textiles, Tanning, Paper 
and Carton, Petroleum, Pharmaceutical, Fertilisers, Rashadiyya 
Cement, Fuheis Cement, Glass, Irbid Electricity, Hotel and Tourism, 
Arab International Hotels, Jordan Tourism, National Marine, Industrial 
Bank, Housing Bank, Television and Cinema Production. 
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Chapter Five 
The State's 'Development' Role and Class Interests 
To complement the analysis of the previous chapter, attention will now focus on 
elucidating specifically the impact of the expanded state's development role on 
the transformation of the social structure of society in order to show how the 
state, despite the concentration and centralisation of economic power in its 
hand, was unable to implement the task it took upon itself in restructuring the 
economy, through development planning and a process of state's control over 
resources, towards a more productive one and less dependent on external 
funds. As seen from the previous chapter state dependence on external funds 
increased substantially and the service structure of the economy as will be 
seen from the discussion of this chapter has been further consolidated. Hence 
the state augmented the prosperity and wealth of its class alliance of 
commercial and state bourgeoisie and the landed class while increasing the 
stability of the regime via the expansion of the 'new' petty bourgeoisie. This 
attests to the fact that the state could not escape the particular configuration of 
its power base which provided its legitimacy, that is, economic and class 
interests play a major role in determining state actions and policies. 
Furthermore, although state development strategy was geared towards 
nurturing and promoting private interests and creating a thriving private sector, 
this promotion remained limited by the tension that laden state's role between 
the ruling family and private interests. 
Consequently the interests of the Hashemite ruling family meant that the state 
promoted and nurtured private sector interests but these remained subordinate 
to and dependent on the state. Thus the prosperity of the propertied class 
continued to be primarily reliant on state expenditure and, more importantly, on 
the ability of the state to muster funds from abroad, and although the period 
witnessed a further enmeshing of economic interests, which cut across the 
sub-statal affiliation and in particular the division of the Palestinians-East 
Bankers, the propertied class remained permeated with personalised relations 
of kinship, familial, ethnicity, religion, etc., hence its coherence and ability to 
capture the state for its own interest was undermined. Similarly, the state 
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bourgeoisie, whose control over resources increased their power and influence 
were not in a position to capture the state either since their fate is 'politically 
determined' (Waterbury 1991: 13). Even those state bourgeoisie who are 
themselves influential businessmen their access to state powerful positions is 
also determined politically. The king could dismiss any of the most senior 
figures when the legitimacy of the ruling class is threatened. The recent and 
most classic example of this was the dismissal of Zaid Rifa'i in 1989 - who was 
not only one of the most enduring of Jordan's prime ministers, but a personal 
friend of King Hussein - as a result of intense popular objections and bitterness 
towards the government's handling of the economic recession. Thus, the 
Hashemite family continued to appear as holding the balance between 
fractured and rivalled social groups while maintaining the dependency of both 
the bourgeoisie and the top management of both civil and military apparatus on 
its ability to extract the necessary funds from outside to maintain prosperity and 
stability. 
The following discussion will illustrate, besides the strengthening of the existing 
powerful economic interests, the overall changes in the class structure 
emphasising the expansion of the 'new' petty bourgeoisie whose improved 
livelihood has been a major reason behind the stability of the regime. It will 
also highlight the growth of the marginalised groups or those left at a worsened 
situation and the widened income disparities and living standard gaps among 
the various social groups. 
The Consolidation of the Locai Bourgeoisie 
The increased interdependency between the state bourgeoisie and the 
propertied class has been one of the most significant developments of the oil 
boom period. The remarkable expansion in the economic role of the state 
increased the power of the state bourgeoisie in both the civil and military and 
security apparatus via controlling access to lucrative contracts and the means 
for prosperity of the property-owning class, which also provided them with the 
channel and opportunity to accumulate wealth and power. High commission 
fees, discretionary powers and nepotism thrived which largely explains why 
unjustified increases in project costs occurred frequently and the widespread 
corruption and misuse of public funds. This was the case prior to the oil boom 
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but with the new levels of state expenditure this aspect was intensified, in 
addition the level of richness that accrued has been incomparable to previous 
periods. 
Subsequently the state resorted increasingly to drawing some of its top 
management from the ranks of economically influential businessmen. For 
instance, five out of eight members of the board of directors of the Central 
Bank, which is appointed by the cabinet, were eminent merchants and bankers 
who directly participated in setting up the overall frame of the working of the 
economy. The cabinet included ministers who were wealthy bankers or 
merchants. Most notable was the rotation of the post of Minister of Trade and 
Industry among the three leading commercial families the Mu'asher, the Taba'a 
and the Asfour. Two of the Prime Ministers of Jordan during that period were 
influential businessmen, Mudar Badran and Zaid Rifa'i, not to mention the 
prevalence of prominent businessmen in the boards of directors of most if not 
all public institutions as well as in the posts of general directors. 
The prosperity of local bourgeoisie, therefore, did not result just from the 
expansion of economic opportunities but was facilitated by the augmentation of 
the alliance of the property-owning class with state top management. 
Simultaneously competition for resources depended not on economic priority 
but on differences in the power that various figures wielded, in addition to who 
benefits from the high commissions entailed in the numerous projects and the 
projects themselves. Most of the important institutions such as the Jordan 
Valley Authority, the Ministry of Planning (previously the National Planning 
Council), and the Royal Jordanian Airlines had been highly centralised and run 
by one strong man; Munther Haddadin, Haneh 'Odeh and Ali Gandour 
respectively. Such concentration and centralisation of power made it easier for 
the clique to operate and for the system of nepotism and favouritism to thrive, 
especially with the absence of any sort of accountability. Thus the rivalries, 
disagreements and conflicts that existed among the propertied bourgeoisie and 
state bourgeoisie and/or between them had been oriented towards the 
accessibility and disbursement of state resources as well as the incumbency of 
top level positions of state apparatus, rather than being ideologically or 
politically motivated. This is further emphasised by the fact that the investment 
levels of the plans were set by the cabinet and accordingly the role of the 
budget department tended to be of a negotiator among the various ministries. 
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institution and enterprises on their investment shares. That's why it was the 
power that a minister, a director, etc., wielded that counted and not the 
institution per se and/or its function or economic priorities. 
Most important about this alliance is that it preserved the dominant place of 
propertied bourgeoisie in its principle economic activity: commercial and 
business services, while expanding the scope of its investments in fields that 
were just emerging in the pre-1973 period. These include banking and finance, 
transit trade, real-estate and export trade particularly high value cash crops of 
fruits and vegetables. Subsequently the unusual service orientation of the 
economy was further entrenched, generating two thirds of domestic output and 
absorbing two thirds of the labour force. The share of service sector, as seen 
from Table 5.1, ranged between its highest of 70 per cent and its lowest of 61 
per cent. It also absorbed on average more than two thirds of the labour force 
and its share had increased from the level of 64 per cent in 1973 to 70 per cent 
in 1985, see Table 5.2. Even in comparison with states of similar income levels 
the ratio is too high where service sector does not contribute more than 40 per 
cent of GDP and does not absorb more than 30 per cent of labour force (Al-
Nashrah Al-lgtisadiyya 1983: 8). The contribution of the enlarged size of state 
sector and its consolidation as the major source of employment was the 
second reason which gave further impetus to the service orientation of the 
economy and accounted for the growth of the 'new' petty bourgeoisie, as will be 
seen later in the discussion. 
The augmentation of the service orientation of the economy happened despite 
the growth shown in commodity producing sectors, since their growth was 
underlined by the massive state investments in social services and physical 
infrastructure including the huge investments in the irrigation sector of the 
Jordan Valley as well as the infrastructural support of resource-based 
industries. Moreover, as seen from the previous chapter the massive 
investments in industry were economically unprofitable in addition to their 
nature contributing very little to manufacturing, therefore, a structural change in 
the economic base did not take place. The expanded opportunities in the 
commodity producing sectors were captured by the commercial and business 
community already at an advantage either by diversifying activities into new 
fields notably contracting, agriculture and light manufacturing. 
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Table 5.1 Relative Importance of economic sectors for the period 1973-1985 
{%) 
1973 1975 1978 1980 1982 1984 1985 
Commodity Sector 
Industry 11.3 18.5 17.1 18.7 19.6 19.0 16.4 
Agriculture 9.3 8.6 10.6 7.7 7.0 7.5 8.3 
Electricity & water 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.6 
Construction 8.0 6.3 9.3 10.9 10.4 9.7 9.2 
Total Share 30.0 34.4 38.3 39.2 39.2 38.7 36.5 
Tertiary Sector 
Commerce 20.2 22.1 18.6 18.6 18.0 18.4 18.8 
Transport and communication 9.5 8.2 10.8 9.0 10.6 11.0 11.2 
Finance & real-estate 11.1 9.9 12.2 11.9 11.1 11.0 11.6 
Government services 24.7 21.5 17.2 19.1 18.7 18.1 18.9 
others 4.5 3.9 2.9 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.0 
Total share 70.0 65.6 61.7 60.8 60.8 61.3 63.5 
Source: Based on (Central Bank of Jordan 1989:47). 
Table 5.2 Relative importance of employment in the service sector for the period 1973-1985 
(JD thousands) 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 
Total employed 296.0 338.1 371.0 391.1 418.4 445.3 472.3 
Service sector 188.0 218.9 244.7 259.1 284.5 311.1 328.4 
% In Services 63.5 70.4 66.0 66.2 68.0 69.9 69.5 
Source: Based on (Ibrahim 1989:62). 
Following the same methodology used in chapter three a separate discussion 
is warranted of the various social groups that make up the propertied class, 
similarly without giving the illusion that they represent divergent groups 
especially that many of them are engaged in more than one type of investment. 
In fact the boom era provided ample opportunities for the most prominent 
businessmen to invest capital in more than one activity cutting across 
economic sectors. 
Merchants 
Trade continued to be one of the principle economic activities dominating the 
private sector and lending further support to the position and influence of 
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merchants. It was precipitated by two major factors which provided ample 
economic opportunities for growth. The first was the substantial increase in the 
demand for goods and services in both the private and the state domains 
coupled with the continued liberal state policies. In other words, the enhanced 
purchasing power of the state and society, due to the abundance of 
remittances and aid, pushed consumption to unprecedented levels. The 
second was the increase in transit trade as well as the improvement in 
domestic exports. Accordingly, the contribution of the trade sector to the GNP 
was staggering and rose steadily. In 1973 the import/export sector contributed 
52 per cent to the GNP, with the predominant share held by imports at around 
45 per cent while the exports' share was a mere 7 per cent. By 1985 
export/import sector contributed 71 per cent, 57 per cent to imports and 14 per 
cent to exports (Central Bank of Jordan 1989). Thus, although compradore 
merchants - those trading on behalf of foreign capital - still dominated, an 
increase took place among those trading with domestic items, especially 
agricultural produce and light manufactured goods, destined primarily to the 
Gulf in particular Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
The sector's activities and profits remained concentrated in the hands of the old 
clique of leading merchant families. According to the 1985 study of wholesale 
and retail trade, out of 28,155 trading enterprises, only 425 were wholesalers, 
of which more than two thirds were located in Amman. Wholesalers therefore 
did not exceeded 1.5 per cent of the total commercial enterprises. Moreover 
they also tended to be the major importers. This monopoly was facilitated by 
the fact that importers required substantial amounts of capital, usually 25 per 
cent of the value of imported goods, in order to open import letter of credit and 
they tended to get exclusive agencies for particular lines of products in order to 
avoid competition (Nyrop et al. 1974: 193). The holding of the leading families 
onto their monopolistic position is illustrated in their continued domination of 
both the Amman Chamber of Commerce and the Union of Chambers in 
particular the Taba'a, Bdair, Asfour, Abu Hassan, Mango, Mu'asher, Danwaza, 
Ka'war, Barakat, and Toukan families. In addition they represented the sector 
on the various state committees, most importantly the plan preparation 
committees as well as being heavily involved in the various boards of directors 
of key public companies and institutions. One example is Mohammad Bdair, 
who was simultaneously on the boards of the Phosphate, Potash and Oil 
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Refinery Companies, besides owning a majority share of tine Jordan Electricity 
Company and acting as its director. 
The extent of the consumer behaviour that the 1970s engraved on both the 
private and state sector alike, can be revealed by looking at the usage of 
domestic output. Consumption expenditure averaged one and a half times 
domestic output reaching its peak in 1979 with a share of 143.2 per cent of the 
GDP. From then onwards it declined, reaching a level of 130 per cent, which 
was still very high, (Table 5.3). Correspondingly Jordan's import bill reached 
an unprecedented level. It grew at an average annual rate of more than 20 per 
cent, constituting four times the exports in 1985, (Table 5.4). That was not due 
to the population growth, nor to the rate of inflation, but rather to a real increase 
in consumption levels. In spite of the improvement of exports, indicated by a 
growth rate of 27 per cent and the decrease in the gap between imports and 
exports from sixfold to fourfold for the period 1973-85, this discrepancy 
remained very large. 
Significantly the consumption fetish and its ever growing dependence on 
foreign goods was directly encouraged by the state. In the first instance, the 
growth of the government's own demand was met increasingly through imports, 
considering the size of its consumption expenditure, representing around a 
quarter of the total consumption for the period 1973-85, one can envisage the 
impact of this on the economy, (Table 5.3). It also made the supply contracts 
of the state a very lucrative business for key merchants, especially with the 
widespread nepotism and preferential treatment. An important example of that 
is the state's supply contracts for some basic food items. The government in 
1974 established the Ministry of Supply with the aim of providing basic 
consumption food items at controlled prices. Contrary to public belief then, that 
the government would import these items directly, hence preventing a 
monopoly by key merchants, it reverted instead to subcontracting to those key 
merchants (Fanek 1982: 25). Thus, in addition to providing them with a 
profitable business, the government transferred the costs of providing 
appropriate warehousing facilities and any financial risks to the government. 
The contracts for wheat for instance were controlled and divided predominately 
between the Al-Talhouni and Tamari families (ibid.). 
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Table 5.4 Growth of imports for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Imports Domestic exports Exports / Imports 
% 
1973 108.3 14.0 12.9 
1974 156.6 39.4 25.2 
1975 234.0 40.1 17.1 
1976 339.5 49.5 14.6 
1977 454.5 60.3 13.3 
1978 458.9 64.1 14.0 
1979 585.7 82.6 14.1 
1980 716.0 120.1 16.8 
1981 1047.5 169.0 16.1 
1982 1142.5 185.6 16.2 
1983 1103.3 160.1 14.5 
1984 1071.3 261.1* 24.4 
1985 1074.4 255.3 23.8 
Average annual growth rate of imports 21% 
Average annual growth rate of exports 27% 
Note: * • The upsurge in exports had been due to substantial increase in the exports of chemicals especially fertilisers 
and pharmaceuticals. 
Source: (ibid.: 32-3). 
Furthermore state's customs and duties policy played a central role by allowing 
the proliferation of exemptions of state agencies from virtually all principal 
duties and taxes. These exemptions not only eroded the tax base and 
marginalised domestic revenues, but more importantly encouraged imports and 
reduced the profitability of local producers since. 
It places the domestic manufacturer at a significant disadvantage 
vis-^-vis imports within a large portion of his market, in effect 
reducing the size of his market substantially. (World Bank 1988:23) 
Given Jordan's exchange rate policy, it further raised the profitability of the 
import sector, impeding local industries and saturating the domestic commodity 
market with foreign products. The value of imports, for instance, not paying 
any tariff for the year 1985 was about half the total value of imports. Of these 
nearly 25 per cent competed directly with local producers, thus the exemptions 
enjoyed by state sector effectively reduced the market for local producers by 
25 per cent (ibid.). In addition the lack of a general consumption tax has also 
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fuelled the consumption orientation of the society in particular the live styles 
adopted by the rich stratum. It has been precisely these two elements that the 
recent deliberation of the government on addressing the present economic 
problem found most pressing and were marked as the essential structural 
problems of the Tax System in Jordan (World Bank 1989:4). 
Finally the very liberal import licences' policy permitted the import of a wide 
range of goods particularly consumer and luxury goods. Jordan's commodity 
market became flooded with a wide range of goods, of various brands, such as 
cars, clothes, electrical equipments, cosmetics, etc. State's defence of its 
policy is that it was necessary to fuel the economic growth by providing 
essential equipment and machinery and raw materials. At face value the 
structure of imports evidence that, but a more critical scrutiny reveals that 
consumption oriented items had the largest share. For instance the largest 
part of the increase in raw material was crude oil and a significant part of that 
supported the increase in transport. In 1981 Cars and transit trade consumed 
50 per cent of total energy consumption (Abu Al-Sha'ar 1983: 97). The number 
of registered cars in 1975 was approximately 29,000 increasing fivefold in 1985 
to 145,000, while trucks and pickups were 8,000 increasing to 55,000, a 
sevenfold increase for the same period (Development Plan 1981-5:179; Khatat 
Al-Tanmiyya 1986-90 Plan: 405). Secondly many items under capital goods do 
not contribute directly to an expansion in the production facilities of the 
economy such as transport equipment, spare parts and so forth, hence a large 
part of the increase had been geared towards contributing to services and 
commercial activities. 
The accelerated boom in transit trade was the second reason behind 
establishing trading as the most dynamic sector, which further emphasised the 
crucial role of Jordan as a major conduit to the Gulf especially after the 
Lebanese civil war and the closure of Beirut port, the reopening of the Suez 
canal and most significantly after the eruption of the Iran-Iraq war. With the 
closure of Basra and Umm Qasr ports, Iraq's dependence on Aqaba grew 
significantly and further accentuated with the closure of its border with Syria. 
Thus the new political alignment between Jordan and Iraq was motivated 
primarily by economic concerns on the part of Iraq and by political concerns on 
the part of Jordan, in particular due to the fear of an Iranian victory and the 
mullahs anti monarchist ideology. Crown Prince Hassan had indicated that if 
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Iran and Syria secured any land link across Iraq, Jordan's security would be 
seriously effected (MECS 1982-3: 644). 
This alliance, nevertheless, proved to be of immense economic significance to 
Jordan. A whole set of commercial businesses were established catering for 
transit trade and substantially dependent on the demands in the Gulf market, in 
general and the needs of Iraq, in particular. A strong pro-Iraqi lobby developed 
in Jordan headed by Amin Shukayr and based on the dependence of 
approximately 160 commercial and industrial firms on Iraq (Baram 1991: 58). 
As seen from Table 5.5, Gulf markets absorbed 38 per cent of the total exports 
in 1973, growing to more than half by 1982 and dropping slightly to 47 per cent 
in 1985. The most important items of export were foodstuffs in particular fruit 
and vegetables, as well as light manufactured goods specifically geared 
towards Iraq. Subsequently, Iraqi imports from Jordan in 1977-78 came to $8-
10 million annually and the figures soared to $47 million in 1978-9, $104 million 
in 1979-80, $214 million in 1980-1 and back to $209 million in 1981-2. Iraqi 
exports to Jordan were insignificant prior to 1984 but they jumped to $173 
million in 1985 and then declined to $168 million in 1986 (ibid.: 57,58). 
Table 5.5 Relative Importance of domestic exports destination for ttie period 1973-1985 (JD million) 
Total domestic exports 
% to Gulf 
% to Asia 
Source: Based on (Statistical yearbook 1973:158-160; 1976:164-167; 1983:104-109; 1987:328-331). 
The total volume of transit trade increased also from a level of 608,000 tons in 
1979 to 4.2 million tons in 1985 - an average growth rate of 38 per cent - most 
of which passed through Aqaba port destined predominantly for Iraq and 
secondly for Saudi Arabia, (Table 5.6). The movement of people was also 
impressive. In 1979 around 7,000 people arrived at and departed from the port 
and by 1988 the figure had reached more than 823,000, most of whom were 
Egyptian workers heading to Iraq. This was apart from the significance of 
Aqaba for Iraqi military imports (ibid.: 57). 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 
14.0 40.1 60.3 82.6 169.0 160.1 255.3 
38.0 26.0 38.0 48.0 56.0 50.0 47.0 
23.0 35.0 29.0 25.0 16.0 30.0 34.0 
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Table 5.6 Growth in transit trade for the period 1979-1985 
(tons million) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Transit through Aqaba 0.161 0.941 3.031 4.166 2.937 3.220 4.008 
other transit 0.447 1.193 3.190 2.393 0.666 1.729 1.827 
Total transit trade 0.606 2.134 6.221 6.559 3.603 4.957 4.190 
Annual changes - 251.0 191.5 5.4 -45.0 37.5 -15.5 
Average annual growth rate 38% 
Source: (Statistical yearbook 1983:114; 1987:138,146,148). 
In this respect it is understandable that the government placed a strong 
emphasis on providing the necessary infrastructure to support transit trade. 
Hence there were heavy investments in the development of Aqaba which 
involved the expansion of freight berths, warehouses, docks, equipment and 
machinery to handle the increased cargo, in addition to the development of the 
road network to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Iraq contributed to that effort by 
providing Jordan in 1980 with a $189.2 million loan and a grant of $58.3 million, 
as well as, by establishing an Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transport Company, which 
by 1985 had 750 trucks and 6 passenger carriages (Development Plan 1981-5: 
178; Khatat Al-Tanmiyya 1986-90 Plan: 406). The creation of free zones came 
as part of this new emphasis, catering for transit trade and encouraging the 
development of export industries. So far the two free zones - at Aqaba and 
Zarqa - handle predominantly transit trade. The profits of companies that had 
offices within the zone areas were exempt from taxes for the first twelve years. 
Finally there was the creation and or/expansion of institutions associated with 
the sector such as the Free Zone Corporation, the Ports Corporation and the 
Aqaba Region Authority. 
Although the profits of the transit and export trade were concentrated in few 
hands, the livelihood of many people became increasingly dependent on the 
demand of the Gulf markets. The slow down in the region, in particular Iraq's 
capability to import and to pay for Jordanian exports, greatly affected the 
economy. This was further exacerbated by the Gulf war. Hence it is 
understandable that Jordan's compliance with the UN sanctions on Iraq were 
described as 'suicide', since it directly affected the three main dimensions of 
the new expanded economic ties with Iraq: the port of Aqaba, exports, and oil 
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imports. By mid 1990 around 70 per cent of the imports and 25 per cent of the 
exports through Aqaba were still in transit, and most of these were destined for 
Iraq (Baram 1991: 67-8). This is quite indicative of the close economic ties 
built during those years. 
Bankers 
The remarkable expansion and growth of the commercial bankers was one of 
the particular features of the oil boom period. The overflow of external capital 
and the huge profits accumulated in the economy as a result of the expansion 
of commercial activities, provided stimulus for traditional leading bankers, as 
well as for new investors, with new opportunities to strengthen their position in 
the economy. The importance of this community and the state's 
unquestionable support was indicated clearly by Prime Minister Ahmad 
'Ubaidatin 1984: 
we believe that the banking system is fortunate and unique among 
economic sectors with its stable and solid environment, and this is 
the one sector which we will not allow to go bankrupt, to lose or to 
recess in times of difficulty. (Al-Bunuk fil Urdun 1984:10) 
The specific ways in which the government sponsored and nurtured the 
financial community, in particular the bankers, were many, the most important 
of which were the numerous tax exemptions allowing for high profits. This 
policy caused some concern even within the establishment itself most notably 
the Central Bank. The governor of the bank expressed this when he said : 
despite the high tax rate on banks, its exemptions lead to reducing 
the ratio of what they pay to a level much lower than what is desired 
by the Finance Ministry, or what the law promulgates, or even in 
some instances banks do not pay taxes at all due to the many 
exemptions. (Al-Maiki 1988: 214) 
Another factor that contributed significantly to the increased profits of the 
bankers was the concentration of credit in trading activities, which were less 
risky and more profitable. In connection with this tendency, 'overdrafts' were 
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encouraged as the main credit instrument. Although Central Bank law gave it 
the authority to organise credit facilities in terms of quantity and quality, in 
addition to organising the total domestic and external investments of 
commercial banks, unfortunately its authority was not used to control this major 
problem associated with the way in which the banking system works to the 
benefit of traders. The share of 'overdraft' credit amounted to more than 54 per 
cent of the credit advanced during the period 1979-82 (Al-Nimri 1984: 36). 
Besides being a misuse of the instrument, which was supposed to be used by 
banks in order to cover a customer's emergency and temporary deficits, and be 
reviewed annually, the banks in Jordan were using it as an alternative to 
extending loans and it became a constant feature of major clients accounts, 
annually renewed without revision. 
Another significant implication of using this instrument as the predominant form 
of credit facilities to the economy was the concentration of economic activities 
and wealth among asset owners. In this system the only bank guarantees that 
clients could offer were land and real-estate assets, which discriminated and 
penalised those without wealth. Under a system where loan credit was 
encouraged, credit would be given on the merit of the project. Also in 
comparison with loans, it was difficult to know where the capital was being 
invested making it extremely difficult to direct credit to commodity producing 
sectors and limiting the banks' ability to supervise credit and to plan their 
liquidity, thus imposing further restrictions on their contribution to the 
development effort. Because of this, the sectoral distribution of credit was 
inaccurate and most probably the share of commerce was higher than 
indicated by official statistics. According to Table 5.7, the share of the 
commerce sector fell from 40 per cent in 1973 to 25 per cent in 1985, followed 
by construction with a share of 26 per cent, while industry's share was 15 per 
cent and agriculture 2 per cent. The industrial credit went predominantly to 
fund state industrial enterprises, while the very low share of agriculture was not 
even geared towards farm production but went rather to fund merchants 
trading in the import and export of agricultural inputs and outputs: 
It is not possible to obtain details from commercial banks on the 
distribution of their credit facilities by occupation of beneficiaries or 
purposes and terms of credit; yet it is evident that these facilities are 
obtained for purposes other than farm production, by non-farming 
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borrowers such as merchants dealing with the import and export of 
agricultural inputs and outputs. (Taquieddin 1985: 322) 
Table 5.7 Sectoral distribution of commercial banks credit facilities for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Total Agriculture Industry Construction Commerce 
% % % % 
1973 61.817 3.30 10.10 23.40 40.60 
1974 84.950 4.40 12.30 22.90 35.70 
1975 126.744 2.80 11.90 24.80 40.50 
1976 207.091 2.50 10.70 24.20 39.40 
1977 244.055 3.40 11.00 27.00 33.40 
1978 332.799 3.80 11.50 30.20 30.20 
1979 465.059 3.70 13.00 32.50 28.90 
1980 563.856 3.10 15.20 32.10 29.60 
1981 721.317 2.70 12.40 27.90 31.30 
1982 887.171 2.80 12.70 24.40 32.10 
1983 1030.922 2.50 13.50 26.30 26.80 
1984 1184.825 2.20 14.30 27.40 25.00 
1985 1274.416 2.10 14.80 26.00 24.20 
Source: Based on (Central Bank of Jordan 1989:17). 
The state not only supported the bankers by not interfering in credit 
arrangement even when it was necessary, but also participated directly in the 
growth of the banking facilities. It established the Housing Bank in 1974 and 
became its major shareholder with the participation of the governments of 
Qatar, Kuwait, Abu Dubai and Iran. The bank was managed from its inception 
by the same person, Zuhair Khoury, a former staff member of the Central 
Bank. It enjoyed many privileges, most important of which was accepting 
deposits of all kinds, although it was created as a specialised credit institution 
for housing, in particular to disadvantaged social stratum. On that account it 
failed miserably, since housing for low-middle/low income groups remained a 
major problem. But as a bank it grew within a very short time to second place, 
competing with well established banks, such as the Arab bank and the Amman-
Cairo bank. Naturally the backing of the government was the main reason 
behind its success. According to Khoury 'the special advantages and privileges 
have been utilised by the bank to service government employees, public 
sector, and military and public security recruits' (Al-Maiki 1988:262). 
But the bank also serviced the private sector well. Its tax exemptions made it a 
very attractive place for other banks to have accounts (ibid.: 267). Moreover 
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the government did not take its profits unless they exceeded 10 per cent, which 
in effect meant a state subsidy to private share holders, and it helped as well in 
financing luxury housing and providing credit to those who did not qualify as 
'priority or needy target' groups. In defence of this policy, Khoury stressed that 
the strategy of the bank was to increase the supply of housing irrespective of 
the type, which, according to him would eventually solve the housing problem 
and reduce costs and rent (ibid.). It was an unusual logic considering the 
experience of rising building costs and rents as well as the abundance of empty 
expensive apartments. 
A very important factor behind the state's unequivocal support of the banking 
community was its importance for extending credit to the state sector. This 
grew considerably, as seen in Table 5.8, and constituted additional income for 
financing state expenditures. In support of this the Central Bank imposed a 
ceiling on the extension of commercial credit, except for credit extended to the 
public sector and public companies - where no ceiling applied. Through that 
the state tapped funds to support its ailing state enterprises and to finance its 
consumption expenditure. Credit advanced to the public sector increased from 
a level of JD21 million in 1973 to JD346 million with a growth rate for the whole 
period 1973-85 of 27 per cent per annum. The claims of the Commercial 
sector on the state grew from a share of 43 per cent to 73 per cent for the 
same period. According to a leading banker around 100 clients monopolised 
credit, these being the state sector and a handful of private individuals (Al-Maiki 
1988: 307). What this also signified is that the state budget was increasingly 
suffering deficits, despite the huge external resources, and it attested to the 
government's unwillingness to affect the prosperity of the powerful economic 
interests through taxation. Within this web of interconnected interests between 
the private and public sector, it is understandable that the aforementioned 
supportive sentiments would be expressed by government officials about the 
banking system. 
The particular aspects of the sector's growth were manifested on many levels, 
one of which was its size. The number of Jordanian banks grew from four to 
eleven with branches growing from 33 to 237 for the period 1973-85. Foreign 
banks increased from 5 to 8 with branches growing from 20 to 35 for the same 
period. This brought the total growth of banks from 9 to 19, more than double. 
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Table 5.8 Relative Importance of commercial credit to state sector for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Credit to municipalities Bills and bonds Total Claims on state % 
1973 3.67 16.94 20.61 47.90 43.0 
1974 5.46 14,91 20.37 51.41 39.6 
1975 7.28 24.48 31.76 60.27 52.7 
1976 12.26 23.03 35.29 80.64 43.8 
1977 17.92 32.85 50.77 108.92 46.6 
1978 24.02 68.60 92.62 148.50 62.4 
1979 27.76 73.82 101.58 155.28 65.4 
1980 31.85 59.81 91.66 208.30 44.0 
1981 45.00 80.78 125.78 264.85 47.5 
1982 64.50 102.78 167.27 338.57 49.4 
1983 65.43 147.22 212.66 389.31 54.6 
1984 85.06 208.51 293.57 424.84 69.1 
1985 117.19 228.29 345.48 472.55 73.1 
rage annual growth rate of commercial credit 26.50% 
Average annual growth rate of total claims on state 21% 
Source: Based on (ibid.: 12,16,17) . 
with branches amounting to 272, as seen in Table 5.9. It is worth noting that 
this expansion took place between 1974-79, since when the state has ceased 
granting licences to new banks. The remarkable size of the branches which 
were concentrated in major cities, particularly in Amman, was primarily 
motivated by the heavy competition for deposits, reflecting the growth and 
accumulation in money-capital. 
Table 5.9 Growth of commercial banks and their branches for the period 1973-1985 
Jordanian banks Foreign banks 
Number of banks Number of branches Number of banks Number of branches 
1973 4 33 5 20 
1974 5 47 6 23 
1975 5 53 7 26 
1976 5 59 8 29 
1977 6 63 8 29 
1978 9 74 8 31 
1979 10 89 8 32 
1980 11 110 8 32 
1981 11 140 8 34 
1982 11 170 8 35 
1983 11 198 8 35 
1984 11 217 8 35 
1985 11 237 8 35 
Source: (ibid: 4, 5). 
174 
Thus, the size of deposits grew spectacularly including those of private non-
resident accounts. As seen from Table 5.10, total deposits grew from a level of 
JD85.8 million in 1973 to JD1.7 billion in 1985, with an annual growth rate of 
28.6 per cent. As for non-resident accounts, they grew by more than 50 per 
cent annually, from a mere JD2.1 million to JD294.3 million. This reflects the 
relative success of the state in attracting remittances through official channels 
manifested by the growth in the share of non-resident accounts from only 2.5 
per cent to 17 per cent. One must keep in mind that this represented a very 
small proportion of what was actually flowing into the economy. 
Table 5.10 Growth of deposits of commercial banks tor the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Total Private resident Private non-resident Public sector 
% % % 
1973 85.754 85.49 2.50 12.01 
1974 115.062 85.76 3.15 11.09 
1975 168.714 85.11 5.12 9.77 
1976 250.031 81.85 8.15 10.00 
1977 314.841 84.95 6.02 9.04 
1978 448.510 81.30 10.59 8.12 
1979 593.136 78.46 11.31 10.22 
1980 808.478 71.81 16.48 11.71 
1981 977.648 72.25 14.68 13.06 
1982 1169.479 75.54 14.67 9.79 
1983 1397.821 74.07 15,50 10.42 
1984 1603.087 72.97 17.27 9.79 
1985 1747.168 72.94 16.84 10.22 
Source: (ibid: 14-5) 
Despite this expansion, capital remained concentrated in a few banks, namely 
the Arab Bank and the Housing Bank. The assets of the Arab Bank were worth 
JD605 million in 1985, having increased from a level of JD152 million in mid 
1970s. To further its influence the bank established the Abdul Hamid Shoman 
Foundation in 1980, for the purpose of encouraging and supporting scientific 
and cultural life in Jordan. The Foundation established the first privately-
owned public library in the country, a computer learning centre, publishing and 
translating facilities, granted awards to scientists, and held lectures, seminars, 
etc. The assets of the Housing Bank, the second bank in Jordan, were worth 
JD382 million, growing from a level of JD55 million, while the Petra Bank, 
which was established in 1978, became the third bank with assets worth JD243 
million for the same period. These two banks in particular were meant to 
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compete with the Arab Bank. Ironically the Petra bank went into liquidation 
following its collapse in 1989 as a result of a large scale embezzlements and 
the misuse of its funds by the management of the bank. The rest of the banks 
owned assets worth less than JD130 million, although these assets had grown 
substantially. For example, the assets of the Amman-Cairo Bank grew from 
JD40 to JD129 million, those of the Jordan - Kuwait bank grew from a mere 
JD5.4 million to JD128.4 million, the Al-Ahli Bank assets valued at JD122 
million, grew from JD49 and the Bank of Jordan's assets grew from a level of 
JD30 million to JD96 million for the same period, while those of the Islamic 
Bank, which was established in 1980 with assets of a mere JD15.5, grew to 
JD127 million by 1985 (Al-Bunuk fil Urdun 1986; DaliyI al-Bunuk 1982). 
In addition to the expansion of commercial banks, financial investment 
companies, which were non-existent prior to 1973 except for one, specialising 
in real-estate, Refco, increased significantly. This was the result of the 
government's new thinking, encouraged by the continuation of the civil war in 
Lebanon, to establish Amman as a regional financial centre, and its aim of 
replacing Beirut as the centre for attracting foreign capital and Gulf capital. In 
the words of the governor of Jordan's Central Bank the government wanted to 
create a 'capital import' regional financial market (Al-Maiki 1988:190). Within 
the frame of this new direction, the Amman Financial market was created in 
1979, followed by the establishment of the first financial company, the Arab 
Finance Corporation under the direction and sponsorship of the government 
with Saudi partnership. 
Following that, six investment companies were established during 1979-84. 
These were the Arab Finance Corporation and the Jordan Securities 
Corporation (1979), the Jordan Finance House and the Islamic Investment 
House (1981), the Jordan Investment Corporation and the Finance and Credit 
Corporation (1982) as well as three more companies specialising in real-estate 
and housing: Darco (1982), Beitana and National Development and Finance 
(1984). The assets of the financial companies were very small in comparison 
to those of the commercial banks but they were expanding fast. The total 
deposits grew from JD7.1 million to JD131 million, during 1980-85, while the 
total credit facilities expanded from JD5.1 million to JD87 million for the same 
period, as seen from Table 5.11. Yet Jordan was far from creating a well-
developed sophisticated financial market, as indicated by the small size of the 
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market and its inability to attract capital on the scale expected by the 
government. 
Table 5.11 Deposits and loans held by financial Investment companies for the period 1980-1985 
(JD million) 
Financial companies Real-estate companies Grand total 
Loans Deposits Loans Deposits Loans Deposits 
1980 3.5 6.1 1.6 1.0 5.1 7.1 
1985 78.3 117.0 8.5 14.3 86.8 131.0 
Source: (Central Bank of Jordan 1989a 16-7) 
The growing awareness of the strength and importance of the banking and 
financial community led its leading figures to create their own association, even 
though the Law of Chambers of Commerce decrees that chambers of 
commerce represent all types of commercial interests. In 1978 the Association 
of Banks in Jordan was born with its own monthly magazine, Al Bunuk fil Urdun 
or Banks in Jordan. It became the focal point of regular meetings within the 
community and with the top management of the state, while its journal was 
used as a platform for expressing opinions and stands on issues concerning 
the sector and the economy in general. During 1978-1985 three management 
boards of the Association were elected and in each one the Shoman family of 
the Arab bank held the chairmanship. Such developments attested to the 
existence of class awareness and solidarity, but it was still undermined by the 
personalisation of economic relations and the clique identification, although as 
will be seen below, economic interests increasingly cut across the various 
forms of primary affiliations. 
Jordanian banks are usually established by a group who form a sponsoring 
committee and who subscribe up to 75 per cent of the capital, the remaining 
part being offered to public subscription. Thus, a small group of shareholders 
control policies and constitute the management. For instance the Arab bank is 
controlled, as mentioned before, by the Shoman family, as well as the 
Palestinian Christian family of Tannous and the Palestinian family of Al-Masri, 
in addition to Al-Hariri of Lebanon. The Al-Ahli bank is owned by two Christian 
East Banker families, the Mu'asher and the Sukker, and the Cairo-Amman 
bank is owned by the Palestinian families of Sha'sha,' Al-Masri, Abu Ragab, as 
177 
well as the East Banker family of Al-Talhouni. As for the Jordan Islamic Bank, 
the first bank in Jordan operating on concepts of Islamic finance, it was 
established by three personalities from the northern part of the country Adel 
Shamaileh, Yousif Mbeidain and Naif Al-Hadid in partnership, ironically, with a 
wealthy Christian, Tawfiq Fakhoury. The same could be said about investment 
companies. The Mu'asher, Sukker and Abu Hassan families, all East Bankers 
families, control the National Financial Investment Company, while the 
Palestinian families, Jardaneh and Mango and the East Banker families, Shami 
and Al-Talhouni, control the Jordan Investment and Finance Corporation. 
This discussion would be incomplete without referring to the prosperity that 
accrued to the money-exchangers, as a consequence of the growth of the 
remittance economy or the hidden economy, as well as the general increase in 
the level of foreign financial resources. Their role prior to this period was 
limited to the traditional activity of dealing in foreign currencies, but during the 
boom era they branched into fields that were restricted to them. These 
included attracting deposits by giving high interest rates, making advances to 
the public, funding trade from their own foreign accounts, so as not to disclose 
the true value of the imports, thereby, helping traders to avoid paying customs 
(Hadad 1990: 182-5). Finally they facilitated capital flight from the country, 
especially when interest rates are high in Western countries. These practices 
were common, particularly, among the influential ones who made huge profits. 
Seven out of fifty currency dealers in Amman made an average income of JD 
1.25 million during the 1970's (Ameri 1981: 307). Throughout this period the 
Central Bank did not do much to curb these activities, although Law no (52) 
1976 gives it the power to check their books and control their activities. But in 
1989 when the value of the dinar plummeted, the government used them as a 
scape goat, accused them of currency dealing, and subsequently ordered the 
closure of their businesses, as mentioned before. This was similar to the 
situation of the Petra Bank which functioned under the supervision of the 
Central Bank for eleven years before the latter took action against the 
embezzlement and misuse of the bank's assets by the management. The 
chairman of the bank, Ahmad Chalabi, had connections at the highest levels of 
the government, which not only protected him for a long time, but also enabled 
him to flee the country at the right moment, while other staff in the bank were 
faced with criminal charges and a court case. 
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Landowners, Real-estate Agents and Contractors 
The third social strata that emerged as a major beneficiary of the expanded 
economic opportunities were real-estate agents and contractors, as well as the 
direct beneficiaries, the landowners. The frenzied demand for land, caused by 
the high liquidity of the economy, and the expansion in state 'development' 
projects pushed the prices of land to unforeseen levels. Quick and sudden 
wealth for landowners and real-estate agents became common, and was 
further facilitated by the absence of any serious effort on the part of the 
government to tax their huge profits. Moreover, there was a large portion of 
fraudulent deals in terms of location and specifications because many were 
absentee investors, working in the Gulf. Hence, significant profits accrued to 
those middlemen and commission agents involved in these deals. 
The value of land as an exchangeable commodity in the market became much 
higher than its worth as a source of productive income. It led to the selling of 
large agricultural areas that were close to the sites of various 'development' 
projects or at the outskirts of classified and zoned areas, or close to areas 
covered by social and infrastructure services, which resulted in the 
fragmentation and shrinkage of areas for agricultural use. Moreover, the real-
estate boom caused a sharp increase in unfarmed agricultural land. 
Previously, land was left unfarmed in drought years, but more recently it was 
left unfarmed because it belonged to absentee owners who purchased it only 
to re-sell it at higher prices (Qasem: 1985: 391). This was further encouraged 
by the lack of a proper system for classifying and zoning city and village land. 
This problem was compounded by the uncontrolled expansion of villages and 
cities, and the use of zoning as a way of increasing the value of the land, since 
its value depended on whether it was included in the zoned areas, especially if 
classified as commercial. 
Subsequently, economic motives, facilitated by lax and inappropriate 
organisational and procedural regulations, resulted in a considerable increase 
in the level of investment in real-estate, diverting crucial amounts of capital 
away from the commodity-producing sectors. Estimated investment for the 
period 1973-85, increased from over JD22 million in 1973 to JD239 million in 
1985, with an average growth rate of 22 per cent per annum, as shown in 
Table 5.12. Its peak period was 1973-81, with an average growth of 35 per 
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cent, in particular for the years 1975 and 1976, after which it declined 
significantly and reached a negative growth rate of 3 per cent for the period 
1982-85. This was the result of a decline in remittances, in state investment 
levels, and the subsequent slowing down of the economy. 
Table 5.12 Estimated private sector investment in real estate for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Number of transactions Total investment * Growtti rate (%) 
1973 77313 22.4 -
1974 64659 20.3 -9.0 
1975 93262 53.6 164.0 
1976 108518 92.8 73.0 
1977 74084 60.4 -35.0 
1978 86799 98.2 63.0 
1979 101825 144.3 47.0 
1980 117857 172.3 19.0 
1981 126747 244.2 42.0 
1982 126500 260.9 7.0 
1983 123926 260.3 -0.2 
1984 126505 260.7 0.2 
1985 134678 239.2 -8.0 
Note: * - Calculated on tfie basis tfiat govemment revenues of land transactions are 10% of the value of land. 
Source: (Lands and Surveys Annual Report: 1979:47; 1985:16). 
The extensive demand for land was not exclusive to the private sector. The 
government was a major contributor and its quest for land expanded 
substantially in order to carry out its 'development' plans, which concentrated 
on the provision of social services and physical infrastructure. Although 
accurate and complete data is not available for the level of government's land 
possessions. Table 5.13 provides a good indicator of its important role, taking 
into account that it does not include hundreds of transactions undertal^ ing by 
the Amman Municipality and other village and local councils all over the 
country, in addition to some of the purchases of public companies. The 
average annual compensation payments of the government to land owners 
were around JD7 million. The land possession budget prior to 1973 was 
allocated specifically for each respective ministry or institution and expended 
after being approved by the cabinet. This practice changed to a more relaxed 
one allocating a lump sum in state expenditure (Lands and Surveys Annual 
Report 1973: 56-57) which resulted in an intensification of the state's 
acquisition of land to a level exceeding its immediate needs. Although the 
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government's justification was that this was done in anticipation of higher 
prices, in effect it contributed to pushing prices up. In the end this benefited 
the key landowners, commission and real-estate agents. A comparison 
between what the government was spending in compensating land owners and 
the revenues it yielded indicates that its expenditures were on average 42 per 
cent of its revenues. Moreover, in the peak years of 1975 and 1976 
government expenditure actually exceeded its revenues, (Table 5.13). 
Table 5.13 Estimated government expenditure on land acquisition for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Expenditure No. of transactions Revenues Expenditure / Revenues 
1973 3.7 80 2.2 
/o 
163.5 
1974 1.1 65 2.0 51.7 
1975 3.1 44 5.4 57.3 
1976 10.5 155 9.3 113.3 
1977 7.6 168 6.0 125.8 
1978 3.2 103 9.8 32.6 
1979 4.8 78 14.4 33.5 
1980 3.1 60 17.2 17.8 
1981 13.3 59 24.4 54.5 
1982 6.4 84 26.1 24.4 
1983 3.3 63 26.6 12.5 
1984 6.0 124 26.1 23.0 
1985 16.1 137 23.9 67.2 
Source: (Lands and Surveys Annual Report for the years: 1973-85). 
The real-estate spurt was understandably associated with a substantial growth 
in construction activities, which contributed on average 10 per cent of the GDP 
and was the fastest growing among the commodity-producing sectors. It 
enticed a large number of local businessmen to establish contracting firms 
and/or to expand existing ones. Thus, the number of local contracting firms in 
1984 stood at around 1000, most of which were established during the 1970s 
and the beginning of the 1980s. Despite this relatively large number these 
contracting companies were considered small scale, in comparison with 
international or regional standards, with limited financial, planning and 
administrative capabilities. According to the domestic classification, which 
reflected the limited capacity of the local market, large firms were those with a 
paid up capital between JD200,000 and JD600,000 representing 3 per cent of 
the total firms. Therefore, the contracting market was controlled by a handful 
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of contractors, such as Sakat, Al-Hayak, A-Hudhud, Hajar and Shahin who 
subcontracted to the small and medium sized contractors, representing 97 per 
cent of the total firms (Al-Bitar 1984: 3-5). 
The sheer size of the state's investments made it the key actor in the sector, in 
spite of the expansion in private sector investments. Hence local contractors 
were dependent on state contracts as their main source of income. The 
decentralised character of public contracts created ample opportunity for 
nepotism and commission fees to thrive, since each ministry, semi-autonomous 
enterprise, and public share-holding company had its own committee for 
tenders. State investments, as seen from Table 5.14, exceeded 55 per cent of 
the total investment, growing from a level of JD92.5 million for the period 1973-
5 to a level of JD1.9 billion for the period 1981-5, that is, a thirteenfold 
increase. Public works accounted for two thirds of that. 
Table 5.14 Total investment in the construction sector for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Total Total Public Non-residential Residential 
public private works Public Private Public Private 
1973-1975 92.5 64.2 72,7 16.0 14.5 3.8 49.6 
1976-1980 625.0 440.6 492.6 79.8 72.5 52.7 368.0 
1981-1985 1231.5 1036.3 681.6 438.4 208.2 111.4 828.3 
Total 1949.1 1541.1 1247.0 534.2 295.2 167.9 1245.9 
Grand Total 3490.2 1247.0 829.4 1413.8 
Source: Based on (AI-'Atoum 1988:81,93,100). 
reflecting the concentration of state's investments in the provision of social 
services and physical infrastructure. The bulk of that, exceeding a quarter of 
the total investment, around JD616.4 million, went to the transport sector over 
the period 1973-85 (AI-'Atoum: 1988: 102,108,117). This heavy concentration 
of investment in the transport sector attests to the new signifcance attached to 
Jordan's transit role in the region, especially following the eruption of the 
Lebanese civil war and the Iraq-Iran War. The other important type of state 
investment was in non-residential buildings, that is, state buildings such as 
ministries, governmental departments, universities, schools, hospitals and so 
forth. It is worth noting that private sector involvement was comparatively small 
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and did not exceed one third of the total investment, although there was an 
increase in the number of private schools, hospitals and commercial buildings. 
The expansion in the state's investments in the social and physical 
infrastructure is generally considered to be one of the most important factors in 
stimulating commodity-producing sectors. However, this was not the case in 
Jordan as in many 'developing' countries. Rather it succeeded in supporting 
trading and service activities and in benefiting land speculators, commission 
agents and contractors. In other words it courted social groups that did not add 
to society's capacity to reproduce itself. In addition, despite the huge 
investment level, many of the needs of limited income groups - housing, 
schools, hospitals, roads- were not met and the quality of the existing facilities 
left a lot to be desired. 
The only field of activity that was dominated by private investment was that of 
residential buildings. Investment levels in this field increased from JD50 million 
for the period 1973-5 to JD1.3 billion for the period 1981-5. Its share of total 
private sector investment was 81 per cent, which was in complete accord with 
the consumption drive associated with the increase in income and wealth of the 
local bourgeoisie, (Table 5.14). Luxury and large residential buildings became 
the second most favoured private sector investment after owning a luxury car. 
Hence the massive horizontal expansion of urban areas especially in Amman, 
often at the expense of agricultural areas. New residential areas in Amman 
erupted such as Shemisani, Abdoun, Tala' Al-Ali, Al-Swiefieyya, in addition to 
the expansion of well established areas such as Jabal Al-Hussein and Jabal 
Amman. Other main cities also experienced similar expansion. It is interesting 
to note the marginal role of the state in supporting the provision of 
accommodation for limited income groups. Its investment did not exceed 12 
per cent of the total investments in residential buildings valued at JD168 million 
for the period 1981-5, (Table 5.14). This investment was carried out by three 
state agencies: the Housing Corporation, the Department of Urban 
Development and the Jordan Valley Authority. The Housing Corporation 
carried out 93 per cent of the investment for the period 1973-85, as the Urban 
Development Department was created only in 1980 (AI-'Atoum 1988: 77). 
Each one had a different target group; employees of the state sector for the 
Housing Corporation, the farmers of the area for the Jordan Valley Authority 
and the urban slum areas of Amman for the Urban Development Department. 
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Although the large size of state investments created expanded opportunities for 
local contractors to increase their wealth and eminence, the bulk of the profits 
and benefits accrued to groups external to the economy, since the foreign 
component of the sector was remarkable. Firstly, foreign contractors 
dominated the market with a share exceeding 50 per cent. This was due to the 
fact that foreign firms operated with the full support of their governments or of 
international institutions such as the World Bank, which insists on having 
contracts open for international competition. With Jordan's dependence on 
loans and grants from international institutions and foreign governments this 
meant that most, if not all the contracts for development projects were open to 
international firms. This, coupled with the exclusion of industrial companies -
that are 51 per cent owned by the government - from the administrative and 
jurisdictional cover of the Public Works Regulation, enhanced the government's 
discretionary powers to commission, especially foreign firms. But since some 
of the key local contractors are sub-contractors to major foreign firms, the 
government still guaranteed some benefits to certain local contractors. 
The extensive presence of international contracting companies was not new. 
They had had a strong footing since the formation of the state, in particular the 
British and the French. In the post-1973 period American and German 
contracting companies, followed by Asian companies, such as Korean, 
Chinese, Turkish and Indian replaced the British and the French. This 
redistribution was done at the expense of local and regional contractors. Asian 
contractors concentrated on projects with low-medium technological 
requirements, while the American and European companies concentrated on 
those projects with high technological requirements, such as communication 
and electricity networks, desalination plants, dams, etc. This certainly 
restricted the development of local expertise and the use of local resources (Al-
Bitar 1989: 7-8). 
Secondly, there was a lack of institutional support for promoting the local 
contracting industry, since the government did not allow for the emergence of a 
contractors association in the proper sense until after the boom years. In 1987 
Law no (13) was promulgated and the status of the Contractors Association 
changed from a charitable organisation registered in the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Works to an association equipped with its own law. 
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Thirdly, there was an absence of local coalitions and a concentration of local 
contracting in civil works, since its technical and financial ability was very 
limited in comparison with that of foreign firms, and which remained so due to 
the absence of chances to increase their experience. These factors allowed 
for the prevalence of foreign firms with their monopoly of large, highly 
sophisticated and technologically advanced projects, whilst simultaneously 
precluding the development of local industry that could at least have met the 
domestic needs, if not competed regionally or internationally. To illustrate how 
serious the dominance of foreign contractors was and to translate that into 
figures, I will refer to the period 1981-5. The number of projects undertaken by 
foreign contractors was small, not exceeding 3 per cent, but the value of these 
projects was estimated at around 41 per cent of the total value of projects 
implemented during that period. The average value of a foreign project was 
JD4.6 million while that of a local contractor was JD204,000. If the year 1982 
is taken separately, the figures are even more staggering. This represented 
the highest value of projects tendered to foreign contractors, which was 
approximately 55 per cent of the total value for that year and 72 per cent of the 
total value of projects during 1981-5. Also, 1982 was the year where 
commissioning had the highest share, with 70 per cent of the total projects 
implemented during the whole period. The reason given to justify this was the 
incapability of local contractors to deal with the size of projects, although the 
government could have resorted to various methods to support the local 
contractors and internalise the benefits (Ministry of Public Works 1986: 25-6). 
Such methods could have included sub-dividing the large tenders and/or 
allocating a certain percent to local firms, as other 'developing' countries were 
doing in an effort to encourage and protect local industries from the fierce 
competition of foreign firms. 
Finally, the sector was heavily reliant on foreign labour, in particular Egyptians 
and Asians, causing a large outflow of remittances, but providing cheap labour 
with wages below the level of domestic labour. As illustrated in Table 5.15, of 
those employed in the construction sector, foreign labour constituted around 46 
per cent in 1985, growing from a level of less than one per cent in 1973. In that 
year there were no more than 158 foreign workers, the figure increasing to a 
remarkable 44,000 by 1985. The construction sector was one the most 
important sectors for generating employment, of which half were foreigners. 
For the period 1977-85 foreign labour in construction remitted an estimated 
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JD163 million, that is 36 per cent of the total current account deficit. This, 
combined with the sector's heavy reliance on foreign material, equipment and 
machinery (estimated to be around JD886 million and contributing 14 per cent 
to trade deficit in the period 1973-85) constituted around 15 per cent of total 
trade and current deficit during the 1973-1985 period (AI-'Atoum 1988:191). 
Table 5.15 Relative importance of foreign labour in the construction sector for the period 1973-1985 
Foreign Domestic Total Foreign / Total 
labour labour labour % 
1973 158 28800 28958 0.5 
1974 219 32500 32719 0.7 
1975 941 36200 37141 2.5 
1976 2023 39600 41623 4.9 
1977 4111 43400 47511 8.7 
1978 7914 47000 54914 14.4 
1979 17336 50800 68136 25.4 
1980 22371 50900 73271 30.5 
1981 29378 52500 81878 35.9 
1982 38579 52600 91179 42.3 
1983 40661 52700 93361 43.6 
1984 48449 52700 101149 47.9 
1985 44330 51900 96230 46.1 
Source: (Ibrahim 1989:60,62). 
Agricultural Bourgeoisie 
The focus of the state's agricultural policy continued to be the creation of a 
small capital-intensive export sector, which benefited a small clique of 
absentee landowners, as well as middlemen and commission agents, while 
proving detrimental to the larger farming community. According to a recent 
study, the estimate of those valley farmers who owned an economically viable 
unit did not exceed eight out of a total 6,000 farmers (Dar Al-Handasah 1987: 
15). These eight were in effect the landowners who were able, through the 
broadening of the definition of family eligible for receiving farm units, to 
increase their land holdings, sometimes by five times the maximum allowed in 
the original land reform law of the valley (Ameri 1981:162). In the light of this, 
not only was state policy biased against rainfed areas but also supportive of an 
extremely small number of influential businessmen who dominated the valley 
over the bulk of the farming community in the valley and the larger community 
of farmers in highland and rainfed areas. 
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The profitability of these farmers was enhanced and maintained by a wide 
range of arrangements. To start with, these were the high investments poured 
into the irrigation sector and the general development of the valley. During the 
three consecutive plans the total investment of the Jordan Valley Authority on 
the Ghor area exceeded JD270 million. It grew from a level of JD85 million for 
the period 1973-1980 to JD186 million for the period 1981-5 (Jordan Valley 
Authority: 1985). Thus the size of capital poured into the valley was 
phenomenal. Additionally, official agricultural credit organisations: the 
Agricultural Credit Co-operation (ACC), the Jordan Co-operative Organisation 
(JCO) and the Jordan Valley Farmers Association (JVFA), continued to support 
large farmers and those with assets by persisting in using collateral against the 
loan as the major criterion for credit-worthiness. This was predominant in both 
the valley and the highlands. Given the small contribution of the commercial 
banks in supporting agriculture, in addition to high interest rates, especially in 
comparison with these organisations, it becomes evident that the denied official 
credit was vital to small farmers. The interests rates of the commercial banks 
ranged between 10-12 per cent while official credit organisations offered loans 
at 6-8 per cent. Thus, it was no surprise that the indebtedness of large farmers 
was five times that of the small farmers. 
The monopoly of official credit was facilitated by the fact that the top 
management of these credit organisations enjoyed discretionary powers and 
wielded great influence as a result of the political nature of their appointment. 
Hence their ability to affect decisions based on personal criteria and Wastah. 
Such a setting was most conducive to nepotism and the dispensation of 
favours. As subtly suggested 'boards of directors need to have more active 
members, particularly those with banking background and experience' 
(Taquieddin 1985: 318). 
Another interesting aspect of the state's control of the operation of the farming 
environment, in general, and the credit facilities, in particular, is the control of 
the government over the JVFA which was established in 1974. Essentially it 
was supposed to be a private agency for all farmers in the valley to protect and 
improve their situation. However, the government had representatives on its 
board of directors as well as being its major source of finance. More 
significantly, the Jordan Valley Authority had to approve the by-laws of the 
agency as a condition for its ratification by the cabinet (ibid.: 309-313), which. 
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in effect, protected the interests of the large farmers and absentee land 
owners. Thus it lacked the legitimacy it needed to prove that it was actually an 
association for ail farmers in the valley, and not another instrument 
manipulated by the government to protect and enhance the interests of the 
small clique of farmers. This was highlighted by the suggestion that it 'needs to 
expand its activities considerably to win the loyalty and co-operation of farmers 
(ibid.: 309). The consequence of this overall credit environment was that 
disadvantaged farmers, even in the favoured valley, resorted to traditional 
sources of credit. These sources included a wide range of groups such as 
landowners, middlemen, merchants and sometimes family. Some farmers, 
especially those of the Jordan Valley solicited funds from both sources, the 
result being a heavy loan burden, with defaulting on their repayments (Qasem 
1986 :130). Unfortunately, information of the actual size of traditional sources 
of credit is not available, but its role remained significant. 
Another major source of the state's support was seen in the water charges in 
the valley. From 1974 water charges were at a flat rate of 3 fils for one cubic 
metre. This covered less than a quarter of the operation and maintenance 
costs, let alone the capital investment costs of the dams, irrigation and 
distribution facilities carried out by the Valley Authority. In comparison, farmers 
in the uplands were fully responsible for the development and costs of 
irrigation. The average cost of pumping one cubic metre was 56 fils (World 
Bank 1988: 27-8). If with this much higher cost, highland farmers could still 
make a profit, it meant that inefficiency in utilising the resources of the valley 
was widespread and some of the Jordan valley farmers were making immense 
profits. The benefits of the tax exemption in agricultural income continued to 
be reaped by those large farmers, especially in the irrigated sector. In addition, 
the policy of exempting all agricultural imports, including machinery from 
customs, benefited those farmers who could afford to buy them, besides the 
merchants who specialised in importing them. 
This remarkable support for the small capital-intensive export-oriented sector 
had detrimental consequences for the development of the national economy 
and in particular the agricultural sector, as it came at the expense of the 
highlands and rainfed agriculture, that is to say cereal and field crops. Hence, 
the food deficit grew from JD26 million in 1973 to JD153 million by 1982, that 
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is, approximately a sixfold increase. It then decreased to JD132 million by1985 
as a result of a decline in agricultural imports of 8 per cent, (Table 5.16). 
Table 5.16 Growth of food deficit for the period 1973-1985 
(JD million) 
Foodstuff imports Foodstuff exports Net food deficit 
1973 30.81 4.65 26.16 
1974 42.74 9.56 33.18 
1975 49.42 10.20 39.22 
1976 81.37 16.37 65.00 
1977 75.92 20.64 55.28 
1978 87.56 16.33 71.23 
1979 108.28 21.23 87.05 
1980 118.78 23.49 95.29 
1981 167.93 33.03 134.90 
1982 191.92 39.14 152.78 
1983 180.31 36.27 144.04 
1984 184.31 41.76 142.55 
1985 175.78 43.55 132.23 
Source: (Central Bank of Jordan 1989:34-5). 
It is worth noting that in the 1950s and 1960s half of Jordan's wheat 
requirements were met by domestic production, whilst the foreign donation of 
wheat amounted to 25 per cent of the total needs. Jordan's imports were, 
therefore, only 25 per cent of total needs. However, from the 1970s Jordan's 
total direct imports rose to 70 per cent because production fell by 20 per cent 
and denotations fell to 10-12 per cent of the wheat demand (Hurani and 
Duwayri 1986: 62). Cereal items alone accounted for 26 per cent of the deficit, 
followed by sugar with 16 per cent and meat 13 per cent. Although the cereal 
deficit had been high since 1973, the meat deficit was only 3 per cent in that 
year (Haddad 1985: 52). Thus, despite the improvement in the earnings of the 
export of agricultural produce these earnings were so small that they covered 
only a fraction of the food imports, as seen from Table 5.16. 
The total resources, therefore, that were poured into capital-intensive cash 
crops neither enhanced food self-sufficiency nor the ability to pay for food 
needs. Moreover, Jordanian produce became less competitive especially in 
comparison with Turkish produce. This was a prime reason behind losing the 
grip on the Gulf markets, and prompted even local export agents to move into 
the Turkish markets. 
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The 'New' Petty Bourgeoisie 
The remarkable expansion of the 'new' petty bourgeoisie, with its wide range of 
professionals, technicians, managers, clerks etc., was one of the most 
noticeable and crucial developments of this period. It reflected the expansion 
of the state apparatus: the military and internal security, the civil administration, 
and the breadth of state agencies participating in production or the provision of 
services. The upturn of private sector activities requiring a broad spread of 
professional and technical personnel also contributed to the swelling of this 
class. Nevertheless, it remained predominantly concentrated in the state 
sector. As seen in Table 5.17, the employment capacity in the state sector 
substantially increased, allowing it to absorb around 50 per cent of the active 
labour force. 
Table 5.17 Growth of state employment during the period 1973-1985 
(thousands) 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 
Total employed 296.0 338.1 371.0 391.1 418.4 445.3 472.3 
Govemment administration 
Social services and defence 130.7 153.3 173.2 182.7 197.4 214.2 220.7 
Share in total employed % 44.2 45.3 46.7 46.7 47.2 48.1 46.7 
Source: Based on (Ibrahim 1989:62) 
Central government accounted on average for a third of total state 
employment, with its employment capacity increasing from 33,330 in 1973 to 
77,705 in 1985, more than doubled (Zyood 1989:146). Separate statistics on 
the employment generated within the autonomous institutions however, are not 
available. These institutions offered a higher salary than those on the civil list 
and became extremely attractive to professionals and the highly educated, 
Table 5.18 attempts to make an estimate of their contribution, and while it is an 
underestimation since not all these institutions are included, at least it shows 
the upward trend. In 1979 they absorbed 12,000 growing to approximately 
20,000 in 1985. The military absorbed around 17 per cent of the active labour 
force, witnessing a large increase in the professionals within the army in 
response to the increased demand for engineers and technical people and also 
within its service facilities, particularly in the medical field. The Hussein 
Medical City, for example, became the focal point for a wide range of medical 
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staff including doctors, dentists, technicians, and nurses as well as the 
managerial stratum, and it was here that the most prestigious doctors in the 
private field gained their experience and training. 
Table 5.18 Employment by state autonomous enterprises for the period 1979-1985 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1985 
12260 13630 15080 17333 18856 19828 
Source; Based on (Annual budget document of Autonomous Enterprises: 1981,1983,1986). 
The growing importance of the state as the major employer explains why its 
expenditure on salaries and wages grew fast and remained the most important 
item of state outlays after military expenditure. On average, salaries and 
wages grew at 15 per cent, for the period 1978-85, while constituting 20 per 
cent of consumption expenditure for the period 1973-1985 (ibid.: 158). No 
doubt the benefits of this were not equal across the bureaucracy, and the lion's 
share remained concentrated in top management, with its higher salary scale 
in comparison to the middle and lower ranks. In fact the position of the lower 
ranks of the bureaucracy worsened due to inflation and the higher cost of living 
experienced during this period, especially as salaries and wages were not 
adjusted accordingly. 
However, this factor was mitigated, as in the pre-1973 period, by the fact that 
the state sector provided secure employment and to many a prestige that 
made it so attractive. In addition the working hours, from eight till two, allowed 
quite a proportion to have another job, which increasing numbers resorted to in 
order to augment their income. Also, the benefits of state employment 
included housing, medical insurance, training courses abroad or secondment 
to the Gulf, and access to the highly subsidised Consumer corporations, the 
military and the civil one. Moreover, some of the higher ranks of the state 
sector were opened up to those who were not connected with the traditional 
6lite and wealthy and prominent families. This was motivated by enlarging the 
proportion of East Bankers in state positions, and hence from the late 1970s, 
an increasing number of those in state management were drawn from a wide 
range of familial backgrounds. This chance increased the aspirations of a 
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large segment of the educated stratum to reach high positions, further 
emphasising the state sector as the most important channel for social mobility. 
The substantial expansion in the pool of professionals, illustrated in Table 5.19, 
occurred, as a result of the overall situation produced in the boom era of 
expanded state capacity to employ, increased demand for skilled labour in the 
Gulf and the remarkable expansion in education. This was further encouraged 
by the state's consolidation of values stressing the difference in prestige, status 
and salaries between professionals in scientific fields, engineering, medicine, 
etc., and those in social sciences, as well as stressing the differences between 
professionals and those in technical and semi-skilled fields. Thus, while Jordan 
suffered shortages in some fields filled by immigrant labour, the market 
became over-saturated with qualified professional people in other fields. For 
instance, the number of doctors grew from less than a 1,000 at the beginning 
of the 1970s to more than 5,000 in the mid 1980s. They were concentrated in 
the state sector, both military and civil, which accounted for 60 per cent of 
those employed, the rest being engaged in private hospitals and clinics or 
working in the Gulf (Doctors Association). 
Table 5.19 Development of the professional and management strata for the period 1973-1985 (thousands) 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 
Total employed 46.2 58.5 71.4 83.6 87.8 91.2 95.7 
Professionals 24.9 33.0 41.9 51.2 55.9 60.0 63.3 
Administrators 3.7 4.7 5.8 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.6 
Clerks 17.6 20.8 23.7 25.8 25.3 24.7 25.8 
Source: Based on (Ibrahim 1989:63). 
More spectacular growth was seen in the engineering field. The number of 
engineers grew from around a 1,000 to more than 13,000 for the same period 
(The Association of Engineers). The ministry of public works represented an 
important channel of employment for the country's engineers, especially after 
the decline of economic opportunities in the Gulf. Moreover, the number of 
pharmacists grew substantially from 386 to 1,672, especially when compared 
with other countries in the region. Tunis with a population of 8 million, that is 
approximately treble the population in Jordan had 1,500 pharmacists while Iraq 
with a population of 16 million had 3,000 pharmacists (The Association of 
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Pharmacists). Although this profession was primarily private, the state helped 
in its growth by expanding the licenses granted for opening pharmacies. 
Between 1982-5 the government granted 369 licenses (ibid.). The high profits 
in this field were based on selling consumer items such as cosmetics, 
perfumeries and other accessories, which were made abundant through the 
open import policy. In addition, two pharmacy departments were established, 
one at Jordan University and the other at the Science and Technology 
University. 
The stability and increased legitimacy of the state, therefore, stemmed 
particularly from its ability to provide employment opportunities, which tended 
to be politically motivated rather than an expression of economic need. Hence 
the productivity of the state sector was very low as it was over-staffed and 
lacked a clear cut job description. It was, however, able to absorb the 
expansion in the highly educated stratum as well as those leaving rural areas 
or those with very little qualifications. This class remained incoherent with a 
variety of strata manifesting different social backgrounds and political 
consciousness, while its attachment to the state continued to put it in a very 
contradictory and awkward position. On the one hand, its interests were tied to 
the state making it a pillar of stability, and on the other hand, a change in the 
state's ability to expend and employ made it potentially the most important 
source of instability. 
The Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie 
The expansion in the petty bourgeoisie was not exclusive to the 'new' stratum, 
but occurred also in the traditional petty bourgeoisie engaged in a wide range 
of commercial and service activities as well as light small-scale manufacturing. 
The growth of the economy and the high liquidity provided expanded 
opportunities for growth to retailers, shopkeepers, barbers, tailors, repair 
shops, restaurants, cafeterias, workshops, etc., in many towns and major cities. 
Moreover, the growth of residential areas and its sprawling into new areas as 
well as the expansion experienced in the traditional residential areas stimulated 
the emergence of many new commercial and service centres, not to mention 
the expansion of existing ones. 
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To use the figures of the Chamber of Commerce the number of those involved 
in commercial activities increased substantially, from approximately 13,000 in 
1975 to 30,000 by 1985, more than a twofold increase, taking into 
consideration that a large number of traders especially small retailers do not 
register with the respective chamber of commerce, (Table 5.20). 
Disadvantaged cities and areas such as Aqaba, Tafeilah and Karak showed 
the largest increase in the number of traders which was more than fourfold, 
threefold and twofold respectively. That meant an acceleration of the process 
of commercialisation as well as the increased dependence of a larger segment 
of the population in rural areas on trading and service activities as a source of 
income. The capital, Amman, retained its number one position with a share of 
44 per cent, but with a slower rate of increase of two and a half fold, as 
compared to the other faster growing areas. 
Table 5.20 Estimated membership in the chambers of commerce in Jordan for the period 1975-1985 
1975 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1985 
Amman 5193 5742 7465 7587 7651 8883 13067 
Zarqa 4091 4412 5118 5710 6130 7134 7886 
Irbid 1494 1978 2615 2428 2520 2733 2837 
Salt 493 534 473 730 788 699 737 
Jerash n.a 222 352 475 598 636 655 
Madaba 436 471 762 910 976 1101 1140 
Karak 418 617 778 825 795 874 930 
Ma'an 373 364 371 386 467 503 500 
Tafeilah 165 153 196 207 220 232 597 
Aqaba 279 344 472 607 815 1202 1252 
Source: (Union of Chambers of Commerce). 
The other significant factor contributing to the growth of the petty bourgeoisie 
was the unchanged structure of industry. According to the 1984 census about 
80 per cent of industrial enterprises employ less than five people. Even though 
this represented a 10 per cent drop from the pre-1973 period, the petty 
structure of investors was still dominant. In addition, investors remained 
concentrated in either traditional handicrafts of artisan character such as 
stonemasonry, woodcarving, brass artisans and embroiderers or light 
manufacturing such as food processing, textiles and clothing, leather tanning, 
pharmaceuticals, etc. Nevertheless a growth occurred in firms which catered 
for the needs of the domestic and regional construction boom, particularly in 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These firms specialised in paints, aluminium profiles. 
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sanitary ware, doors, windows, tiles and so forth. The export of construction 
nnateriai, paints, sanitary ware, scaffolding furniture, fixtures, etc., grew fastest 
at a rate of 50 per cent during 1975-8. It then fell to 28 per cent during 1979-82 
to reach a negative rate of growth of 28 per cent in 1985 (World Bank 1988: 
10). Moreover, the development of the Jordan valley prompted the expansion 
of small enterprises that processed the output of the valley farmers, for 
example making fruit juice and tomato paste, in addition to manufacturing 
some of the required inputs such as drip irrigation systems, rubber pipes and 
greenhouses. 
Yet the low contribution of this sector in the value added in industry, only 5 per 
cent, attest to the weakness of this stratum of numerous producers (ibid.6). 
This weakness did not lay just in its dependence on the regional economy, but 
more significantly in the environment provided by state policies which did not 
create the possibility for strong domestic producers. First of all, the negative 
influences of the liberal import policy coupled with the exchange rate of the 
dinar, made imports cheaper than local produce. Secondly, the exemptions of 
the imports of the state sector from customs and duties reduced, as mentioned 
before, the local market by 25 per cent. In addition, the availability of 
subsidised imported goods to both the military and civilian consumer societies 
competed directly with local producers. Thirdly, there was a lack of linkages to 
the most important resource-based industrial enterprises. These firms could 
import duty free while the imported material necessary for domestic produce 
were subject to custom duties, making their products much more expensive 
(ibid. 14). Finally the emphasis of the state on the mining sector absorbed 
huge resources, as seen in chapter four, at the expense of supporting domestic 
manufacturing. 
Moreover, the orientation, of both commercial banks and official credit 
institutions towards favouring large producers, since they relied excessively on 
collateral rather than on detailed project appraisal for granting loans, as well as 
the Law of Encouragement of Investment, which also favoured large 
producers, further undermined this stratum. Even the Industrial Development 
Bank which was meant to help small private investors preferred to lend to large 
public firms. The fear of undermining the market of import merchants, 
therefore, had kept small local producers at a disadvantage while allowing for 
the growth of those large local producers connected with the same prominent 
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families which dominated commercial activities. This includes families such as 
the Abu Hassan who specialised in a wide range of under license products, 
such as soaps, detergents, paints, biscuits, toiletries, ice cream, etc. Others 
include the Sha'lan family, manufacturers of paints, glues, dairy products and 
cosmetics, the Mu'asher family who manufacture beer and the Abu Jaber who 
manufacture soft drinks as well as beer. Some of the manufacturing 
enterprises of these families had been established in the 1950s and/or the 
1960s, in addition to those well established firms which had held a monopoly 
since the 1930s, such as Farid Sa'd's tobacco and cigarettes firm. 
Just as the decline in state economic power detrimentally affected the 'new' 
petty bourgeoisie the internal weakness of the petty manufacturers coupled 
with the pressures from declining demands, domestic and regional, threatened 
the livelihood of a large segment of the population. This coupled with its 
fragmentation and the lack of political organisation further limited its ability to 
effect policy changes to protect itself, especially in face of the interests of the 
few large producers, whose strength was derived from the support provided by 
the state, and the diversity of their economic activities. 
The Marginalised Social Classes and Groups 
One of the striking features of the boom era was the growth of the social 
groups at the margins of society and the inequalities it generated in both rural 
and urban areas, which underpinned the mounting resentment and disaffection 
that exploded into riots in 1989 in the southern parts of the country, that is to 
say, the area least touched by the 'prosperity' of the 1970's. According to a 
study conducted for the housing strategy, 20 per cent of the population, those 
with incomes below JD100 per month, could not benefit from any housing 
projects, since they would be unable to cover the monthly payments, however 
low (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 1988: 32). Ironically, it was estimated that limited 
income groups would account for 67 per cent of the housing needs till the turn 
of the century. As for the level of absolute poverty - measured against a level 
of income of less than JD95 - official data indicated that it increased from 7 per 
cent of the population in 1977 to 15 per cent in early 1980s, while relative 
poverty - measured against a level of income around JD95 - accounted for 
around 48 per cent (ibid.). 
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Yet despite the growth of the social groups at the margins of the society, the 
government's actions were limited and its attempts to deal with poverty were 
fragmented with no co-ordination between the different concerned agencies. 
Most significantly, these attempts were of a 'charitable' nature rather than 
having a clear economic policy to alter the situation of these groups and their 
ability for self-sustainment. The first signs of the government's concern for the 
growing social disparities, came with the interest in regional planning, thus 
recognising the unbalanced and inequitable consequences of the development 
of Jordan, the high level of internal migration to urban areas as well as the 
growing resentment of the high living standards of a small segment of the 
population. However, it was not until 1984 that a regional planning department 
was established in the Ministry of Planning (then the National Planning Council) 
in order to create and activate the local councils and to assess the 
developmental potential and possibilities of the various regions. Even that 
remained too constrained since it entailed not just huge financial resources but 
also the political commitment to decentralise the highly centralised government 
structures and to embark on the difficult task of actually creating viable 
communities that did not depend on the benevolence of the state. Also from 
the mid 1970s the government started to refer to 'pockets of poverty' hence 
acknowledging the problem, but simultaneously attempting to blur its size and 
seriousness. Still it was not until the late 1980s that a National Aid Fund for 
disadvantaged groups was created which aimed at limiting the expansion of 
'pockets of poverty', creating income-generating projects and providing monthly 
allowance to families that are in dire need (Khatat Al-Tanmiyya 1986-90:183). 
Rural areas in particular were hit hardest, and inequality was greater than in 
urban areas as a result of a heavier concentration of wealth and income in a 
few hands. According to an official study, the highest income bracket in rural 
areas had a share of 43 per cent of the total household income. Considering 
that rural income was estimated at a third less than urban areas, that gives 
some indication of the size of the problem. The fact that the farming 
community was concentrated In rural areas explained the declining incomes of 
rural areas. It was further marginalised, showing a declining ability to either 
sustain itself or to produce profitably for market purposes. This related directly 
to the neglect it suffered from the government in contrast to the focus and 
attention gained by the small irrigated sector. 
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For instance, the land fragmentation that continued to be the primary constraint 
was not addressed appropriately by the government (Duwayri 1985: 130). The 
first time that the government's attention was directed towards this issue came 
as late as 1981. The cabinet took the decision then to limit the size of land 
plots outside city, town and village limits to no less than 60 dunums which 
effectively meant that land over 120 dunums could not be partitioned thus 
raising the ceiling from the previous level of 20 dunums. However, the problem 
was much deeper than that. As indicated by Casern, the land laws should 
guarantee economically-sized plots of land, hence laws that treat all land 
equally regardless of its productive potential are unrealistic. And if the 
objective is to keep the farming population on the land then these laws should 
provide the appropriate framework and incentives. He puts the order of the 
magnitude of land into three categories: in high rain areas a minimum of 30 
dunums is adequate while in areas of 300-400mm of rain an area of 200 
dunums is needed. In areas where rain is less than 300mm then a land plot of 
600 dunums is the minimum to support a family (1986: 28). Considering the 
existing small-sized plots the magnitude of unprofitability and declining incomes 
of a large segment of the rural population becomes even more staggering. 
The fragmentation of land, coupled with the lack of official credit support 
aggravated the situation further. As indicated before, instead of catering for 
small farmers, and attempting to free them from the influence of middlemen 
and commission agents and the vicious circle of poverty, the government 
reduced the profitability of rural farming and pushed many to abandon their 
lands. It is therefore, not surprising that the domestic labour force in agriculture 
declined and was substituted with immigrant labour, the majority of whom were 
Egyptians. In 1973 there were only 33 immigrant workers in agriculture, by 
1985 the number reached 49,000, that is, an average rate of increase of 84 per 
cent per annum. The highest rate of growth - 112 per cent - was during 1978-
82, and since then it decreased substantially and reached 6.3 per cent in 1985 
(Ibrahim 1989: 60). These workers provided cheap unorganised labour, 
accepting wages in the range of JD2-2.5, a monthly average of JD60-75 
(Hurani 1985: 83). In comparison, domestic labour declined from a level of 
50,000 to 37,000 for the same period, (Ibrahim1989: 63), an average rate of 
decline of 2.3 per cent which, given the high rate of population growth, 
especially in rural areas implies a substantial rural-urban migration. 
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In an attempt to ameliorate the conditions of the rural population from the early 
1980s, the concept of community development was adopted by various state 
agencies, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Queen Nour Foundation 
and the Queen Alia Social Welfare Fund. Their activities and strategies, 
however, were not focused on creating viable and independent communities. 
In addition they duplicated the role and the responsibilities of local 
governments and their councils as well as duplicating the work among 
themselves, which caused inefficient use of resources, and more importantly, 
did not help in tackling the root problem, that is, the economic situation of these 
groups. 
In the urban areas the situation was much better. The level of income 
disparity, according to a survey conducted in 1981 for Amman and Zarqa, 
showed that the poorest of the population (income level between JD50-100 per 
month) shared 11.5 per cent of the country's household income while 20 per 
cent of that income accrued to 6.2 per cent of the population. Furthermore, in 
Amman 75 per cent of the population lived in areas categorised as having low 
quality housing facilities and high population density, while only 20 per cent 
lived in areas designated as adequate (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 1988: 32,48) The 
Urban Development project, established in 1980, aimed to upgrade the slums 
and congested areas of Amman with the construction of housing units and the 
provision of basic services such as water and sewerage, electricity, roads, 
health and general facilities. The initial target was 15,000 inhabitants of five 
slum and congested areas in Amman: Al-Nuzha, Jofeh, Wadi Haddada, Wadi 
Dm Al-Rimam and East Wahdat (Development Plan 1981-5: 336). In other 
words the areas that are effectively unofficial refugee camps, since the majority 
of their residents are of Palestinian origin. Official camps were also among 
those hit hard by their unchanged situation, as well as by inflation and the 
higher cost of living. Despite the increase in government resources, its 
expenditure on the refugees was insignificant. For the period 1978-1985 it 
spent only JD28.7 million, that is, around half a per cent of central government 
expenditure (Zyood 1989: 162). Additionally UNRWA's ability to sustain its 
services and cover its costs was constantly threatened and its difficult financial 
situation caused by the failure of contributions to keep pace with raising costs 
affected its operation. 
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One significant development that reduced the pressures on the state from an 
extremely disadvantaged social group was the concentration of the growth of 
the working class in immigrant labour. Waged labour, as seen from Table 5.21 
(which uses the occupational structure of the labour force as an approximation 
to arrive at the size of the working class) - grew from 176 to approximately 
100,000, an average increase of 67 per cent annually. Domestic labour 
Table 5.21 Development of the working class for the period 1973-1985 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 
Foreign labour 176 1039 5994 30720 68370 93015 99958 
Domestic labour 209400 232700 247300 251400 268500 285500 302300 
Source: (Ibrahim 1989:61,63) 
however, increased by only 3 per cent for the same period from a level of 
209,000 to 302,000. As immigrant labour was concentrated in construction, 
agriculture and industry, the growth of these sectors was underlined by the use 
of cheap immigrant labour. For its part the government claimed that it was 
forced to follow a very liberal policy towards immigrant labour because local 
labour refused to engage in these menial jobs. To some extent this was true, 
but the essential factor was that local labour could not support a family on the 
same wage level. The significance of that was that organised labour action 
was unlikely to take place, since immigrant labourers were interested primarily 
in maintaining their jobs and their ability to remit to their families. 
Conclusion 
The discussion showed that the state, despite the huge oil capital and the 
concentration of power in its hands, was unable to evade either its class base, 
or its place within the international capitalist market. The extended role of the 
state in development served the interests of the ruling class and entrenched 
the prevalent economic interests in the traditional fields of trading on behalf of 
foreign capital as well as expanding into fields that were just emerging in the 
pre-1973 period, namely banking, real estate, contracting, agriculture and light 
manufacturing. This resulted in a substantial increase in the accumulative fund 
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of the local bourgeoisie. Ironically a large part of that had been deposited 
outside the country in Western banks. According to one estimate capital flight 
from Jordan had been at a quarter of total external debt (Al-Naqeeb 1988: 64). 
Moreover, the expanded role of the state widened the spectrum of benefiting 
groups which underpinned the stability of the period, in particular the 'new' 
petty bourgeoisie who were provided with employment opportunities, chances 
for social mobility, in addition to other benefits accruing through state 
employment. 
On the other hand a large part of the population suffered an increasing decline 
in income and widening income gaps, which had been growing since the 
1950s, but to which the oil era gave further impetus. Most significantly the 
deterioration happened as a result of state policies that catered for the needs 
of the ruling class. Thus oil capital not only widened the gaps among states in 
the region but within these states. The state attempted through resorting to 
methods such as regional planning, community development and urban 
development to alleviate the situation, especially in light of mounting discontent 
and resentments, but without effecting the core problem. Hence its efforts 
were directed to an improvement in living conditions through improving basic 
services and infrastructure but not to change the economic base of the 
weakened position of the marginalised social groups and classes. 
In the following chapter, the dominance of the state will be further emphasised 
by discussing how in spite of 'prosperity' it maintained political control over 
society and curtailed the development of democratic institutions and 
suppressed civil rights and civil freedoms and democratic political life in 
general. 
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Chapter Six 
The State, Society and Legitimacy 
The discussion so far has illustrated how the Jordanian state's central control 
of resources and over the economy guaranteed the prosperity of key social 
groups. This dominance of the state over society is also manifested on 
another level, namely the dominance of the state's political structures and their 
permeating of the private individual sphere, thereby suppressing freedom of 
speech, of opinion and of political affiliation and action - in sum, suppressing 
the development of democratic institutions and democratic political life. That 
the deep penetration of the state into society can be discerned on these two 
interrelated and inseparable levels emphasises the fact that state intervention 
takes place within a matrix of economic interests, which the state itself cannot 
evade and which it protects, not only via economic and developmental 
structures but via political structures also. Just as the emergence of a powerful 
and autonomous private sphere - which might allow the local bourgeoisie to 
present an alternative power base and to capture the state and put it to its 
service - conflicts with the interests of the Hashemites, the development of 
democratic political structures and societal institutions away from central state 
control, could curtail the power of the executive in particular the king, and 
hence undermine the manner in which the hegemony of the ruling class has 
been organised. 
The following discussion aims, therefore, to examine some of the 
manifestations of the domination the state's political structures over society, via 
analysing the cabinet, the legislature and the military and security 
establishment. It will also make clear the inability of the state to undermine the 
ruling class organisation of its power. These remained unchanged: the 
Hashemites the focal point of the state's power, the dominance of primary 
affiliations of tribe (although declining in importance as a result of the ever 
increased social differentiation), family, ethnicity, religion, etc., and their 
continued use as the basis of political appointments and promotion; and the 
primacy of the security apparatus and the military. Moreover, the Palestinian 
question continued to play a central role in the politics of Jordan, reflecting the 
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reasons for the Gulf states In subsidising the Jordanian state - partly in the 
hope that it can substitute the PLO in a negotiated settlement of the future of 
the Occupied Territories or at least to be a significant part in the process, and 
partly to prevent the emergence of nationalist and/or progressive rule in 
Jordan. 
Also, the discussion will illustrate that despite the state's strong political grip 
over society, social discontent and political pressures and demands for a more 
liberal and democratic society have been mounting, in particular demands to 
end martial law, imposed since the 1967 war, to lift the ban on the formation of 
political parties and to end the Mukhabarat's harassment and interference in 
the individual domain. Yet, the state has dealt with these demands either in a 
repressive manner or by the manipulation of the political structures, only 
appearing to make concessions, such as via the creation of the National 
Consultative Council, cabinet changes, etc. The remarkable ability of the mling 
class to manipulate the political structures without effecting real change have 
been underlined by the economic power of the state, since interestingly enough 
with the economic crisis of 1989 most of these demands have been responded 
to. Thus martial law has been frozen, political parties has been allowed to form 
and the Mukhabarat's heavy handedness has been relaxed. Although the 
period after 1985 is beyond the scope of the study, it is important to point out 
the close connection between the economic crisis and the political 
liberalisation, while at the height of the boom era the state's grip on society has 
been firmly maintained. More importantly, these liberalisation measures do not 
necessarily mean that the structures of political and economic power have 
changed or will change, as the experience so far in Jordan has shown that the 
king and the cabinet still hold the decisive power and the prevalent economic 
interests have been maintained. 
The Cabinet 
The king has continued to be the source of power, controlling appointments to 
the cabinet and other key state positions, and the decision-making process has 
become further concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, these being 
besides the king, the prime minister, the interior minister, and the heads of the 
military and security apparatus, as well as the chief of the royal court and/or the 
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minister to the royal court. This concentration of power has preserved the 
workings of patronage and the highly personalised system of appointments, co-
opting and benefiting key families and groups. As a result the appointments to 
the cabinet witnessed continuity by depending on the traditional loyal and 
prominent families as they cut across the various sub-statal affiliations. 
Nevertheless, some careerists have emerged through the state apparatus, and 
these became extremely influential throughout the 1970s and 1980s. They 
include individuals such as Adnan Badran and Ahmad 'Ubaidat, from the 
northern part of the country and Adnan Abu 'Odeh, a Palestinian from Nablus. 
Badran and 'Ubaidat, before holding the prime ministerial post, held the post of 
Director of the Intelligence Service, or the Mukhabarat, while Abu 'Odeh, who 
made his first appearance in the military government formed in 1970, was in 
1973 appointed chief of the royal court and held the sensitive post of Minister 
of Information several times. His importance, in fact, went beyond that, as he 
became one among a handful of people who controlled policy-making in 
Jordan. 
Moreover, although the composition of the cabinet on the one hand maintained 
the formalisation of the cleavages in the society, on the other hand it reflected 
the consolidation of the policy of 'Jordanisation', which meant an increasing 
dependency on East Bankers' loyal and trusted families and a general 
expansion in opportunities for East Bankers at the expense of those of 
Palestinian origin. The purposeful reduction of Palestinians in state positions 
was a noticeable departure from previous times and occurred under the pretext 
that the Rabat resolution (which conferred sole legitimate representation of the 
Palestinian people on the PLO) called for it. As can be seen from Table 6.1 
those of Palestinian origin were reduced to half until 1979. In that year the 
number of Palestinians in the cabinet increased, until by 1985 they reached 
around half of the cabinet, as a result of Jordan's rapprochement with the PLO. 
Thus the ruling family has frequently manipulated Palestinian cabinet 
participation depending on the circumstances and on Jordan's relation with the 
PLO. Just as the Hashemites used the Rabat decision to curtail the political 
power of Palestinians, the marginalisation of the PLO in Lebanon, in 
combination with Camp David, was recognised by Jordan as a chance for a 
Jordan-led settlement of the Palestinian issue. Hence Jordan's renewed 
interest in increasing the influence of those of Palestinian origin, in other words 
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in using them as a legitimating force regarding its orientation towards a 
peaceful settlement. 
Table 6.1 The formation of the cabinet for the period 1972-1985 
Period Palestinians Circassians Christians Total number 
Ahmad Louzl 29/11/971 8 - 1 18 
Zaid Rifa'i 
First cabinet 26/05/1973 8 1 1 19 
Second cabinet 23/11/1974 4 - 1 19 
Third cabinet 8/02/1976 5 - 1 19 
Mudar Badran 
First cabinet 13/07/1976 4 - 1 18 
Second cabinet 27/11/1976 5 1 1 18 
Abdal Hamid Sharaf 19/12/1979 6 - 1 22 
Qasam Rimawi 03/07/1980 8 - - 22 
Mudar Badran 28/08/1980 
Third cabinet 8 - 1 21 
Ahmad 'Ubaidat 10/01/1984 8 1 2 20 
Zaid Rifa'i 
Fourth cabinet 4/4/1985- 10 1 1 23 
24/4/1989 
Source: Based on (Khair 1990). 
By contrast, the disproportionate representation of the two important minorities, 
the Christians and the Circassians, was maintained. The Christians were 
represented in all cabinets by at least one member, while the Circassians were 
represented in four out of the eleven cabinets. Moreover, this did not reflect 
the actual strength of these two communities, since they also have had a 
disproportionate share in the military, the police and the wider state apparatus. 
To further highlight the concentration of power in running the affairs of the state 
it should be added that the cabinet, during the period under study was, as 
indicated in the Table 6.1, dominated by two personalities, Mudar Badran and 
Zaid Rifa'i, which explains why resentments and discontents have focused on 
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them, especially Zaid Rifa'i. The only two exceptions were during the 
premiership of Sharief Abdul Hamid Sharaf which ended with his untimely 
death (followed by a two month interim government of Qasim Al-Rimawai), and 
during the Ahmad 'Ubaidat government. The significance of the Sharaf and 
'Ubaidat governments, although very short in comparison with Badran's and 
Rifa'i's, lay in the reasons behind their appointments. Widespread personal 
enrichment through the holding of positions of power, demands for political 
freedoms and for liberalisation of the political system, combined with growing 
social discontent over the economic situation - all these factors forced the 
ruling class to attempt to address them or more accurately to appear to be 
doing so. It is within this context that the two premierships mentioned must be 
seen. In his ministerial address of 19 December 1979 Sharaf stressed that 
the government will give utmost priority to the deliberation on the 
economic problems and the adjustment of the pattern of economic 
development, and where it deems necessary. (Al-Nashrah Al-
Tijariyya 1980:4) 
Moreover, Sharaf emphasised the need to implement 'balanced social 
planning', to decentralise and to enter into 'dialogue' with the people (MECS 
1979-80: 573). Yet the manner in which Sharaf's cabinet attempted to 
implement both its liberalisation and economic policies, especially the ones 
aiming at decentralisation, emphasised past trends, since it opted for a policy 
based on utilising the traditional personal channels rather than initiating a 
formalised, institutionalised participatory process. Hence, gatherings were held 
to meet local officials and the business community, in addition to ministers' and 
senior officials' frequent tours throughout the country to discuss local problems 
and to encourage people's involvement in their communities. Thus the 
government's vision of decentralising and activating local community councils 
was not intended to effect a real change in the distribution of political power. 
Emphasising that, Sharaf ruled out lifting the ban on the formation of political 
parties and indicated that the important thing was to find 'alternative formulae 
for the citizens' participation in public life' (ibid.: 574). Such new ways, besides 
the regular meetings, included the establishment of a citizens' Complaints 
Bureau and a special anti-corruption court to deal with the extensive problem of 
bribery and embezzlement, in other words, a state controlled process, with the 
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semblance of change, appearing to dispel dissatisfaction and offering the hope 
of change without actually effecting it. 
That said, the untimely death of Sharaf forces one to be careful not to make 
concluding observation concerning his premiership, especially since no one 
doubted his sincerity; he was a strong advocate of the necessity to reverse the 
consumer tide that was sweeping Jordan, which would have meant the eclipse 
of the commercial class, as well as having a desire to 'liberalise' the system. 
By the same token, it is difficult to speculate about how the commercial 
bourgeoisie would have reacted, especially after such a long period of 
nurturing by the state or the state bourgeoisie who had been sharing the 
benefits of the economic 'prosperity'. Moreover, the succeeding government of 
Mudar Badran did not appear to be apprehensive about any of the issues 
raised by Sharaf's administration which attests to the inability of the ruling class 
to embark on any serious change that might threaten existing interests. It was 
not until 1984 that another attempt was made to address the deterioration in 
the economic situation, which by then had worsened significantly, by appointing 
a new cabinet headed by Ahmad 'Ubaidat. 
Perhaps what happened during the 'Ubaidat premiership could be taken as 
indicative of the difficulties which Sharaf would have faced. His cabinet was 
given similar directives to that of Sharaf from king Hussein to curb the 
widespread corruption and misuse of public funds as well as to improve the 
economic situation, especially considering its deterioration. As stated in the 
royal appointment decree, the cabinet was required to 'maintain the gains of 
development' and to 're-arrange the house' (Al-Bunuk fil Urdun 1984: 8). In this 
respect 'Ubaidat's resignation, or more accurately his dismissal after a year and 
a half, came as a surprise. Two different interpretations circulated at the time. 
One attributed the dismissal to his domestic economic policy, and the other to 
his views on Jordan's role in a future settlement of the Palestinian conflict. 
The economic policy of the 'Ubaidat cabinet, although it maintained the level of 
public expenditure (by resorting to loans to compensate for the fall in grants 
and financial assistance from the Gulf), aimed to adopt more 'prudent 
economic decisions, and to balance the economy', as well as to 're-evaluate 
the priorities of both private and public expenditure and pattern of imports' and 
to 'fight the weakness and deteriorating situation of public institutions and firms' 
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(ibid.: 9). This approach, although in essence it did not aim to restructure the 
economy or undermine prevalent economic interests, but rather intended to 
limit the liberty of the private sector, it nevertheless conflicted not just with 
domestic vested economic interests but, more significantly, with the new 
strategy of the World Bank and the IMF as well as USAID of privatisation and 
of streamlining the state sector. Moreover, as part of 'Ubaidat's new way of 
dealing with mounting pressures to control corruption was the creation of the 
Higher Council for Administrative Development to control and to investigate the 
misuse of public finds, focusing first on lower rank employees in a number of 
departments such as income tax, but later extending to others and including 
the investigation of a former cabinet minister who was implicated in illegal land 
transactions - thus going further than anticipated by the ruling class (MECS 
1983-4:515-6). 
The other interpretation of 'Ubaidat's resignation involves his views on Jordan's 
stance towards the West Bank (this view is part of a strain that has emerged 
within the establishment in Jordan), giving priority to the stability of Jordan and 
suggesting abandoning the claim to the West Bank. Hence, this view 
envisages a limited Jordanian role in a future settlement of the Palestinian 
issue. Considering that 1984 was seen by the Jordanian ruling class as 
presenting an ideal opportunity for a Jordan-led peace settlement, this view 
must have been most unwelcome. Despite the apparent importance of this 
second interpretation, the policies of 'Ubaidat's successor, Zaid Rifa'i, point to 
the fact that with all probability it was 'Ubaidat's economic policies that 
precipitated his resignation. 
The Rifa'i government reversed many of the previous government's economic 
policies and pursued an extremely liberal economic programme, as well as 
extending massive support to the private sector. Rifa'i himself is among the 
most economically powerful businessmen in the country. This took place 
against a background of rapid deterioration in the economic situation. 
Nevertheless, Rifa'i's cabinet insisted on the 'temporary nature' of the recession 
and the need for 'flexibility' and the ability to adapt to the new restraining 
international economic situation; as Rifa'i said 'flexibility is the base of our 
economic policy'. To achieve this flexibility and accommodation the 
government emphasised the promotion of the private sector. Hence it aimed to 
208 
support the private sector, while the state sector will be restricted to 
planning, direction and supervision, and the government will work 
with the private sector to ensure its freedom of action and 
movement. In addition, it will discuss each problem to arrive at a 
mutually acceptable solutions. (Al -Nashrah Al-lqtisadiyya 1985:6) 
The specific policies adopted were in effect directed towards benefiting the 
local bourgeoisie and established economic interests. Rifa'i's cabinet removed 
the restrictions on establishing new companies and expanding existing ones, 
eased the regulations and restrictions on granting licences to tourist 
professions, largely replaced the protective policy of local produce with 
customs, abolished price controls (except on certain items determined by the 
cabinet) and provided generous custom exemptions and expansion in income 
tax exemptions for banks and financial companies (Al-Nashrah Al-lqtisadiyya 
1988: 46-7). Moreover, it proceeded with the first stages of the privatisation of 
public sector institutions such as Royal Jordanian Airlines, Tele-
Communication and Public Transport Corporations, besides attempting to 
shrink the role of the Ministry of Health by creating the Medical Institute, the 
aim being to gather government hospitals and medical services under one 
umbrella as a first step towards privatising the sector while restricting the role 
of the ministry of health to preventive medicine. 
This is not to mention the increased intervention of USAID in Amman, as well 
as the frequent missions of the World Bank and the IMF proposing various 
projects for the private sector (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 1988: 38-42). A more direct 
way used by the government to support the private sector was via expanding 
the state's expenditure, in particular, by increasing resort to extra-budgetary 
expenditure. The consequences of the insistence of the government and the 
top management that what Jordan had been going through was a temporary 
recession and of the inadequate measures taken to combat the problem, 
coupled with the increasing resort to loans to fund state outlays, resulted in an 
accentuation of the dire economic situation and a further marginalisation of the 
disadvantaged groups, since government policy in effect imposed additional 
burden on the shoulders of the limited income groups. Hence the strong 
antagonism that Rifa'i provoked and the demands during the 1989 southern 
riots for his resignation. 
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The decision-making process continued to be concentrated in the hands of the 
king and a few individuals who lacked any sort of accountability to the populace 
and appointments continued to be based on personal informal criteria rather 
than merit. This ensured the co-operation and acquiescence of the top level 
management, since its fate was decided politically by one or two individuals. 
Moreover, this lack of accountability encouraged the wide spread misuse of 
public funds and for some of the state bourgeoisie to act on many occasions as 
if the ministry, institution and or enterprise they head is a personal belonging. 
Additionally, the way in which the central government behaved under different 
cabinets demonstrates the restrictions upon the state to act in a manner 
contradictory to prevalent economic interests, even when some members of 
the governing class are members of the ruling class such as in the case of 
Sharaf. The attempts of both Sharaf and 'Ubaidat offered the possibility of at 
least limiting the extent of the economic and political problems, without 
restructuring the balance of social forces and the strength of the state vis-^-vis 
the society. Yet even that was not possible, the ruling class, significantly, acted 
to liberalise the system only under crisis point. 
The National Consultative Council 
The creation of Al-Majlis Al-Watani Al-lstishari, or the National Consultative 
Council (NCC) in mid-1978 was the most important manifestation of mounting 
pressure on the ruling class to respond to growing demands for liberalisation 
and the opening up of political participation, especially in the wake of the 
dramatic events that were gripping the region such as the Sadat visit and the 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon. At the same time and more significantly, the 
creation of the NCC illustrated the lengths to which the state would go to avoid 
relinquishing its control over the political process and permit the development 
of elected democratic structures that would influence the decision-making 
process. Thus, the provisional law of 17 April 1978, promulgating a sixty 
member council appointed by King Hussein - who retained the power to 
dismiss members and to dissolve the council - came directly after the March-
April political activisim of the professional associations and the restfulness of 
the student body at the Jordan and Yarmouk Universities. This attested to the 
government's urgency to contain opposition and marginalise professional 
associations, which since the evacuation of the PLO from Jordan and the 
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continued ban on political parties had become the focal point of the opposition, 
facilitated by the growing numbers of professionals. Although the activities of 
the opposition were limited in terms of their effectiveness and methods, and 
where confined to holding gatherings and making official statements 
highlighting their position, the government exhibited a low level of tolerance as 
shown by its imprisonment for three weeks of those that signed a statement 
condemning Syria's invasion of Lebanon and extending support for the PLO, 
including prominent figures such as Ibrahim Baker, the head of the bar 
association, Bahjat Abu Garbiyya and Yasser Amer, as well as the temporary 
shutdown of the Al-Ra'y newspaper that published the statement (MECS 1977-
8: 582). 
The government, most indicatively, upheld the N C C as 'an institution where the 
legitimate expression of the opinions, interests, and feelings of citizens could 
take place in freedom and responsibility' (ibid.: 583). Yet the council, in accord 
with the king's directive to the Prime Minister Mudar Badran, and as the name 
indicates, functioned mainly as an advisory body, and all legislation was to 
remain provisional until the convening of the parliament. The king, stressing 
that, said: 
we therefore believe that until conditions permit the return of full 
parliamentary life a National Consultative Council should be 
established and should be comprised of competent men who can 
truly represent various public sectors and who are loyal to the 
country and its constitution. The task of the council would be to 
advise the government, discuss public policy, and consider all 
legislation and laws. (Khoury 1981:430) 
The N C C thus provided a semblance of democracy, debating and making 
recommendations that were not binding and had no real power or influence, 
while simultaneously producing support for official policies. Three councils 
were appointed. The first two were filled on the same lines as the cabinet by 
appointments divided according to sub-statal affiliations among the prominent 
and loyal families, while the inclusion of those of Palestinian origin was limited. 
Hence the Palestinians did not account for more than a fifth of the members 
whilst the Circassians and Christian communities were overrepresented by 
comparison (Table 6.2). A third of the members in the second council were. 
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emphasising the 'Jordanlsation' policy and the need to mitigate social 
discontent, newcomers, and there was a tendency towards greater 
representation of the professional strata. Nevertheless, the three figures who 
presided over the council, Ahmad Al-Louzi, Ahmad Al-Tarawneh and Sulaiman 
Arar came from the traditional powerful clique. 
Table 6.2 Composition of the National Consultative Council for the period 1978-1984 
Period Palestinians Circassians Christians Total number 
First council 20/04/1978 11 2 2 60 
Second council 20/04/1980 11 3 4 60 
Third council 20/04/1982 21 2 4 75 
Source: (Ibid.). 
The N C C , subsequently, functioned for six years without effecting real change, 
and with little if any impact on government policies. An example of this 
ineffectiveness was the rejection by the council's economic committee of the 
proposal for a new cement factory in Rashaydiyya as economically unfeasible, 
while the Badran government insisted on it. As mentioned before, this decision 
not only cost the government the capital involved in the implementation of an 
economically unsound project, but in effect reduced the profitability of the well-
established Cement Company at Fuheis, when the government was forced to 
merge the two companies. Also, the N C C thwarted an attempt by some of the 
councils' members, such as Amin Shuqayr and Jamal Sha'ir, who intended to 
promote a national dialogue among the various political groups, associations, 
trade unions, chambers of commerce and industry via a National Guidance 
Committee and by holding seminars, rallies and meetings. The N C C decided 
to rename the National Guidance Committee and to redefine its functions 
( M E C S 1981-2: 674). Thus, even attempts from establishment figures based 
on a gradual approach towards establishing an organised political life were not 
welcomed. 
Nevertheless, the sessions of the council were far from being docile, 
increasingly subjecting the government to attack, especially from the vocal and 
outspoken supporters of the Islamic trend such as Leith Shbailat, Yousef Al 
'Azam, Ahmad Al-Koufahi and Abdullah AI-'Akaiylah. The most important and 
constant topics of debate focused around pressing for political freedoms and 
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for an end to all methods of political harassment, as well as the misuse of 
public funds, not to mention the criticism of the governments' handling of the 
deteriorating economic situation. In fact, discussions became increasingly 
focused on the economic situation, especially concerning agricultural policies, 
the growing disparities in rural and urban areas, and the internal migration 
problems. 
Having shown the limitations of the N C C as a forum for the articulation of 
society vis-^-vis the state, one must also point out the inability exibited by 
secular opposition - in its wider frame of P L O supporters, nationalists, leftists -
to mobilise and effectively exploit the moments of increased pressures on the 
state. The reasons for this are numerous, the most important of them being 
the lack of co-ordinated strategy among the opposition and lack of strategy 
within each trend: the different factions react in sporadic ways to events and 
have no sustained policy. Secondly, the overriding concern of the opposition 
remained focused on the PLO-regime rivalry over Palestinian representation 
and the nature of the settlement of the conflict; even on this issue they were 
unable to cement Palestinian-East Banker solidarity. It was, therefore, not only 
the ability of the government to control and repress the opposition that 
rendered it ineffective but also internal constraints upon these various groups 
serving to make them marginal. More significantly, it has been the 
ineffectiveness of secular opposition, led by the professionals, that has helped 
in widening the support for the Islamic trend, in particular the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which works on a grass roots level, while the secular trend has 
become increasing divorced from the populace, confined to a limited social 
base. 
The Revival of the Parliament 
The revival of the parliament was considered by some to be a 'watershed' in 
the politics of Jordan, signalling a recognition by the ruling class of people's 
intolerance of the absence of democracy (Yorke 1988: 79). Such sentiments 
exaggerated the significance of King Hussein's dismissal of the National 
Consultative Council and his recalling of the ninth dissolved lower house of 
parliament on 5 January 1984. As mentioned in chapter three, the lower house 
was suspended in 1973 and in 1976 dissolved, the justification being that the 
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elected lower house could not function, since half of its members represented 
the West Bank; and holding elections on the East Bank alone signifies Jordan's 
final detachment from the West Bank. The upper house was preserved, and its 
appointments reflected the same policy of sub-statal affiliations, as well as 
halving the numbers of those of Palestinian origin. Without the lower house, 
however, it was of no political significance (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 Composition of tiie Upper House of Parliament for the period 1973-1988 
Period Palestinians Circassians Christians Total Number 
The tentfi senate 21 /a/1973 - 23/8/1974 18 1 1 30 
Tfie eleventh senate 1/12/1974-20/1/1979 9 1 1 30 
The twelfth senate 20/1/1979- 20/1 1983 9 • 1 30 
The thirteenth senate 20/1/1983 • 10/1 1984 8 1 1 30 
The fourteenth senate 12/1/1984- 12/1/1988 11 1 1 30 
Source: (ibid.). 
The summoned house made two amendments to the constitution, allowing the 
king to permit the resumption of the chamber of deputies for four years, in 
addition to permitting the holding of by-elections to fill the empty seats of the 
East Bank, while the deputies themselves would elect the replacements for the 
West Bank seats. Interestingly enough, these were elected prior to filling the 
empty seats of the East Bank. Although social discontent and pressures for 
the democratisation of political life played a role in the reactivating of the 
parliament, a more significant reason was the attempt by the ruling class in 
Jordan to exploit the risen opportunity to achieve its long desired aim of playing 
the decisive role in determining the political future of the Palestinians. This 
opportunity presented itself through a significant weakening of the P L O and its 
withdrawal from Lebanon, followed by the Reagan plan, which called for 
Palestinian autonomy in association with Jordan, the form of which will be left 
to negotiation, but which explicitly rules out an independent Palestinian state 
(Bailey 1984:112). Accordingly, King Hussein welcomed the Reagan plan as a 
'brave and courageous move and an important and historic moment that the 
Arabs should seize for making serious bid for peace' (ibid.: 114). 
The Jordanian government, in spite of the Rabat resolution, persisted in its 
two-pronged policy towards the Palestinian issue. The first element was 
challenging the exclusive right of the P L O to represent the Palestinians. This 
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challenge was asserted on several grounds, such as that of the legality in 
terms of international law, since the West Bank was Jordanian territory when 
occupied by Israel, based on the fact that in 1955, when Jordan was admitted 
to the UN, it comprised of both banks ( M E C S 1978-9: 639). In addition, the 
government constantly referred to the unity of the two people and the one 
family concept, and emphasised the fact that, it was not important to whom the 
land returned as long as Israel relinquishes it. The second element was the 
government's insistence on the Palestinians' right to establish a national and 
political entity, but one whose shape and future link with Jordan will be 
determined by a referendum, assuming that the Palestinians will choose a 
solution that corresponds with Jordan's federation design. 
This position was inseparable from the assigned role of Jordan in the region, 
that is to say its significance in containing the P L O and in its potential role as a 
substitute negotiator and/or a partner to the negotiations over the West Bank, a 
role for which it had received huge amounts of grant-capital from both Saudi 
Arabia and the United States. Jordan, therefore, has used its advantageous 
position relative to the P L O to attempt to augment a power base in the 
Occupied Territories in order to challenge the P L O and legitimise its claims and 
increase its leverage. The channelling of aid through Jordan and its 
administrative ties with the Territories proved to be a very effective means of 
pressuring the Palestinians, and of maintaining the ties with Jordan's traditional 
loyal figures. Nevertheless, Jordan's role was constrained by the fact that it 
needed either the sanction or approval of the P L O and/or the Palestinians in 
the Occupied Territories to grant it the right to negotiate on their behalf. Thus 
the parliament was supposed to represent a contingency plan, that is banking 
on Palestinian representatives to give Jordan such right if talks with the P L O 
failed to produce an agreement. 
In preparation for what it was hoped would be a conclusive end to PLO-Jordan 
rivalry over representing the Palestinians, Jordan intensified its links with the 
West Bank by a number of actions, including Increasing aid to its traditional 
channels: the chambers of commerce, religious institutions and agricultural co-
operatives. It also encouraged the establishment of refugee committees to 
protest against the cuts imposed by UNRWA, and supported the draft petition, 
backing a Jordanian-Palestinian joint action and the Reagan plan which was 
instigated by pro-Jordan figures, such as Rashad Al-Shawa, Anwar Al-Khatib, 
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Nadim Al-Zaru and Hikmat Al-Masri. They defended the joint action strategy 
either on a legal basis; Jordan being legal sovereign of both Banks or on the 
basis that it does not undermine a separate Palestinian identity, since 
Palestinians hold Jordanian passports. Others claimed that it would strengthen 
the political standing of both Hussein and Arafat and that it would be a step 
towards ending occupation. The P L O camp, on the other hand, received it with 
suspicion, emphasising the fact that its real aim is to bypass the P L O and to 
exploit its present weakness. Thus, student bodies and national institutions in 
the Territories actively protested, reaffirming the three fundamental precepts 
that have underlined the Palestinian struggle since the emergence of the PLO: 
the P L O as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, self-
determination and statehood ( M E C S 1983-4: 247-252). 
Interestingly, the opposition to the Reagan plan, and to the attempt by the 
government to circumvent the P L O , were persuasive in Jordan. The majority 
(around 70 per cent) of the slogans/programmes of East Bank candidates 
during the by-election focused on supporting the P L O as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians; by comparison 63 per cent focused on 
issues such as political freedoms, improvements in economic conditions, and 
the need to reduce income gaps as well as to fight corruption (Al-Urdun Al-
Jadid 1984a: 62-6). Although Arafat and Hussein concluded the famous 
'February agreement' in 1984 (which indicated the terms of a joint Palestinian-
Jordanian framework for negotiation), by February of the next year the 
agreement was dead. King Hussein annulled it officially. He followed this by 
severing links with the P L O and closing twenty-five P L O offices in Amman (only 
twelve remained intact), a s well a s by expelling a number of officers loyal to 
Arafat, as a sign of frustration with Arafat's stalling, itself determined by 
increasing pressure from Palestinian quarters to repeal the agreement. 
Most significant has been the open attempt by the government to appeal 
directly to the West Bank, firstly by, passing a draft law in March 1986 
increasing the number of deputies in the lower house to 142 from 60 (71 seats 
for the East Bank and West Bank), and then by the preparation and inclusion of 
a development plan for the Occupied Territories presented in the conference 
held for the 1986-90 development plan of Jordan. The eruption of the intifada 
in December 1987 put a halt to this process, and on 28 July 1988 Jordan 
abolished the plan and severed legal and administrative links with the West 
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Bank but, most importantly, did not abrogate the 1950 'union' agreement, 
hence leaving its options open. Ironically, it was the Gulf War, which the ruling 
c lass in Jordan were forced by popular pressure to oppose, that has given 
Jordan the upper hand in the negotiation of a peace settlement, by the mere 
fact that it further marginalised the P L O and produced widespread feelings of 
resignation in the region. Although it is not clear what the outcome will be of 
the present rounds of peace talks, all signs point to a very limited expression of 
Palestinian nationalism and a substantial role for Jordan. 
Despite the failure of the revival of the parliament in achieving what the ruling 
c lass essentially wanted, it was significant on another level. The East Bank by-
elections illustrated some of the significant changes that the society has 
undergone during the decade of 'prosperity'. First, three out of the eight empty 
East Bank seats went to strong proponents of the Islamic trend, Leith Shbailat 
in Amman, Ahmad Al-Koufahi in Irbid and Abdullah AI-'Akaiylah in Tafeilah, 
while two Arab Nationalist, Riyad Al-Nawaysah and Nazih AI-'Ammarin, won 
the two Karak seats. The remaining three seats were won by candidates who 
had traditional and tribal backing ( M E C S 1983-4: 513). Considering the policy 
the government had adopted since the crisis of the 1950s, the success of the 
Islamic trend candidates should not have come as a surprise. The Muslim 
Brotherhood were the only group formally recognised and allowed to act under 
the pretext of being a Al-Da'wah, or evangelical organisation, in order to offset 
the leftist and secular trend, especially that they, unlike the Liberation Party of 
Jordan, do not espouse the overthrow of the regime, but a policy of 
coexistence. As their leader Abdal Al-Rahman Khalifa indicated they tolerated 
the numerous restrictions imposed by the government since they 'accepted 
these constraints with good grace in order not to create any domestic 
dissension' ( M E C S 1979-80: 577). The deteriorating economic situation, the 
corruption in the upper echelons of the state administration, as well as the rise 
to power of the of Mullahs in Iran played a crucial role in widening the support 
for the Islamic trend in the country, especially considering the continued ban on 
political parties. Moreover, the government in an attempt to contain the Islamic 
trend showed increasing levels of observance to Islamic practices, such as 
Friday prayers, holy holidays and the enforcing of strict adherence during the 
month of Ramadan. In addition, the prominent members of the Muslim 
Brothers were granted important positions, such as the appointment of Khalifa 
to the Senate for many years and Kamal Al-Sharif's appointment to the post of 
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minister of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs and Holy Places, not to mention their 
appointments to the N C C . 
Secondly, other than attesting to the growth of the Islamic trend, the by-
elections signified a challenge by the less influential families to the traditional 
prominent families that had dominated and monopolised the representation of 
the larger affiliation of the tribe, ethnic group, etc., for years. This explains the 
large numbers of candidates - 36 candidates for one seat in Amman, 16 for 
one seat in Irbid, 27 for three seats in Balqa, 18 for two seats in Karak, and 4 
for one seat in Tafeilah, a s well the fact that one-third of the candidates came 
from the professional stratum such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc. 
Despite this, there has been an exaggeration in the assessment of the 
elections a s illustrating the declining influence of traditional appeal (Al-Urdun 
Al-Jadid 1984a: 53-60), these new emerging families or figures still appealed to 
the electorate on traditional basis of affiliations. The society remains 
fragmented along the lines of primary affiliations with a highly personalised and 
informal set of relationships in spite of the decline in the importance of the tribe 
as an overriding affiliation. 
The Security and Military Establishment 
Ironically, the most interesting aspect of the boom period was the growing 
strength and influence of the Mukhabarat, or intelligence services, which 
increasingly became the arm of the executive, not to mention the expansion of 
the public police and the increased influence of its special forces such as the 
Desert Police and Al-Sa'qa. What this entailed was an ever-increasing 
intrusion into and interference with the individual private domain; it also 
signified a low threshold of tolerance on the part of the state towards opposition 
and political activism. The expansion in the security agencies explains the 
increasing levels of expenditure on the security apparatus, especially in 
comparison with previous periods and in particular on the Mukhabarat. 
Although neither total expenditure on the security establishment nor its 
employment levels are made public, as in the case with the military, under the 
pretext of 'security' concerns, its pervasive intervention attests to a large 
apparatus, in addition to its ability to absorb increasing numbers of young 
professionals. Its salary scale is believed to be much higher than that of the 
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civil service, in addition to numerous benefits that enhance its attractiveness as 
a source of employment. 
One of the major reasons for the extensive intrusion of the secret police into 
the private domain of individuals and its substantial influence on society is 
related to the growth of the state sector, since employment in the state sector 
(central government, autonomous institutions, local government and the mixed 
sector), and academic institutions required the prior approval of the 
Mukhabarat. All applications were screened by the Mukhabarat and returned 
to the respective agency as either approved or disapproved. Moreover, 
university staff were not allowed even to be nominated to the professional 
associations' councils and were kept under close observation (by the 
Mukhabarat) for six years, before their status was fixed. Although this is a 
common practice used in many universities for academic assessment, it occurs 
in this c a s e for political reasons and as a means of controlling the political 
activities of university staff. In addition university academic staff were not 
allowed to give lectures or seminars without prior approval of the president of 
the university. 
The Mukhabarat had the power, too under the pretext of security concerns, to 
dismiss even those already employed, either on the grounds of a failure in the 
initial checking process or because for some political reason an employee 
came to be seen as representing a 'security' risk. Tying employment to 
individuals' political opinions and political activism proved to be an effective 
method of repression, silencing critical voices as well as excluding progressive 
or critical elements by the virtue of the workings of the system. Considering the 
importance of the state sector for employment opportunities, as well as being 
the major channel for social mobility for the professionals and the educated 
stratum, one can envisage the effectiveness of this method. Thus, the 
depoliticisation and apathy, that occurred replacing the enthusiasm and 
activism that characterised the 1950s and 1960s, even though the challenges 
and threats of the 1970s were no less substantial, should not be surprising. 
Instances that exemplified the power of the Mukhabarat and the public police 
include the disturbances at the University of Jordan in April 1978, following the 
burning of the Palestinian flag during an exhibition commemorating the 
Palestinian 'Day of the Land'. The students took the opportunity to press for 
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the formation of a student union instead of the existing student societies which 
are elected in each department, as well as for a disciplinary council for those 
who violated an activity sanctioned by the university. The reaction of the 
government was too severe; tanks surrounding the campus, police throwing 
tear gas, and making daily arrests outside the campus. The ordeal lasted for 
approximately ten days. In the end, the police broke into the university campus 
and arrested those allegedly accused of being the leaders. On the same day, 
the university administration, at the request of the Mukhabarat, dismissed 
twenty students and others were threatened with a similar fate, in addition to 
dismissing six lecturers . Later it became evident that the affair was incited by 
the intelligence service to discern allegiances as well as to exploit the occasion 
to dismiss staff members and students viewed as undesirable due to their 
political views. Ironically, one of the staff members from the chemistry 
department was, during the disturbances, in the United States on a training 
course, sent by the university, when he was accused of inciting the students 
and accordingly dismissed from his lecturing position. 
Another instance of interference by the security services was the disturbances 
at Yarmouk University in 1986 following the students protests over increased 
tuition and fees. The protest prompted another severe response, from the 
Special Forces of the Public Security Department who stormed the campus 
tear gassing and clubbing the students, which resulted in a number of students 
(estimated between three to six) being killed. Resorting to force was preferred, 
by the government, to the students' request to disperse the demonstration by 
marching out of the campus - most probably to avoid being hand-picked and 
arrested by the Mukhabarat if they were to leave individually. One reason the 
university was set up 100 kilometres away from Amman and 20 kilometres 
outside the nearest city, Irbid, is to distance it from large population centres, 
hence the authorities feared that to allow the students to march out of the 
campus might result in a populace reaction in favour of the students (Middle 
East Report, 1987: 33). These two events, other than being indicative of the 
power of Mukhabarat and the police are significant in disclosing the level of 
intolerance on the part of the government and its fear of even minimal political 
activity, as well as its way in using such events to subdue any potential 
opposition before it materialises. 
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The increased prominence of the Mukhabarat has lessened the dependence 
on the military establishment as the sole source of internal security, but it has 
not undermined its importance as an important pillar of maintaining the ruling 
class hegemony - despite frequent disturbances within the army in 1972, 1977, 
1979, 1982 and 1984. These frequent disturbances manifested the fact that 
the military was not insulated from the pressures of rising costs of living and 
increasing social differentiation. But what lessened the impact of these 
disturbances and precluded the military from posing as a viable alternative to 
rule is that the military too expressed the fragmentation of society and the 
overriding importance of familial, ethnic, tribal and religious affiliations which 
weakened the coherence of opposition movements within it, as well as helped 
to maintain the need for the ruling family as the source of its unity. Although 
the proportion of those of Bedouin origin is still high, their rivalry and 
competition undermines their numerical strength and their potential as an 
alternative source of control over the military. Moreover, the sensitive top 
positions have continued to be monopolised by minority groups, the Christians 
and the Circassians, who have continued to be disproportionately represented 
and who are staunch supporters of the regime. 
Moreover, to mitigate social discontent, it became a habit of the government to 
raise salaries following each disturbance, in addition to the expansion in the 
benefits for officers and petty officers in terms of housing projects, providing 
easy credit to build houses, secondments to the Gulf in order to earn better 
salaries a s well a s opportunities in state apparatus for retired service men. 
Additionally, the government expanded educational opportunities for 
servicemen and their families via the establishment of Muo'tah University, 
which is predominantly an establishment for the children of those serving in the 
military and security apparatus. It also allocated 20 per cent of the places in 
Jordan's universities and other institutions of higher learning to the children of 
active and retired members of the armed forces and the security forces (MECS 
1979-80: 575). These will be given government scholarships, either from Al-
Makrumah Al-Malakiyya, the royal family or from Al-Diwan Al-Hashemy, the 
royal court or from the military. The reserving of these seats, besides entailing 
financial costs reduced the academic standards of the universities and 
educational facilities, since students applying for these reserved seats do not 
compete on an equal footing with the rest of the applicants; the high 
requirements of the various departments are not applicable to them. In 1984-5 
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the share of these reserved seats increased to 25 per cent (Hourani 1985: 35-
6). 
In light of the government's consistent public adherence to a negotiated 
settlement of the Palestine-Israel question, and King Hussein's instilling in the 
military the logic of settlement (by emphasising ideas such as that what is 
taken by force will return only through political means as well as stating that 
souls will not be sacrificed unless victory is assured, and that there will be no 
repetition of the 1967 debacle) the focus on modernising and mechanising the 
army and its continued absorption of a large part of state resources has been 
motivated by reasons other than in preparation for a military solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. One is the awareness of the ruling family of the urgency to 
meet the army's practical needs and provide the requisite weaponry and 
training, which plays a crucial part in shaping the military perception of the 
leadership as 'meritorious and deserving of protection', as well as to satisfy the 
professional aspirations of the military. (Yorke 1988: 22). Part of that 
satisfaction is also an ability to maintain some parity with Israel, Syria and Iraq. 
In addition, it must be said that the awarding of lucrative defence contracts was 
an important source of financial benefit to top military officers and the 
Hashemites due to the high commission fees accruing from the process of 
defence procurement (ibid.: 24). 
Although Jordan has not always been successful in acquiring sophisticated 
weaponry from the United States, due to the security concerns of both the 
United States and Israel in keeping Israel's upper hand in the area, 
nevertheless the capability of the military has been enhanced as manifested by 
the increase in its formations and weaponry. The armoured divisions have 
increased from two to five, and the mechanised divisions from two to six, while 
the two anti-aircraft brigades expanded their artillery battalions from six to 
sixteen during the period 1973-84. Also, the air force has been strengthened 
by an increase in the number of combat aircraft to 103 and of ground attack 
squadrons to three. This increased capability, however, is still limited, and is 
not of the same magnitude as Israel's, Syria's or Iraq's. This is particulariy true 
of the air force. For instance, against 103 combat aircraft, Syria had 600 and 
Israel 630, in 1984 (The military Balance 1973-4; 1983-4). 
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Jordan's emphasis on building an advanced army is exemplified further by its 
rapprochement with the former Soviet Union in order to compensate for the 
United States' delays in supplying Jordan with military hardware. During the 
1970s the level of contact increased through frequent official visits and the 
exchange of delegations for economic and technical co-operation, as well as 
military delegations. King Hussein visited the Soviet Union in 1976 and 1981 
and Crown Prince Hassan in 1978, besides the two visits of Chief of Staff Zaid 
bin Shaker in 1979 and 1984. This took place against the background of 
Soviet interest in reconvening the Geneva conference. The Soviet Union 
hoped through its links with Jordan to overcome the difficulty of involving the 
P L O , and Jordan's insistence on a role for the Soviet Union was intended to 
enhance Jordan's bargaining power with the United States. In addition Jordan 
and the Soviet Union shared a similar stance on some aspects of the peace 
process, primarily support for a Geneva-type forum and for UN resolution 242. 
The improved relation culminated in 1981 by Jordan acquiring an anti-aircraft 
missile system paid for by Iraq valued at $200 million, which was installed in 
1983. Despite this the United States remained the most important supplier of 
military hardware, credit sales and grants. 
Another reason for the high expenditure on the army and emphasis on its 
advancement is related to the added significance of the role of the Jordanian 
military in supporting the security of the Gulf, which the ruling class has been 
pressing for to increase their standing in the region and their usefulness to the 
United States. As indicated by Crown Prince Hassan, 
neither Israel nor Egypt could play such a role as Jordan's in 
providing the Gulf states with a 'strategic hinterland'. ( M E C S 1982-
3: 647) 
Ties between Jordan and the Gulf have strengthened substantially, and 
Jordan's military assistance has taken the form of Jordanian military and police 
training missions in the Gulf, or the Gulf army and police training in Jordan, 
hence the allocation of special sections in the Jordanian military college to train 
officers, especially from Oman, and in the Police College where cadets from 
the UAE and Qatar train. In addition, Jordan has seconded or recommended 
retired officers and personnel to serve in the Gulf, not to mention the 
appointment of high ranking military officers to ambassadorial posts such as 
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Amar Khamash and Mohammad Khalil Abd-AI-Daim who have both held the 
position of Chief of Staff of the Military in Jordan. Emphasising this co-
operation. King Hussein stressed that 
Jordan provides all that is required of it on the military level to Gulf 
needs through the effort of its professional military officers who are 
devoid of political adherence. (Murad 1973:157) 
This was the context for the attempt in eariy 1983 to form a Jordanian Rapid 
Development Force that could be used in an emergency to maintain the 
security of the Gulf states. The disclosure of the request by the US 
administration to Congress for a special budget to equip and train the 
Jordanian force in the Israeli press, as well as the disclosure in the US press of 
a secret deal of $225 million to provide support for two brigades of Jordanian 
elite troops, around 8,000 men, resulted in blocking the plan by Congress. 
The deal included transport planes, medical evacuation transport and 
advanced infantry and river crossing equipment, in addition it would have had 
the support of the U S Air Force to airiift the Jordanian force if required in an 
emergency. On the other hand the disclosure was embarrassing to the 
Jordanian government. Hence it was denied and King Hussein asserted that 
no such force existed and that Jordan was willing to come to the rescue of any 
Arab state, if required, just as it did in 1961 in Kuwait and in the eariy 1970s in 
Oman ( M E C S 1983-4: 528-9). At the beginning of 1984 the US government 
tried to renew attempts to gain congressional support for the allocation of funds 
for the force without success . Instead of funds for arms and equipment extra 
economic aid totalling $250 was offered (The Middle East and North Africa 
1990:552). 
Ironically the Gulf war exposed the limitations of a direct military involvement of 
Jordan in the security of the Gulf. King Hussein and the Jordanian 
establishment found themselves in a precarious situation, pushed to take a 
stance contrary to the expectation of their major funders, the US and Saudi 
Arabia, as a result of intense domestic resentment towards American 
intervention in the Gulf and massive support to Iraq. The American 
administration, though extremely displeased with Jordan, recognised the 
importance of the internal security of the regime and the constraints imposed 
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on it by the intense anti-Western popular feelings that gripped Jordan as 
indicated by Baker: 
We have a major disagreement with the King....[But the U.S. means 
to] keep lines of communication open to the King notwithstanding 
the fact he's on the wrong side and we have a major disagreement 
here with him....[W]hen we look at alternatives we don't see what we 
perceive to be a particularly pretty picture-alternatives to the 
King....(Jreisat and Freij 1991:102) 
Moreover, the Gulf war has imposed a new reality whereby the United States 
can intervene directly to secure its major interest in the region, namely oil, 
without having to rely on either Jordan or more significantly Israel. This 
combined with Jordan's economic crisis and the Arab-Israeli peace process will 
undoubtedly have profound effects on the military and will necessitate a 
rethinking of its role and the huge resources it consumes. 
Conclusion 
The discussion showed how the state has been able to maintain the 
dominance of its political structures over society, suppressing dissent and 
controlling the scope of action of individuals and group associations (whether 
professional, social or political), and limiting their influence on its actions and 
policies, in order to maintain the hegemony of the ruling class. Thus, even at 
the height of 'prosperity' the state was unable to relinquish its tight control over 
society and allow the expression of political opinions and the development of 
democratic political structures. Instead the highly centralised decision-making 
process was augmented by the rising power of the Mukhabarat and its 
increasing encroachment into the private domain. In addition the king 
remained the ultimate source of power. Although, as seen from the discussion, 
social discontent and resentments, and political demands for the liberalisation 
of the political system were mounting, the state was able to manipulate political 
structures in order to appear as offering the hope of change but without 
actually effecting it, as in the case of the cabinet changes, the creation of the 
National Consultative Council and the revival of the parliament. In addition it 
also resorted to repressive means, in order to marginalise social and political 
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discontent, ranging from banning political gathering, tight control over the press 
and the media, maintenance of martial law, etc. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of the ruling class continued to be based on primary 
affiliations of tribe (although declining in importance, and substituted by familial 
affiliation), as well as ethnicity, religion etc., and further emphasised by their 
formalisation through state positions of power, where appointments and 
promotions were decided on such a basis This, most importantly, masked the 
c lass basis of Jordanian society, but also underpinned the success of the state 
in reducing the possibility of a challenge to ruling class hegemony and/or the 
primacy of the Hashemites. The power of the state over society and the 
primacy of traditional forms of affiliations were further facilitated by the 
disorganisation and marginalisation of opposition, whose attention continued to 
be concentrated on the Palestine issue, relegating to the background economic 
concerns, especially the particular concerns of the marginalised segments of 
society. 
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Conclusion 
The discussion of the political economy of Jordan in the wake of the oil boom 
illustrated how the state's increased economic power and its expanded 
'developmental' role has been utilised to entrench the power of the ruling class 
and to provide the opportunity for the prominent economic interests to exert an 
increased influence and expand their wealth. The propertied class extended its 
economic concerns beyond its traditional field of activity of trading on behalf of 
foreign capital, into other fields, such as banking, real-estate, construction, light 
manufacturing and agriculture, while the power of the state bourgeoisie, who 
increasingly were drawn from the propertied class, especially at the highest 
levels of state management, and whose interests became closely enmeshed 
with the interests of the propertied class, was immensely enhanced. Moreover, 
top positions in the state became the carrot for co-opting and integrating into 
the state opposition elements or critical voices as well as less influential and 
prestigious families. Thus the attractiveness of state positions increased the 
legitimacy of the state and kept aspirations high to join its ranks. Yet, despite 
opening up state positions at a variety of management levels to the less 
prominent and influential families, a small clique of businessmen and state 
officials dominated the economic scene and the decision-making process. This 
allowed the thriving of nepotism and favouritism as well as the misuse of public 
funds on a scale not experienced before, not to mention the increasing 
concentration of wealth in a few hands. 
Some of the social and political problems accompanying the widening of 
income gaps have been mitigated by the increased ability of the state to absorb 
the professional stratum - which have expanded beyond the needs of the 
economy as a result of high demand in Gulf states and the expansion of 
education - in addition to absorbing a large part of the population at its lower 
echelons, thereby providing secure employment to a wide segment of the 
population. The political significance of the state's capacity to employ 
increased immensely, which explains the inflation of the state sector beyond 
the dictates of economic needs or efficient utilisation of resources. Although 
the state sector's salaries were lower than in the private sector or than those in 
the Gulf states, the benefits, other than job security, attached to state 
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employment, such as access to medical care, access to the Consumer 
Corporations offering goods at highly subsidised prices, soft credit for housing 
and housing projects, compensated for the difference. Consequently the 'new' 
petty bourgeoisie became the pillar of the stability of the regime, this expansion 
with the prevalence of small-scale private Investors accounted for the 
increased petty bourgeois character of the state. 
Yet, despite the 'prosperity' and the expansion of the benefiting social classes 
and groups, there has been a remarkable increase in the proportion of those at 
the margins of society in both rural and urban areas, whose living standards 
and incomes have been deteriorating. The policies of the state in agriculture 
have been directly responsible for declining incomes in rural areas, since they 
have focused on large capital intensive farming, leaving the farming community 
to fend for itself under an increasingly unfavourable situation. Moreover, the 
state has made heavy investments in the mining sector, diverting scarce 
resources to inefficient economic enterprises, while keeping small domestic 
investors deprived of the needed funds as well as at a disadvantage due to the 
state's open import policy favouring the commercial bourgeoisie. The 
expansion in the employment of foreign labour, who have been willing to take 
wages much lower than domestic labour, has on the one hand relieved the 
state from the pressures of an expanding domestic working class and, on the 
other, has jeopardised the wage scale of domestic labour, and hence directly 
influenced their living standards. Beneath the surface of prosperity and 
stability, tensions, social discontent and resentments were mounting and the 
society's polarisation intensified between a small rich stratum and the wider 
segments of the population who were unable to benefit or improve their lot. 
Thus, the challenge of this study to the assumption that the state acts for the 
general interests of society lies precisely in this fact. The boom era resulted, in 
spite the abundance of financial resources and the expansion of state's 
'developmental' role, in an increased marginalisation of the bulk of the 
population and increased differentiation in income and living standards. One 
can easily argue that Jordan has actually thwarted a unique chance to create a 
development that caters towards the needs of the larger segment of the 
population and a more sustainable development by creating conditions 
whereby the society could have became less dependent on foreign goods and 
commodities and external funds for its livelihood. But this would have 
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conflicted with the interests of the ruling class as well as with its strategic-
political role on which the abundance of external capital has been predicated. 
Moreover, although this abundance proved instrumental in creating the 
'prosperity' of this period and the increased legitimacy of the Jordanian ruling 
class, significantly it was a temporary prosperity. The decline in the regional oil 
economy and the subsequent reduction in the available financial resources to 
the state and the reduction in remitted income, due to declining demand on 
Jordanian labour underpinned the economic crisis of Jordan which has been in 
the making since 1983, but whose final manifestation occurred only in 1989 
with the plummeting of the value of the dinar and the intervention of the IMF 
and its imposition of a programme of structural adjustment policies. This 
meant that all social layers of the society came under economic pressure but 
with varying degrees. The most affected were the salaried stratum and those 
dependent on state employment, in addition to the social groups that were 
already marginalised during the 1970's, not to mention the small investors 
across a wide range of economic activities. The propertied class and the state 
bourgeoisie were affected too but not in the same degree since they can rely 
on the diversity of their sources of income and their accumulated funds. 
Significantly this crisis in the state sector itself and in the economy in general 
not only called into question the effectiveness of state-sponsored development 
and exposed the need to critically analysis the boom era and understand 
state's role and its limitation, it also called into question the ability of the state to 
continue its political domination and its authoritarian political system. Ironically 
during the boom era the state's control over the society was further entrenched 
especially through the increased power of the Mukhabarat to intervene in the 
private domain and the individual sphere and the continued concentration of 
power in the executive especially the king. This coupled with a very low level 
of tolerance of opposition and a tight control over the potential channels for 
political expression succeeded in marginalising political action in spite of the 
rife political climate due to the domestic economic situation - widening income 
gaps and rising cost of living - and to regional events such as the camp David, 
the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Thus the 
dominance of the state's political structures and state's reluctance to relinquish 
its authoritarian grip over society was unchanged and continued unabated. 
Even until 1988 the government was able to carry out a concentrated attack on 
newspapers, journalists, the Jordanian Writers Association and professional 
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associations in an attempt to silence political voices especially in light of 
increased criticisms concerning the deterioration of the economic situation as 
well as the enthusiasm that the Palestinian 'intifada' evoked. But significantly, 
in less than a year, precipitated by the riots in the southern part of the country 
against the economic hardship and the IMF structural policies, the government 
was at the forefront of a process of political 'liberalisation' and 
'democratisation'. Thus the domestic economic situation, coupled with the 
changes on the Palestinian front due to the eruption of the 'intifada' and 
Jordan's subsequent disengagement policy, dramatically changed the 
framework of the government and accelerated the response to demands being 
voiced throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The process of 'democratisation', 
although offering on the one hand a unique chance for change, is beset by 
immense difficulties. 
The first of these is the structural limitation of the process, since the aim (as 
attested by the cosmetic changes seen in the first four years of the experience, 
1989-1993, and considering the manifested ability of the ruling class to 
manipulate the process) is not to create new forms of legitimacy and to 
reorganise state power, but to provide a semblance of democracy to protect 
the existing power structures. Secondly, the opposition movement in Jordan, in 
Its wider frame, has been marginalised for a long time. Hence its ability to 
capture the moment is very doubtful, considering also the increased 
fragmentation of society and the persistence of conflicts expressing themselves 
not on basis of economic or class interests but traditional affiliations, in addition 
to the rise of the Islamic trend as the most viable part of the opposition. 
Although one must point to the fact that, since the 1989 elections and the 
landslide victory of the candidates of the Islamic trend, they have been losing 
grounds, since people can see the limitation of their programme and their 
inability to effect any changes. Thirdly is the constraint on the process due to 
the prevalent international environment with the United States becoming the 
sole dominating international power, making the region much more vulnerable 
and the chances for a progressive or nationalistic movement to emerge 
dramatically reduced. The Gulf war was an example of the potential danger 
attached to America's 'new world order' and to any challenge to the status quo 
and Western domination. The final and most significant factor is the economic 
situation and how the structural adjustment policies, in addition to the peace 
process will effect the bulk of the population and reorient the economy. Thus 
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the challenge for both sides is great; for the ruling class it is to maintain 
legitimacy, and for the opposition it is to take the chance open to it. But one 
must note that if, during the boom era the Jordanian society was so restricted 
in terms of expressing itself, the 1990s with their immense economic problems 
will undoubtedly bring further constraints on the manner in which the society 
expresses itself, this time under the semblance of democracy. 
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